Alfred von Waldersee, monarchist:  his private life, public image, and the limits of his ambition, 1882-1891 by Trosclair, Wade James
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2012
Alfred von Waldersee, monarchist: his private life,
public image, and the limits of his ambition,
1882-1891
Wade James Trosclair
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Trosclair, Wade James, "Alfred von Waldersee, monarchist: his private life, public image, and the limits of his ambition, 1882-1891"





ALFRED VON WALDERSEE, MONARCHIST: 












Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 



















	   ii 
Acknowledgements 
 
 In late autumn 2010, while browsing through the shelves of Louisiana State University’s 
Middleton Library in search of a Master’s thesis topic, I stumbled across the three-volume 
memoirs of Count Alfred von Waldersee.  At that time, I could not fathom the year-and-a-half 
long journey that would culminate with the completion of this thesis.  Since this endeavor began, 
I have come to think about history in different ways; I became a better writer and researcher; I 
traveled to places I had never been before; I learned and experienced new things; and I 
reexamined, questioned, and revised the traditional depictions of Alfred and Mary von 
Waldersee.  All of these things would have been impossible without the assistance of a number 
of individuals and institutions. 
 I would first like to thank my family and friends for their support and for tolerating my 
many absences over the course of the past year.  In particular, I want to acknowledge my friends 
and colleagues Scott Berg, Paige Bowers, and Jason Wolfe, who have been invaluable in helping 
me throughout this process with their encouragement, advice, and friendship.  I also would like 
to thank my friends Ben Bourgeois, who has been my ever-patient tech support, and Beau 
Wheeler, who, through our conversations as we explored the Hohenzollern palaces in Potsdam, 
heard and helped me form the beginnings of my new interpretation of Alfred von Waldersee. 
 The richness in detail and the overall argument of this project would have simply been 
impossible without the generosity of two individuals.  First, I want to thank my paternal 
grandmother, Dorothy “Maw-Maw” Trosclair, for the funding that allowed me to gain the 
invaluable experience of researching in a European archive and to be able to see and feel 
Waldersee’s original journals among other wonderful and interesting documents.  Second, I must 
	   iii 
express my immense gratitude to Dr. Alison Frank, Assistant Professor of History at Harvard 
University, who graciously allowed a total stranger to occupy her house for a week and a half 
while doing her own research in Europe.  The archival material I examined during my time in 
Cambridge was extremely fascinating and instrumental for this project.  Not only did the things I 
see and read encourage my questions and thoughts about Alfred von Waldersee, but they also 
increased incalculably my love of historical research and the nineteenth century. 
 Because archival research has played a large role in this undertaking, I would like to 
express my appreciation to the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, 
Germany for allowing me to access the Waldersee Papers and the staff of Houghton Library at 
Harvard University for their assistance as I journeyed through the many volumes of the Von 
Waldersee-Lee Collection.  I would like to thank Dr. Victor Stater and the Louisiana State 
University Department of History for their financial support for my research trips and for a 
teaching assistantship, which, among other things, allowed me to spend more time and energy on 
my thesis.  LSU’s Interlibrary Loan Department has been incredibly helpful in obtaining 
essential books throughout this process.  As teachers and members of my committee, Drs. David 
Lindenfeld and Benjamin Martin have in their own ways helped and encouraged me in the 
development of my thinking about history and my thesis project. 
 Last and certainly not least, I must thank – though I never will be able to enough – Dr. 
Suzanne Marchand, my mentor and thesis advisor, for her patience, encouragement, guidance, 
and support throughout my time at Louisiana State University.  Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, 
“Become who you are”; Dr. Marchand helped me make that possible. 
	   iv 





Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii 
 
List of Images ................................................................................................................................. v 
 
Abstract  ......................................................................................................................................... vi 
 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
 
Part I: Suaviter in Modo, Fortiter in Re, 1882-1887 ..................................................................... 13 
 God Bless this Happy Pair ................................................................................................ 16 
 Talk and Tables ................................................................................................................. 28 
 Ultima Ratio ...................................................................................................................... 39 
 The Father Who Art in Herwarthstrasse 2 ........................................................................ 80 
 Christian Philanthropy and Anti-Semitism  .................................................................... 103 
 
Part II: A Transformational Time, 1888-1891 ............................................................................ 119 
 The Stoecker Affair ......................................................................................................... 127 
 The Coming Man? .......................................................................................................... 136 
 The American Egeria? .................................................................................................... 153 
 The Monarchist and the Changing Monarchy ................................................................ 165 
 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 201 
 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 210 
 
Vita .............................................................................................................................................. 214 
	   v 
List of Images 
 
1. Berlin, around 1900 .................................................................................................................... 2 
 
2. Berlin, July 5, 2011 ..................................................................................................................... 2 
 
3. Alfred and Mary von Waldersee in 1899 ..................................................................................18  
 
4. Floor plan of the Military Staff Building  ................................................................................. 20 
 
5. The southeast corner of the Military Staff Building ................................................................. 21 
  
6. Waldersee as Quartermaster-General ....................................................................................... 44 
 
7. The four main Russian armies according to the 1880 Redeployment Plan .............................. 78 
 
8. Their Majesties and Waldersee in the courtyard of the Military Staff Building .................... 126  
 
9. Postcard commemorating Waldersee and the China Expedition ............................................ 202 
  
10. Trade Card for Ogden’s Cigarettes ....................................................................................... 203 
 
11. Trade Card for Claus & Schweder Soap ............................................................................... 203 
 
12. Cigar Band ............................................................................................................................ 203 
  
13. Postcard commemorating Waldersee’s death in 1904 .......................................................... 206 
  
14. Photograph of Waldersee taken for his 70th birthday in 1902 .............................................. 207  
 
 	  	  
	   vi 
Abstract 
  
 In the decades following the Second World War, historians writing about militarism and 
politics during the German Empire have often mentioned Count Alfred von Waldersee (1832-
1904), the army’s Quartermaster-General (1882-1888) then Chief of the General Staff (1888-
1891), portraying him as a stereotypical warmongering Prussian political general who sought to 
enhance his own influence, especially by aspiring to the chancellorship.  They have typically 
viewed Alfred von Waldersee within the contexts of civil versus military relations and the era 
and entourage of Wilhelm II (r. 1888-1918), but these frameworks do not help accurately explain 
the man, his motivations, how he saw himself, and his relationship to power.   
 Using archival material that has never before been utilized judiciously and extensively by 
a professional historian, this study seeks to question, reevaluate, and revise the traditional 
interpretation of Waldersee by analyzing his private life, public image, and the limits of his 
ambition.  This thesis argues that Alfred von Waldersee needs to be understood as a man formed 
by his experiences in the age of Wilhelm I; this was the era in which his opinions about domestic 
and international affairs solidified and he became a political partisan in Berlin.  He was a 
monarchist, but one whose conception of the Prusso-German monarchy was based on the rule of 
Wilhelm I, his friend and ideal sovereign.  In his actions throughout the 1880s, Waldersee sought 
to defend the traditional power of the Kaiser against what he considered the sovereign’s enemies: 
threatening foreign powers, constitutionalism, democracy, socialism, Jews, and Catholics.  This 
project also focuses on his relationship with his American-born wife, his anti-Semitism, his 
views on preventive war, and his relationship with the press.     
	   vii 
 During his life, but especially from 1882 to 1891, Waldersee did not aspire to gain 
political power for himself; he never wanted to become Chancellor.  As an intimate and aide-de-
camp to the Kaisers, Waldersee did not operate outside the convoluted power structure of the 
German Empire.  In the colorful, modernizing Europe of the late nineteenth century, Waldersee 
saw the world in black and white and represented one of the last gasps of an earlier age. 
 	   1 
Introduction 
 
 At dawn on April 29, 1945, Soviet troops crossed the Moltke Bridge near the heart of 
Berlin.  Their objective was the Reichstag, but in their struggle to secure this bridge over the 
Spree River, which German troops had failed to destroy completely, they stormed the nearby 
building of the Ministry of the Interior.  Within the halls, offices, and chambers of this massive 
complex, the remnants of Hitler’s army attempted to hold back the “Red Horde” from the east.  
The death, destruction, and hell of war entered the very rooms, where in the 1880s, Count Alfred 
von Waldersee, the Quartermaster-General then Chief of Staff of the Imperial German army, had 
lived and worked, planning and preparing to defend the Fatherland against its enemies – 
especially, and ironically, the Russians and Socialists.   
 In the late nineteenth century, Berlin was a bustling and budding metropolis of the new, 
formidable German Empire, and the Military Staff Building was – unlike in 1945 – in a peaceful 
and picturesque area of the capital.  By the end of the 1880s, Waldersee detested and opposed the 
powerful Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, forming just one episode in the history of civil and 
military relations in Imperial Germany.  In a quite fitting, though perhaps unintentional, symbol 
of the ultimate victory of civilian-led government over military influence, in 2001 the Office of 
the Chancellery of the Federal Republic of Germany opened in Berlin on the former site of the 
Military Staff Building.  Walking across the Moltke Bridge today, in a city that has experienced 
such great physical transformations, one can barely sense the horrific nightmare that engulfed 
this area in the final days of the Third Reich, much less the imperial grandeur, which emanated 
from this district during the time of Alfred von Waldersee. 
 























Image 1: Berlin, around 1900.  The Moltke Bridge in foreground with the Military 
Staff Building center-right.  In the background, the Reichstag is to the left, and the 
Victory column is behind the Military Staff Building.  
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moltkebrücke 
  
Image 2: Berlin, July 5, 2011.  The Moltke Bridge with the Reichstag in the 
distance and the Office of the Chancellor, the former site of the Military Staff 
Building, on the right.  Photograph taken by the author. 
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 In 1832, Frederick William III ruled the Kingdom of Prussia.  His 35 year-old son, who 
would one day be crowned Kaiser Wilhelm I, had become a father the previous year to the future 
Kaiser Frederick III.  At 17 years old, Otto von Bismarck began studying law at the University of 
Göttingen in 1832, one of the first steps in his illustrious career.  That same year, a 31 year-old 
Helmuth von Moltke was about to be promoted to the Prussian army’s General Staff, which he 
would one day famously head.  On April 8, 1832, Alfred von Waldersee was born in Potsdam 
into an aristocratic Prussian military family, and his name would also become known throughout 
the German Empire, Europe, and the world.1  Following in his father’s footsteps, he would join 
the Prussian army, become an officer, and rise through the ranks, serving as a staff officer in the 
Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71).  Most famously, he would 
become a Chief of the German General Staff (1888-1891), a Field Marshal (1900), and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Eight-Nation Alliance, which suppressed the Boxer Rebellion in 
China (1900-01).   
 These positions are certainly noteworthy, but Alfred von Waldersee did not receive 
military fame and glory.  His predecessor, Helmuth von Moltke, and his successor, Alfred von 
Schlieffen, have overshadowed his short tenure as head of the General Staff.  By the time he 
arrived in Asia in September 1900, major military action had already ended.  Beginning in 1887, 
Waldersee would become known more for his influence in politics than in military affairs.  This 
trend would continue in twentieth-century historiography.  In 1922-1923, the archivist Heinrich 
Otto Meisner published his three-volume Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred 
Grafen von Waldersee, which Frederic Whyte would heavily abridge and translate into English 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 His father – Franz Heinrich (1791-1873) – commanded the 5th Army Corps and was later the 
military governor of Berlin (1864-1870).  His mother had been a lady-in-waiting to the Duchess 
of Cumberland and died in 1859.  His maternal grandfather was General Lieutenant Baron von 
Hünerbein, a friend of the popular Queen Louise, who had died in 1810.   
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in 1924.2  These books are not traditional memoirs because they are largely composed of 
Waldersee’s letters, memoranda, and journal entries.  Although Meisner uses his subject’s 
different military positions as the organizational basis for his work, politics – both domestic and 
international – and court affairs are the dominant themes of Waldersee’s writings and thus of 
Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten.  In 1928, Meisner published letters from Waldersee’s military 
correspondence in his book titled, Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred 
Grafen von Waldersee, 1886-91.  The next year, Hans Mohs published military documents from 
Waldersee’s life in his two-volume work, General-Feldmarschall Alfred Graf von Waldersee in 
seinem militärischen Wirken (1929).   
 In 1935, Wolfgang Fornaschon wrote the only scholarly book exclusively about 
Waldersee.  In his Die Politischen Anschauungen des Grafen Alfred von Waldersee und seine 
Stellungnahme zur deutschen Politik (The Political Views of Count Alfred von Waldersee and his 
Response to German Politics), the author analyzes Waldersee’s political views and his role in 
political affairs from 1891 until 1900.  “The conclusions [Fornaschon] arrives at are neither new 
nor original,” writes Ian Morrow in a 1936 review, “Thus he finds that Waldersee was not 
endowed with political gifts, but was the victim of his own insatiable desire for political power.”3  
Although references to Fornaschon’s work in later publications have been rare, the multi-volume 
works edited by Meisner and Mohs have formed the basis for understanding Waldersee in the 
later twentieth century. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Frederic Whyte, A Field-Marshal’s Memoirs: From the Diary, Correspondence, and 
Reminiscences of Alfred, Count von Waldersee, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924). 
3 Ian Morrow, Review of Wolfgang Fornaschon’s Die Politischen Anschauungen des Grafen 
Alfred von Waldersee und seine Stellungnahme zur deutschen Politik, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 15, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1936): 925. 
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 In the first decades after the Second World War, three books and their authors have been 
important to the understanding of Waldersee in recent historiography: Walter Goerlitz’s History 
of the German General Staff, 1657-1945 (1954), Gordon Craig’s The Politics of the Prussian 
Army, 1640-1945 (1955), and Martin Kitchen’s The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914 (1968).  
These books have helped form and promote what I will refer to as the traditional interpretation of 
Alfred von Waldersee.  Taken together, they portray him as an intriguer at court who sought to 
enhance his own power, an ambitious political general who aspired to become Chancellor, and 
an irrational, simple-minded, and reckless warmonger.  These three basic tenets, which 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s, have appeared largely intact ever since in biographies and 
books concerning the politics of Otto von Bismarck about Wilhelm II. 
 Perhaps no one has sought to reevaluate the traditional interpretation because it can 
conveniently serve arguments about the Iron Chancellor’s capability to maintain peace and the 
last Kaiser’s desire to assert his authority.  The most recent publication that upholds the 
traditional interpretation is Annika Mombauer’s 2004 work on Wilhelm II and Waldersee during 
the Boxer Rebellion (1900-01).  “Waldersee had once before been aiming to become 
Chancellor,” she writes, referring to the late 1880s, and later noting, that “his long-standing 
dream of becoming Chancellor was never fulfilled.”4 
 This thesis is a significant departure from twentieth-century historiography about 
Waldersee in terms of its focus, approach, and sources.  Fornaschon was concerned largely with 
Waldersee’s political ideas and political role in the 1890s, but I will explore Waldersee’s career 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Annika Mombauer, “Wilhelm, Waldersee, and the Boxer Rebellion,” The Kaiser: New 
Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, eds. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 111 & 115.  In the most recent biography of 
Otto von Bismarck, the author hardly discusses Waldersee, but calls him a “full-time intriguer” 
and a “political general.”  Jonathan Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 425 & 428. 
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in the 1880s, when he became part of the elite in Berlin and when he transformed into a 
politically-motivated individual.  In contrast to Kitchen, I will provide a more detailed and 
thorough examination of Waldersee’s life and the development of his views from 1882 through 
1891.5  Unlike virtually every historian who has to some extent written about or mentioned 
Waldersee, I shall look beyond the conventional image of an ambitious political general and seek 
to uncover, illuminate, and understand him as a human being, one whose life illuminates 
important aspects of the early decades of the German Empire.  Although my focus on 
Waldersee’s private life and the development of his opinions will give this thesis the feel of a 
biography, each section centers on an important issue or relationship in his experience in Berlin, 
and at the core of most sections is an argument against the traditional interpretation of Waldersee. 
 This thesis is divided into two parts, and though each has its own detailed introduction 
and explanation of the major themes and arguments covered, the following is a brief overview of 
the content of this thesis.  Specific issues in historiography will be addressed in each section. 
 In Part I, “Suaviter in Modo, Fortiter in Re, 1882-1887,” I emphasize the exclusive, 
private world of the elite, in which Waldersee lived and became politically active.  The social 
and political elite were one and the same, and thus I highlight the role social events and casual 
dealings played in political relationships and official interactions.  Although social activities – 
both formal and informal – played an important role throughout Waldersee’s life, I illustrate his 
participation in the capital’s social life in the section “Talk and Tables.”  Waldersee’s 
relationships with certain individuals who play significant roles in the late 1880s frame the other 
sections of Part I.  In “God Bless this Happy Pair,” I illuminate his relationship with his wife, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Using a chapter of his book on the German officer corps, Kitchen made an honest yet timid 
attempt to explain Waldersee thoroughly, but he arrived at the same conclusion that Goerlitz and 
Craig did.  Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968), 64-95. 
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Mary, and her life during this period.  “Ultima Ratio” focuses on Waldersee’s relationship with 
Otto von Bismarck, especially concerning the issues of foreign policy and war.  The 
development of his relationship with Prince William of Hohenzollern, the future Wilhelm II, is 
described and explained in “The Father who art in Herwarthstrasse 2.”  Lastly, Waldersee’s 
connection with the controversial Adolf Stoecker is a central concern in the final section, 
“Christian Philanthropy and Anti-Semitism.”   
 In Part II, “A Transformational Time, 1888-1891,” I emphasize the clash of Waldersee’s 
private life with the creation of his public image through the press.  The relationships he formed, 
the beliefs he held, and the actions he committed in the exclusive world of the elite from 1882 to 
1887 would have public, political implications from 1888 to 1891.  In the first section, simply 
titled, “The Stoecker Affair,” I show how this event became a turning point for Waldersee, 
especially by thrusting him into the limelight.  The next section, “The Coming Man?” deals 
specifically with his public image in the press and the extent of his political ambitions.  “The 
American Egeria?” focuses on the depiction of Mary von Waldersee in American and European 
newspapers and on her rumored political intriguing.  The last section, “The Monarchist and the 
Changing Monarchy,” will explore Waldersee’s last years in Berlin, his relationship with 
Wilhelm II, and his conception of the monarchy. 
 At its most fundamental level, this thesis seeks to answer a simple question: Who was 
Alfred von Waldersee?  As mentioned above, historians have considered him within the contexts 
of civil versus military relations and the entourage and era of Wilhelm II, but these frameworks 
do not sufficiently help make sense of Waldersee.  According to German historian Fritz Hartung 
in his 1924 review of Meisner’s work, the most important part of the Denkwürdigkeiten is 1882-
1891, when Waldersee “observed and attempted to influence events in Berlin from the closest 
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proximity.”  “It is initially still the time of the old Kaiser [Wilhelm I] into which Waldersee leads 
us, but the new generation already stands waiting at the door,” he notes.6  Hartung’s observation 
points to something that historians have failed to consider earnestly: Waldersee, who was in his 
50s during this period, was a member of Wilhelm I’s entourage before he ever met the future 
Wilhelm II.  I argue therefore that Waldersee needs to be analyzed and understood within the 
context of Wilhelm I’s reign, during which his Weltanschauung – his ideas about domestic and 
international politics – became firmly established.    
 One could call Waldersee a number of different things – as historians have – but by 
looking at his basic beliefs, the way he saw himself, and the motivations behind his actions, I 
believe he should be called first and foremost a monarchist, but one whose conception of the 
Prusso-German monarchy was based on his experience of the rule of Wilhelm I, his friend and 
ideal sovereign.  
 The reader of this thesis should keep in mind that the diffusion of the monarch’s power at 
court, in the government, and in the military was not always clear-cut and neatly organized.  
Beginning in the late seventeenth century, the ruler of Prussia had rewarded the nobility’s loyalty 
to the crown through privileges and honors, such as a monopoly over high-ranking positions in 
the army.  By the nineteenth century, the military and the aristocracy provided the bulwark of the 
monarch’s traditional absolutist power against the tides of constitutionalism and democracy.  
Despite advances in establishing a parliamentary form of government, ultimate power remained 
in the person of the Prussian king and later German Emperor, who determined how to exercise 
his power, especially in the personal and political relationships with his subordinates.  This 
power structure meant that individuals or groups clamored for the monarch’s favor, resulting in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Fritz Hartung, Review of Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred 
Grafen von Waldersee, Historische Zeitschrift, Bd. 130, H. 3 (1924): 519-522. 
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system of fluid political relationships, especially among the people closest to the monarch.  
Although I will often refer to Waldersee in terms of his office, his direct relationship to the 
sovereign was more important at court and in high society.  On his calling cards, the title of his 
association to the monarch is printed before the name of his position in the military 
establishment; royal invitations to events at the palace were addressed to His Majesty’s Adjutant 
General (aide-de-camp), not the Quartermaster-General of the army’s General Staff.7   
 In May 1870, King Wilhelm I of Prussia made Waldersee one of his personal assistants, a 
Flügeladjutant.  When the Franco-Prussian War began that summer, Waldersee wrote in his 
journal that he “would have the fortune to take part in the war as a immediate attendant to this 
excellent master.”8  According to Das Buch vom Deutschen Heere (1891), a Flügeladjutant was 
in an “extraordinary position of trust,” which not only required “extensive military knowledge 
and ability,” but also “excellent skill in the mastery of all social manners.”9  The monarch 
formed personal relationships with these men, whom he could also name Generals à la Suite or 
Adjutants General – as Waldersee was in 1880 and 1885, respectively – “even though [they] 
have taken a position in active military service.”10  In order to understand Waldersee, 
recognizing the importance of his relationship with Wilhelm I is essential.  As he wrote after 
leaving the palace in 1873, “A better and kinder master I will never have again; how I must 
thank him for everything!”11  There is no specific section in this thesis about Waldersee’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Calling cards & invitations, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volumes 13 & 17. 
8 Alfred von Waldersee, July 21, 1870, Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred 
Grafen von Waldersee, ed. Heinrich Otto Meisner, Volume I, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), 
83.  
9 Herrmann Vogt, Das Buch vom Deutschen Heere, (Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen & Klasing, 
1891), 21. 
10 Vogt, Das Buch vom Deutschen Heere, 22.  
11 Waldersee, December 17, 1873, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 170-171. 
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relationship to Wilhelm I, instead it will appear like a Wagnerian leitmotif throughout this thesis 
just as it played a significant role during Waldersee’s life in the 1880s. 
 I have used a number of different sources in crafting this thesis, but some play a larger 
role than others.  Waldersee’s published writings provide an important basis for this work, but 
Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten are, as John Röhl calls them, “scandalously expurgated.”12  In his 
research for his massive biography of Wilhelm II, Röhl is a rarity among the historians who have 
written about Waldersee because he has thoroughly read and utilized the general’s original 
journals.13  Despite his view on Meisner’s editing, the unpublished entries that Röhl incorporates 
into his work do not necessarily contradict the published ones, and they have been helpful for my 
own interpretation of Waldersee.    
 This Master’s thesis also utilizes unpublished, archival material from the Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv and from Harvard University’s Houghton Library.14  During my short time looking 
at the Waldersee Papers (Nachlass Waldersee) in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in Berlin, Germany, 
I was mainly interested in newspaper articles about Waldersee because the press played an 
important role in his life, and – unlike American, British, and French newspapers – the major 
German newspapers of the nineteenth century do not have online archives.  At Harvard 
University’s Houghton Library in Cambridge, Massachusetts I examined the Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, which contains primarily letters and memorabilia that Waldersee’s widowed mother-
in-law, Mrs. Anne Lee, wrote, collected, and sent to her cousin in Connecticut for decades.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 John Röhl, Wilhelm II: The Kaiser’s Personal Monarchy, 1888-1900, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), xix. 
13 I have seen and touched Waldersee’s journals myself at the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, but I did 
not have the time and resources to attempt to dive into them and to dissect his handwriting while 
researching in Berlin in July 2011. 
14 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, VI. HA Familienarchive und Nachlässe, N1 
Alfred von Waldersee Rep. 92.  Houghton Library, Harvard University, Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, MS AM 994.PF. 
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collection formed the basis of a 1962 book about Mary von Waldersee written by an amateur 
historian whose shameful distortion of her is made worse by the fact that he does not properly 
cite his evidence.15  Therefore, I am the first person to utilize in a responsible, extensive, and 
professional way the material in the Von Waldersee-Lee Collection.  Mrs. Lee’s letters about, 
and objects from, everyday life inside and outside the Military Staff Building have been 
invaluable to understanding the Waldersees.   
 In the interests of time and length, I have not been able to cover everything about 
Waldersee from 1882 through 1891.  The reader will not find in-depth discussions about his 
military life, his influence in German strategic thinking and planning, or his relationships with 
others in the military establishment, such as the War Ministers, Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf 
and Julius von Verdy du Vernois and the Chiefs of the Military Cabinet, Emil von Albedyll and 
Wilhelm von Hahnke.  I also have not extensively explored Waldersee’s relationships with 
civilians, from newspaper editors and leaders of political parties to members of the court and 
royal government, such as Friedrich von Holstein and Philipp zu Eulenburg.  I discuss and 
incorporate Mary von Waldersee in this work, but I do not go into detail about her specific 
philanthropic activities.  She kept diaries, but their location is unknown if they exist today.  
According to her niece, who wrote a book about Mary that is heavily couched in religious 
language, she did not want her private diaries to become public.16   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Alson J Smith, A View of the Spree: The extraordinary career of the American grocer’s 
daughter who became a ‘sanctified Pompadour’ to Germany’s last Kaiser, (New York: The John 
Day Company, 1962). 
16 Countess Elisabeth Waldersee, Von Klarheit zu Klarheit!  (Stuttgart: Buchhandlung des 
Deutschen Philadelphia-Vereins, 1915). Anna Katterfeld, Unseres Herrgotts Schatzmeisterein: 
Ein Lebensbild der Gräfin Marie Esther von Waldersee, (Berlin: Acker-Verlag, 1931).  Because 
Von Klarheit zu Klarheit! went out of print, this small book was written with the Countess’s 
permission and is similar to her book in its style, bias, and lack of citations. 
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 Although this thesis project may be complete, by no means do I consider it the final word 
about Alfred von Waldersee.  More research needs to be done to gain an even better 
understanding of this man, his world, and the numerous issues upon which his life touches.  I 
hope that the story I tell and the arguments I advance in these pages may become the foundation 
of a more comprehensive work in the future. 
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Part I: Suaviter in Modo, Fortiter in Re, 1882-1887 
 
 On January 2, 1882, The Times of London reported that through a cabinet order of 
December 27, Kaiser Wilhelm I had appointed Count Alfred von Waldersee the Quartermaster-
General of the army’s General Staff.  In this newly-created position, Waldersee would be the 
assistant to – and the presumptive successor of – the great strategist and Chief of Staff Helmuth 
von Moltke.  After noting the importance of this day for Prussian military history and providing 
a short biography of the man who was then Chief of Staff of the 10th Army Corps in Hanover, 
the correspondent stated the following: 
 The Count comes to Berlin with a reputation for other recommendable qualities besides 
 great accomplishments in all the principles and details of his profession.  He is a man of 
 tall and most distinguished military presence and polished manners, combining a high 
 degree the suaviter in modo with the fortiter in re1 – an attainment which is by no means 
 common in Prussia in any sphere of life whatever, especially in army circles.  In fact, in 
 addition to being an illustrious soldier, Count Waldersee is also a brilliant courtier – an 
 impression which General Roberts and his critical colleagues from England did not fail to 
 carry away with them from Hanover, when last autumn they attended the maneuvers of 
 the 10th Army Corps and were objects of so much hospitable attention from the chief of 
 its staff.2 
 
Stepping off the train in Berlin, Waldersee began a new, eventful chapter of his life, bringing his 
military and social talents with him.   
 From 1882 to 1887, Alfred von Waldersee established himself in the social life, court, 
and politics of the German capital.  He entered the exclusive world of the empire’s elite suaviter 
in modo – gentle in manner – but he did more than just become a well-dressed member of the 
Kaiser’s entourage and an aristocratic socialite.  In the halls and offices of government buildings, 
he acted fortiter in re – strong in deed – through his advocacy and enactment of policies and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 gentle in manner . . . strong in deed 
2 The Times of London, January 2, 1882, http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive. 
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through his forging and fostering of relationships.  By the end of 1887, Waldersee was on the 
threshold of a new era in his life, one which would be determined by the issues he concerned 
himself with and the relationships he formed before 1888.  In order to reevaluate the traditional 
interpretation of Alfred von Waldersee, Part I focuses on the important relationships and issues 
during the first half of his time in Berlin. 
 In “God Bless this Happy Pair,” I examine Alfred von Waldersee’s marriage to the 
American Mary Lee – his most consistent, stable, and happiest relationship.  I also discuss 
Mary’s beliefs and her relationship to her husband and German high society.  In “Talk and 
Tables,” I illustrate the Waldersees’ social life in Berlin.  Among the elite, there was a blurry line 
between a policymaker’s private and political life; the social life of the upper class provided 
places of exchange, where one formed opinions, spread gossip, shared information, and 
developed personal and political relationships.  Understanding this exclusive world helps 
illuminate how Alfred von Waldersee related to other officials and aristocrats and provides the 
backdrop for his political actions and relationships. 
 Apart from his marriage with Mary, Waldersee’s three most important relationships in 
1882-1887 each connect to a questionable claim that has been made about him in historiography.  
In “Ultima Ratio,” I argue that Waldersee should not be casually labeled with the pejorative term 
“warmonger” by illuminating the evolution of Waldersee’s view on foreign affairs and the 
methodical development of his advocacy for preventive war.  His differences in foreign policy 
with Bismarck did not break their amicable relationship, but the Chancellor became concerned 
about Waldersee’s relationship with Prince Wilhelm, the future Wilhelm II.  In “The Father who 
art in Herwarthstrasse 2,” I argue that Waldersee did not attempt to form a relationship with the 
prince in order to use him for his own ambitions.  Instead, Prince Wilhelm found a friend and 
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father-figure in Waldersee, who saw in the prince a strong Kaiser for the future of the German 
Empire.  In 1887, Waldersee encouraged Prince Wilhelm to support the City Mission, an 
institution in Berlin devoted to aiding the poor and working class while turning them away from 
godless, democratic socialism and toward Christianity and monarchism.  This organization had 
been established by Adolf Stoecker, the founder of the Christian Social Party and of a new kind 
of anti-Semitism.  This fact caused Bismarck and the liberal parties great anxiety.  In “Christian 
Philanthropy and Anti-Semitism,” I clarify Waldersee’s early relationship with Stoecker and 
argue that even though he was an anti-Semite, Waldersee’s motivation for becoming involved 
with the City Mission was his belief in promoting and defending the Christian, Prusso-German 
monarchy.  
 The one theme that runs through these relationships is Waldersee’s monarchism; his 
overriding desire to defend and promote the power, sovereignty, and lands of the Hohenzollerns 
was so simplistic and passionate that it may seem exaggerated.  This principle was, however, the 
basic motivation for his actions.  On a political level, he was a Protestant noble – a Count – and a 
Prussian officer, unwavering and selfless for his warrior-king.  On a personal level, he was a 
friend and aide-de-camp to Kaiser Wilhelm I, with whom he socialized at hunts, dinners, and tea 
parties.   
 Through the relationships Waldersee made or nurtured and the issues that concerned him 
from 1882 to 1887, we can perceive not only the combination of volatility, constancy, 
anxiousness, and gracefulness among the German elite in the last years of Wilhelm I’s reign, but 
also gain a better understanding of Waldersee himself.  In his efforts to promote and defend the 
monarchy of Wilhelm I against the threats of a rapidly evolving and unstable world, Waldersee 
became an active partisan in the political intrigue of the capital.  Drawn by the attractions of 
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certain individuals, he would continue to be a star on the rise, though always remaining loyally in 
the Kaiser’s orbit. 
  
God Bless this Happy Pair 
 
 On February 18, 1874, Mrs. Anne Lee, the widow of a New York merchant, was staying 
at her daughter Josie’s estate of Lautenbach in southwest Germany.  She penned a letter to her 
cousin in Connecticut to announce the engagement of Mary, her youngest daughter and the 
widow of the Danish Prince of Noer, to Count Alfred von Waldersee, a colonel, aide-de-camp to 
Wilhelm I, and Chief of Staff for the army corps in Hanover under the command of Prince 
Albrecht of Prussia, the Kaiser’s nephew: 
 Mary met him for the first time at a neighboring château where he was visiting mutual 
 friends the past autumn.  By his own saying he was greatly impressed by Mary at  that 
 time – it was at a dinner there to which we were all invited – and finding his heart on the 
 verge of departure, if not gone, he lost no time in cultivating the acquaintance in every 
 available way.  He came several times to Lautenbach and finally professed himself 
 exceedingly attached to Mary.  She would not give encouragement – as she said she 
 could not without knowing more of his inner feelings – as she would never sacrifice her 
 principle or heart to marry again – but was certainly much pleased with the Count.  So 
 time wore on ‘til the attachment became mutual and the betrothal took place in December 
 [1873] . . . he seems to be esteemed wherever he is known and his intimate friends are 
 loud in his praise . . . I believe that God sent him to be a loving companion and to cheer 
 the heart of my dear child – and in consequence that their union will be blessed with 
 happiness . . . He is very fond of hunting and brought with him a deer and hares – so we 
 feasted.  I will tell you that he is a favorite aide-de-camp of the Emperor – [and] when the 
 Count went as German etiquette required to ask his sovereign’s assent to his marriage, he 
 reported his Majesty as being much pleased, giving it freely, laughingly saying, “Ah I 
 find you have been hunting in Württemberg!” and sending his congratulations to Mary.3 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, February 18, 1874, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
Mary’s first husband, the much older Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein-Noer, died eight 
months after their marriage in 1864 while touring through the Holy Land.  
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 On the long-awaited wedding day – April 14, 1874 – the small, modest medieval church 
in the village of Kochendorf was filled to capacity.  From an evergreen archway built over the 
main doorway, a sign stated, “God bless this happy pair.”  Evergreen trees and wreaths, 
camellias, and other flowering plants decorated the altar, before which stood two armchairs for 
the bride and groom.  Led by the pastor, the wedding party exited the sacristy.  Escorting Mrs. 
Lee, Alfred von Waldersee was dressed in his blue, scarlet, and silver colonel’s uniform; 
seventeen medals hung on his chest, and a white feather plume draped the silver decoration on 
his Prussian helmet.  Following the mother and groom, Mary’s brother Dave, who had arrived 
from New York, entered with the bride.  Her Parisian-made, white silk dress had a high neck and 
long sleeves; its skirt trimmed with silver netting and fringe.  On her head sat a wreath of white 
Persian lilacs, white azaleas, silver leaves, and pendants, behind which hung a short tulle veil.  
On her chest hung Alfred’s wedding gift: a diamond cross set in silver.  In her hands, she held a 
bouquet of white flowers her groom had brought from Berlin.  After the long ceremony of 
prayers, songs, organ music, and a solemn sermon, twenty-four guests were invited to the 
wedding dinner, which lasted nearly three hours and included toasts, speeches, and the reading of 
telegrams wishing the happy couple well.  Mary and Alfred quickly changed their clothes to 
catch the train and began their honeymoon journey through Italy, where they spent a week in 
Naples.  The family decided that in the future, Mrs. Lee would stay with her daughter Josie at 
Lautenbach during the summer, but would reside with Alfred and Mary at Hanover, where her 
new son-in-law was stationed, for the rest of the year.4 
 This section will describe Mary von Waldersee and her relationship with her husband 
from 1882 through 1887.  Her philanthropic activities during these years would bring Waldersee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Anne Lee to Frances, April 6, 1874, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume A. 
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into contact with a controversial preacher (See “Christian Philanthropy and Anti-Semitism”), and 
this connection would open the floodgates for press gossip about both Alfred and Mary von 
Waldersee.  Beginning in 1888, American newspapers would portray a false image of Mary 
because they believed she played an important political role at court (See “The American 
Egeria?”).  Consequently, it is important to illuminate Mary’s beliefs and her relationship with 












 Mary’s mother was especially proud of her new son-in-law.  “I tell you so much of 
Alfred,” Mrs. Lee wrote to her cousin in December 1874, “because I feel that you sympathize in 
my gladness that my dear child has such an affectionate husband, and above all, one who puts his 
trust in God.”5  “Alfred is as kind as ever,” she wrote in February 1875, “On the 1st the sun shone 
brightly, and he came in with a pot in each hand of the sweet spring violets all in bloom; one for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, December 12, 1874, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
A. 
Image 3: Alfred and Mary von 
Waldersee in 1899.  Countess 
Elisabeth von Waldersee, Von 
Klarheit zu Klarheit! 
(Stuttgart: Buchhandlung des 
Deutschen Philadelphia-
Vereins, 1915). 
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Mary, and one for me.”6  Simply put, life was good for the Waldersees in Hanover, and during 
their time there, Alfred von Waldersee, through his social graces and military abilities, became a 
well-known figure to the army’s General Staff.  He made an especially good impression on the 
Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, who, beginning in 1880, increasingly 
conversed with Waldersee about his future.  The demands of his offices burdened the aging 
Moltke, who found in Alfred von Waldersee an energetic man of talent and character.  On 
December 31, 1881, the Kaiser appointed Waldersee to the newly created position of 
Quartermaster-General, Moltke’s right-hand man and presumptive successor.  In 1882, the 50 
year-old Waldersee, his 45 year-old wife, Mary, and his 79 year-old mother-in-law, Mrs. Anne 
Lee, left Hannover and arrived at their new home in Berlin.  
 Located to the west of the capital’s old center, the Military Staff Building was an 
imposing three-story structure of red brick.  The northwest corner of the building touched the left 
bank of the Spree River, which the Waldersees could view from their apartment – 
Herwarthstrasse 2 – in the west side of the complex.  Sitting in her room, Mrs. Lee could look 
out on swans swimming carelessly among the boats passing on the murky blue water.  In the 
distance, elevated trains dashed over their iron supports across the skyline.7   The southern end of 
the building abutted the Königsplatz, the centerpiece of which was the Victory Column that 
commemorated the Wars of Unification.  Beyond this manicured park stood the trees of the 
Tiergarten, Berlin’s largest green space.  “The scene is peaceful – suggestive of the country – yet 
full of life,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “I often think how favored we are by such a quiet spot in so large a 
city.”8   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, February 3, 1875, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume A. 
7 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, June 20, 1883, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
8 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, June 20, 1883, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
   

























Image 4: Floor plan of the Military Staff Building.  Based on a drawing by 
Alfred von Waldersee for Mrs. Lee’s cousin, Mary Hoppin.  The original is 
located at Harvard University, Houghton Library, Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, MS AM 994.PF, Volume 4.  According to Mrs. Lee, Waldersee 
made the sketch in May 1887.  Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, May 9, 1887, 
Volume B. 
   













 In the bustling and industrializing imperial capital, the Waldersees certainly lived in a 
serene area, but in the following years, the constructions of the Moltke Bridge across the Spree 
and the Reichstag at the opposite side of the Königsplatz would bring more life to this quiet 
neighborhood.  Inside the Military Staff Building, too, the Waldersees brought a new energy to 
the headquarters of the General Staff, hosting family, friends, dinners, holiday gatherings, 
birthday celebrations, religious services, and philanthropic activities.  Alfred and Mary had been 
active in the social life of Hannover, but now they were in the heart of German high society.   
 When Mary arrived in Berlin, she received a warm welcome from the royal family, upon 
whom she would make a strong impression.9  On New Year’s Day 1885 Waldersee went to the 
palace, where the wheelchair-bound Empress Augusta reached for his hand and told him among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1882, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
Image 5: The southeast corner of the Military Staff Building.  Mary Root, 
Chapter Sketches: Connecticut Daughters of the American Revolution.  
(New Haven: Connecticut Chapters, Daughters of the American 
Revolution, 1904), 312. 
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other things to send her greetings to Mary, who “is an excellent woman, of whom I have the 
highest confidence.”  Her judgment delighted Waldersee.10  After visiting Their Majesties one 
day in April 1885, he returned home, where, Mrs. Lee wrote, Alfred “was greatly amused, telling 
[us] how the empress called him to her side and saying all sorts of pleasant things of Mary – how 
much she liked her – was always sure to find her where any good was to be done, and wondered 
if he realized what a treasure he possessed!”  In the same letter to her cousin, she stated, “I do 
think it literally true that Alfred is more attached to Mary than to his career, however high it 
goes.”11    
 The ideas of Alfred’s “possession” of Mary and of the relationship between his career 
and his marriage evoke a quote that constitutes possibly the only surviving words Alfred wrote to 
Mary.  Whenever they were apart, especially when Waldersee was travelling on military 
business, they would write to each other often, at least once a day.  During one such time in 
August 1876 – two years after their marriage – Waldersee was promoted to Major General, and 
when he heard of his appointment, he wrote immediately to Mary: 
 Should I rise to higher rank, this happiness can never compare to that which I enjoy in 
 possessing you.  Everything else is vastly secondary to this one great happiness.  You are 
 the greatest gift which God has bestowed on me . . .12 
 
Mrs. Lee, who included his tender words in a letter to her cousin Mary, noted that it “above all 
else, touched my heart” and “as this was only intended for Mary’s eye, it is for me of more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Alfred von Waldersee, January 1, 1885, Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred 
Grafen von Waldersee, Vol. I, ed. Heinrich Otto Meisner, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), 248.  
Originally published in 1922. 
11 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
12 Mary von Waldersee; quoted in Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 11, 1876, HH, Von 
Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume A. 
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value.”13  In one of her few surviving letters, Mary expressed to Mrs. Mary Hoppin in 1888 her 
feelings for Alfred: 
 After eight and a half years of widowhood, the dear Lord, of His great mercy, restored to 
 me again the hope of happiness, in causing me to meet . . . my present loving and devoted 
 husband . . . and I can never enough thank the Lord for my present and happy home.14 
 
 The difference in Mary and Alfred’s national origins did not have any significant 
consequences because the foundation of the Waldersees’ marriage was their shared Protestant 
faith.  In December 1874, Mrs. Lee noted that before going to bed every night, Mary and Alfred 
read a chapter of the Bible together.15  Earlier that year, in the letter to her cousin about the 
engagement, Mrs. Lee stated that Alfred and Mary’s common religion was the most important 
element for the success of their marriage: “That he is a firm believer in the precious truths of the 
Bible had great influence,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “for I think that is the surest foundation for lasting 
happiness.”16   
 In 1888, Mary believed that her American family was the only one in which all the sisters 
married Protestant Europeans, and stated, “I am glad that we make this exception to the pretty 
general rule.”17  For the July 1903 issue of Harper’s Bazar, an American women’s magazine, 
Mary wrote an article titled, “The Story of My Life.”  She had often been asked about 
international marriages, and took the opportunity to preach on the subject: 
 Americans do not seem to think that such marriages are happy, as a rule.  It is true that 
 there have been a large number of unhappy marriages between American girls and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 11, 1876, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
A. 
14 Mary von Waldersee to Mary Hoppin, August 31, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, 
Volume B. 
15 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, December 12, 1874, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
A. 
16 Anne Lee to Frances, April 6, 1874, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume A. 
17 Mary von Waldersee to Mary Hoppin, August 31, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, 
Volume B. 
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 foreign noblemen, but most of these have been, I think, where one was a Protestant and 
 the other a Catholic, in which case a great gulf was put between them at the beginning.  
 Then, of course, marriage merely for position with a foreigner, on the one hand, and for 
 the money of the American girl, on the other, can never be a guarantee for happiness.  
 But in a marriage for love between two of the same religion—and this I consider most 
 important—there is no reason why happiness should not result from these international 
 marriages.18   
 
She continued to opine about American women in Europe, showing a clear European bias: 
 The independent character of the American girl is not a great drawback; it depends upon 
 her ability to make these qualities respected in her husband’s eyes.  American women are 
 remarkably pliable, and seldom find difficulty in complying with European conventions.  
 And while it is true that women have not the position, technically, in Europe which they 
 have in America, they have perhaps more devotion from their husbands in Europe than 
 men in America, engrossed in business, have time to give.  Count Waldersee and I, for 
 instance, have never been long separated . . . we are generally together.19 
 
Undoubtedly, her own experiences formed her opinions.  As an American, she had adapted 
herself to European life, married a fellow Protestant, and consequently had a happy marriage. 
 The Waldersees’ happy marriage was reinforced not only on their yearly anniversary – 
April 14 – but also on the 14th of every month.  On May 14, 1885, for example, they went to 
church and had an early dinner, at which Mrs. Lee toasted them, “that they might pass many a 
14th with as much happiness as the present.”  Afterward, they took a ride in Waldersee’s favorite 
open carriage, which he drove himself.  Despite her daughter’s pleading, Mrs. Lee thought it was 
too cold to join them.  Instead, she stayed behind and arranged the flowers Alfred had brought 
for Mary, arrangements she proudly showed them upon their return.  That evening Baron Ende 
and his wife – Alfred’s niece – came to have tea, and Mrs. Lee finished the day beating her son-
in-law at his favorite game, backgammon.20  On April 14, 1875 – their first anniversary – a group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mary von Waldersee, “The Story of My Life,” Harper’s Bazar, July 1903, Vol. XXXVII, No. 
7, pgs. 605-606.  HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 11. 
19 Mary von Waldersee, Harper’s Bazar, July 1903, pg. 606. HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, 
Volume 11. 
20 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, May 12, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
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led by one of Waldersee’s fellow officers serenaded the couple.  Friends came to congratulate 
them and a photographer took a picture of them on the balcony of their home in Hanover, and 
later, Alfred and Mary went riding together and gave each other presents.21 
  On March 22, 1885, flags fluttered in the wind throughout Berlin for the Kaiser’s eighty-
eighth birthday.  Upon leaving church, the Waldersees had difficulty passing through the dense 
throngs of people by the palace.  About 65 members of Europe’s aristocracy and royalty had 
arrived for the festivities.  The highlights were a dinner and soirée at the palace in the evening, to 
which Alfred and Mary were both invited.  Mary politely refused to go, however, because she, as 
her mother noted, “has taken great pains to have it understood here, she cannot enter into visiting 
on Sunday.”22  On January 3, 1886, imperial banners bedecked the capital for the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Kaiser’s reign.  Alfred, dressed in full military uniform, and Mary, donned in 
a dark purple satin dress, attended religious service in the palace’s chapel with the German court 
and royalty from throughout Europe.  Afterward, the Waldersees congratulated the Kaiser in the 
White Hall of the palace, but Mary was able to get herself excused from the rest of the day’s 
activities, which Alfred attended by himself.  That evening, Mary went to church.23 
 Despite the customs of court society, Mary adhered to her religious convictions, which 
others found admirable.  As her mother noted, “from the Empress down, her motive is 
appreciated.”24  In her 1903 Harper’s Bazar article, Mary opined about her Sunday custom: 
 During my long residence abroad my Sundays have been passed in the quiet religious 
 American way, neither accepting invitations nor receiving visits, but spending the day 
 for higher interests.  The Count [Alfred von Waldersee] sympathizes also in my views.  
 My sister, the Baroness de Waechter-Lautenbach, has always observed the same habits, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 14, 1875, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume A. 
22 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  
Waldersee got her excused from the events. 
23 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, January 3, 1886, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
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 and it has long been the source of grief to us to see Americans, taught to keep the Sunday 
 at home, show themselves, when they come to Europe, false to their principles and 
 sailing with the stream.  In our position it has sometimes been hard for my sister and 
 myself to be true to our American conscience regarding Sunday, but it has frequently 
 been our experience that a queen or an empress has been perfectly willing to accept our 
 excuses in declining Sunday invitations, and readily sympathized with our scruples.25 
 
To Mary, her observance of Sunday was also a matter of pride as an American.  Her mother also 
shared this view.  After Mary got herself excused from the Festival of Orders which took place 
on a Sunday in January 1886, Mrs. Lee opined to her cousin, “The fact is when one sees these 
things in their true light they are folly.  Still, I am glad to say the keeping of the Sabbath is 
gradually improving and this is cause for gratitude.”26  Two years later, though, the practice was 
evidently not changing for the better: “Germans I’m sorry to say have no idea of the observance 
of the Sabbath as we [Americans] have.”27   
 Alfred was sympathetic to Mary’s practice, but he had to attend Sunday events because 
he was a member of the Kaiser’s entourage.  Getting excused from a court event, Mrs. Lee wrote 
to her cousin, was “no easy matter, as an invitation from royalty amounts to a command.”28  As 
an officer and aide-de-camp to the monarch, Waldersee had to be present.  He did voluntarily 
sacrifice for Mary a typical practice of gentlemen: smoking cigars.  The day before the wedding 
in 1874, Waldersee smoked over a dozen.  According to Mrs. Lee, Mary knew how much men 
enjoyed their cigars and would not have thought of requesting her husband to give them up, but 
he decided to because it was not a good habit and he thought it would please Mary.  “You know 
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26 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, January 3, 1886, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
27 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, January 18, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
28 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
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what inveterate smokers Germans are,” Mrs. Lee wrote to her cousin, “and will think this is 
something in the way of moral power.”29 
 Mary not only refused to be social on Sunday, but also declined invitations to formal 
dinners if Alfred was unable to go with her.  She broke this rule once, however, in May 1885.  
The Waldersees were invited to a dinner held by the recently appointed American envoy John 
Kasson, a lawyer, diplomat, and former Republican congressman from Iowa.  Waldersee had a 
prior engagement with the Kaiser, and thus Mary had to send her regrets.  Upset, Kasson sent her 
a note urging her to come.  Mary could not turn down his personal plea, especially because he 
had become friends with the Waldersees.  “As it was our Minister,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “we liked so 
much and were intimate with, she broke the rule and went.”  They were saddened to learn that he 
was going to be replaced.  “Minister Kasson speaks highly of his successor,” Mrs. Lee wrote, 
“but for us, it will not be the same.”30   
 Of all the people Alfred von Waldersee formed relationships with throughout his life, the 
one with Mary was his most stable, enduring, and happiest.  She would not become involved in 
high politics like her husband, but she would remain faithfully at his side until his death.  The 
Waldersees complemented each other well and became respectable members of Berlin’s high 
society, but Mary chose not to sacrifice her deeply held religious beliefs for the expectations of 
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Talk and Tables 
 
 In May 1885, the new American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, 
“Gentleman George” Pendleton of Ohio, and his family arrived in Berlin.  The former 
Democratic congressman faced difficulties getting settled into his new home, from obtaining 
funds and legation offices to presenting his credentials to the Kaiser, who was too ill to receive 
him until June 21, 1885.  He set to work reestablishing relations with Germany, which had 
become strained over disagreements about Germans with American citizenship evading 
conscription and control of the Samoan Islands in the South Pacific.31  Just like Waldersee, 
George Pendleton did not just establish himself in the political life of Berlin, but also in its social 
scene.  In December 1885, the Pendletons threw a soirée, but the Waldersees had a prior 
engagement and were unable to attend.  Although Mrs. Lee was also invited, she preferred not to 
take part in big gatherings.32   
 In January 1886, the Waldersees attended the Pendletons’ first formal dinner.  The 
Russian ambassador escorted Mary to her seat at the left of the American envoy, and Alfred, who 
mistrusted the Russians, led in the Russian ambassador’s wife, next to whom he sat.  The British 
ambassador took his place to the right of Mrs. Pendleton, the daughter of Francis Scott Key, who 
had penned “The Star Spangled Banner” after observing the British bombardment of Fort 
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McHenry during the War of 1812.33  Given the individuals’ nationalities and their backgrounds, 
these seating arrangements are amusing, but this setting was the world of the elite.  They had 
their diverse and often antagonistic national identities, yet they formed a cosmopolitan, pan-
European upper class.    
 Military officers, diplomats, and government officials – of both aristocratic and bourgeois 
origins – did not simply maintain working relationships with one another, but social ones, too.  
Of course, sometimes these relationships were not always cordial.  For example, in February 
1887, during an Austro-Russian war scare, the Austrian and Russian ambassadors in Berlin both 
attended a dinner, during which each bickered about the war preparations of the other’s 
country.34  Political, diplomatic, and military history have traditionally overlooked or ignored the 
social world of the elite, but shedding light on how policymakers interacted provides a better 
understanding of political developments – and of Alfred von Waldersee.  In Berlin, the political 
elite was the same as the social elite.  Social events provided opportunities for members of the 
upper class to form opinions, exchange gossip, share information, and forge relationships.  This 
section will survey the social life of Alfred and Mary von Waldersee and the Berlin elite – 
specifically dinners, soirées, Christmas festivities, hunting trips, tea gatherings, and birthday 
celebrations – but the importance of social activities will become more evident in the following 
sections that explore Waldersee’s relationships, actions, and beliefs. 
 Formal dinners were the core events for the elite and provided forums for political 
discussions.  In May 1885, Mrs. Lee wrote, “dinners in abundance.”  At this time, Alfred and 
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Mary attended banquets hosted by the Court Marshal of Crown Prince Frederick, Prince and 
Princess Wilhelm, the Duke and Duchess of Sagan, the former cabinet minister Rudolf von 
Delbrück, the French ambassador, the British ambassador, and the British military attaché.35  
These high society feasts were often elaborate and elegant affairs.  At the Kaiser’s palace in 
Berlin, menus for a Königliche Mittagstafel – Royal Luncheon – could include such delicacies as 
oysters, oyster pâté, lobsters, turbot, turtle soup, venison, veal, Alsatian chicken with truffles, 
chicken soup with champagne, pheasant, snipe with breadcrumbs, duck breast with morels, 
artichoke, asparagus, apricot pudding, pineapple pudding, and champagne jelly with 
strawberries.36 
 Mrs. Lee was reading late on the night of May 7, 1885 when Alfred and Mary returned 
from a dinner given by the French ambassador.  Waldersee asked her if she wanted to play 
backgammon, but Mrs. Lee declined, stating it was too late and time for bed.  Before retiring for 
the night, however, they told her about the elegant dinner held in the beautiful salons of the 
French embassy.  Of particular note, there were strawberries, and Mary was taken back by the 
large size of the asparagus served, telling her mother that one spear was enough.  Among the 
thirty-two guests at the table were Sir Edward Malet, the British ambassador, and Colonel 
Swaine, the British military attaché, and their wives.  Just two days before this dinner, the 
Waldersees attended an evening reception at the British embassy, where Malet introduced his 
new wife to Berlin’s high society.37 
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 Alfred and Mary had also recently dined at the Swaines.  The invitation to this dinner was 
unique because there was a representation of “Cleopatra’s needle,” which Mrs. Lee did not find 
surprising because “we thought [it] very appropriate for such a dinner when Egypt would be the 
subject most talked of.”  Colonel Swaine had been the British military attaché in Berlin for a 
long time, but he was temporarily transferred to Sudan, where he took part in Lord Wolseley’s 
1884 Nile Expedition to relieve the besieged forces under General Gordon in Khartoum.  After 
becoming ill, he returned to his position and family in the German capital.  Mrs. Lee learned 
after the French embassy dinner that Swaine intended to rejoin Lord Wolseley’s campaign, but it 
then appeared that the commander was about to return to London.38 
 Several years after their arrival in Berlin, the Waldersees began to host their own social 
events.  There were two large dinners in the beginning of March 1887, one of which was 
attended by the Spanish ambassador, Count Benomar, who began his career as an attaché in 
Washington D.C.  On March 16, the Waldersee’s held an annual soirée, which almost 300 people 
attended, to celebrate the birthday of Mary’s brother Dave.39  In their apartment they also hosted 
evenings for officers.  In May, Moltke, Waldersee, and a group of officers played whist – an 
English card game – and stayed up past 11 o’clock that night.  “A Russian lady was also here 
that interested me,” wrote Mrs. Lee, “speaking of war, she said ‘there will be no war.’”40  At a 
time when the threat of war with Russia was acute, who she was and the reason for her being in 
the Military Staff Building are interesting mysteries.  Dinners were not only hosted for officers 
and friends, but also for family.  Upon the announcement of his nephew’s engagement, Alfred 	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39 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 11, 1887, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  
“Alfred had punch made as I like it more than wine and with thorough clicking glasses we drank 
to Dave’s health at our early dinner.” 
40 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, May 9, 1887, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  “In 
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“felt a dinner was necessary,” Mrs. Lee wrote.  On December 26, 1887, eighteen other family 
members gathered that evening for a dinner Mrs. Lee described as “very handsome and very 
good.”  “As it was such a family affair I was persuaded to join,” she wrote, “We were up very 
late and slept it out this morning.”41   
 The Waldersee family had gathered at Herwarthstrasse 2 that December to celebrate 
Christmas.  After they sang carols, to which Mary provided musical accompaniment on the 
harmonium, the doors were thrown open to a present-filled room, where a lit Christmas tree 
almost touched the ceiling.42  “Tables all around this salon were loaded with souvenirs for this 
one and that,” wrote Mrs. Lee.43  Waldersee received from Prince Wilhelm of Prussia a life-sized 
bust of the young prince, and from the Kaiser he received a small bronze statue of a Saracen 
fighting an infidel.44  For the previous Christmas, the monarch had given Waldersee another gift 
of bronze: a pillar topped with a revolving apparatus, the four sides of which were a clock, a 
barometer, a German thermometer, and an English one.  Arrows crowned the device to show the 
direction of the wind.  The gift impressed Mrs. Lee, who wrote, “I like this trait in Germans – as 
a rule they do not sacrifice utility to show.”  As she wrote this statement, however, an exception 
suddenly occurred to her.  Waldersee’s banker had given him a “pyramid of confectionary” that 
stood about five feet high.  Soldiers, cannons, drums, bugles, flags, and sentry boxes made of 
sugar adorned this delicacy along with candied fruits and bonbons.  “I could not but regret so 
much beauty must soon perish without real advantage to anyone, save the men who made it,” 	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Mrs. Lee opined, “for the price must have been large.”  There was another unique Christmas 
present for Waldersee in 1886.  A friend sent him the head of a goat from the Himalayas.  “It is 
curious,” noted Mrs. Lee, “I never looked at such horns.”  It was placed amid the deer horns, 
boar heads, and elk heads that decorated the front stairway’s platform, an exhibition of “Alfred’s 
fondness for shooting.”45  
 In December 1887, when King Albert of Saxony invited Waldersee to go hunting with 
him, Mrs. Lee stated to her cousin, “Germans never tire of shooting.”46  Waldersee was an avid 
hunter, and by 1903 – a year before his death – he had a collection of more than 500 pairs of 
antlers.47  Traditionally an aristocratic sport, hunting provided a good challenge to proud German 
nobles and military men.  Waldersee thought nothing of getting up early in the morning and 
enduring rain or snow while walking and standing for hours over several days.  When he 
returned, he was always in good spirits despite the tough conditions.48  “It is wonderful how 
Germans cling to their love for the chase,” Mrs. Lee wrote in 1878.49     
 On July 1, 1876, the Waldersees vacationed at Norderney on Germany’s North Sea coast, 
a popular destination for tourists where Alfred liked to take his annual sea bath.  Mrs. Lee 
recounted for her cousin the amusing story of Waldersee’s seal hunt: 
  Alfred went off with his gun, two dogs, and two fishermen in their little vessel to 
 a distant sand bank to shoot, as they said, seals, but I think, seadogs.  The plan was for the 	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 men to stretch themselves on the sand close to the water covered with the skins, so as to 
 induce the unwary seal to suppose it was their own kind, and come up on the bank for 
 relaxation, and receive a bullet instead.  Alfred said they were very shy; he could not 
 shoot them in the water, for they would sink.  He thought, and so did the fishermen, that 
 he was fortunate in securing two.  He was absent nearly three days, and had to rough it; 
 nothing in the little vessel to lie on at night but straw, and his bag for a pillow, and for 
 food – to depend on what he took with him.  I should have thought it downright hardship.  
 But being a pleasure excursion quite altered the view. 
  Several glasses were turned to watch for the returning vessel, while we gazed 
 from our windows; finally, to the pleasure of all, it was sighted, and ere long Alfred 
 arrived, not as we had supposed ‘used up,’ but in the best of spirits declaring he had had a 
 ‘grand time,’ and taking us at once to the beach to see his trophies.  The skins, which are 
 heavy like a dog, and mottled in color, were sent to Hanover as souvenir mats.50 
 
 In the 1870s, Waldersee hunted often in the company of the Kaiser and Prince Albrecht 
of Prussia, for whose army corps Waldersee was the Chief of Staff in Hanover.  At one royal 
hunt in 1875, the Kaiser shot twenty-six wild boars; Waldersee had the second greatest number.  
Mrs. Lee marveled at how the monarch could stand for three to four hours at a time.51  By the 
1880s, the monarch’s age had advanced even more.  On November 3, 1883, Waldersee lamented 
that Wilhelm I was the only living member of the old generation of the Hohenzollerns and that 
his eighty-six year old sovereign could no longer go hunting as he used to.  Amid a “swarm” of 
young princes, he realized that he was the oldest general.  “A new time is coming!” he wrote in 
his journal.52 
 Although Waldersee could no longer tread alongside the Kaiser in Germany’s forests, he 
could still sit with him.  Waldersee was a frequent guest at the palace in Berlin for Their 
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Sea.  “I took twenty-one baths, and so did the others,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “Except when waiting for 
Josie [to arrive], we went under the waves every morning but Sunday – no baths are so 
exhilarating.”   
51 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, November 25, 1875, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
A. 
52 Alfred von Waldersee, November 3, 1883, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 231. 
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Majesties’ weekly tea gatherings.53  In his journal, he described one typical get-together on 
January 24, 1886.  The small circle of guests gathered in a room on the ground floor of the 
palace and took their seats once the empress, who was wheelchair-bound in her later years, was 
first rolled into her position at the small, round table.  After a short while, the Kaiser would enter 
and take his seat to the left of the Empress after greeting each guest individually.  As a general 
rule, the attendees were men from the military, political, and academic professions, but female 
members of the royal family would occasionally join, too.54  First, tea was served, followed by 
mandarin oranges, a glass of wine, and then ice cream.   
 The conversation, often led by Empress Augusta, took place among all members of the 
table, but sometimes the emperor or empress engaged in a side conversation with the person 
sitting next to him or her. 55  The subject would often be about politics.  At one gathering in 1884, 
the conversation centered on the latest trouble the Center and Progressive parties were causing in 
the Reichstag.56  At another in 1887, the empress expressed her concern to Waldersee that 
relations with Austria were not on the right track.57  What was especially appealing about these 
tea gatherings, Waldersee noted, was that one could be with Their Majesties in a casual manner.  
“The old man is always the same,” he wrote of the Kaiser in 1886, “friendly, cheerful, 
participating in all conversations, and of a charming informality.”58  These social gatherings 
provided an informal setting where political issues were discussed, opinions were formed, 
information was shared, and friendships between the emperor and his entourage were fostered.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, December 10, 1886 and March 11, 1887, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, Volume B. 
54 Waldersee, January 24, 1886, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 271-272. 
55 Waldersee, January 24, 1886, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 271-272. 
56 Waldersee, December 21, 1884, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 247. 
57 Waldersee, May 4, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 324. 
58 Waldersee, January 24, 1886, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 271-272. 
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 Birthday celebrations provided the German elite with occasions to further socialize and 
cultivate relationships within Berlin society.  For Kaiser Wilhelm, birthdays provided an 
opportunity not just to receive praise and honor, but also to offer them to his friends and servants.  
On March 22, 1885 – his eighty-eighth birthday – Wilhelm I promoted Waldersee to Adjutant 
General, the highest rank of the emperor’s personal assistants, along with Prince Anton 
Radziwill and Count Heinrich August von Lehndorff, Waldersee’s old friends who had served 
with him during the war as the Kaiser’s aides-de-camp.  The three men visited His Majesty to 
congratulate him on his birthday and to thank him for their new honors.  Shaking their hands, 
Wilhelm stated that the pleasure was his.59  Waldersee had been surprised and overjoyed by the 
promotion, which he saw as “new evidence of the gracious goodwill of the emperor.”60 
 Although Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s seventieth birthday was on April 1, 1885, civic 
groups decided to hold a parade for him on March 27 to avoid a conflict with Holy Week 
festivities.  Count Otto von Stolberg-Wernigerode, former Vice-Chancellor and then current 
Minister of the Royal House, invited the Waldersees to watch the procession from the windows 
of his home, which stood near Bismarck’s Chancellery on the Wilhelmstrasse.  On the day of the 
parade, Waldersee had to go to Potsdam to inspect artillery with Prince Wilhelm, and when he 
returned, the prince was with him.  He had decided to dine with the Waldersees and then 
accompany them to Count Stolberg’s for the torchlight parade.  The group was running late and, 
though the streets were supposed to be closed to traffic, they were able to make their way down 
the Wilhelmstrasse.  They ascended to the top of the grand staircase, where Count Stolberg 
graciously received them and then escorted them through the main hall, where his other guests 
were beginning to crowd around the room’s three big windows.  The host provided the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
60 Waldersee, March 22, 1885, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 254.  
   
	   37 
Waldersees with a small, private room with a good view, where, as Mrs. Lee noted, they were 
able to talk freely.  Prince Wilhelm and Waldersee had gone to the smoking room, but the latter 
returned to his wife and mother-in-law for the parade, which took over an hour to pass.  Bands, 
student groups, clubs, and trade societies processed with horse-drawn floats and torches and 
cheered when they passed the Chancellery.  “All torchlights I had previously seen paled in 
comparison,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “No citizen ever before had such an ovation.”61  Her son-in-law 
likewise opined, “Never have we experienced a similar ovation for someone who is not a 
sovereign.”62  The next day, Waldersee and a number of officers visited Bismarck to wish him 
well for his birthday.  “The Germans are proud that he belongs to them,” wrote Mrs. Lee, “In 
way of mental power he is certainly a remarkable man.”63 
 On April 8, 1885, a little more than a week after Bismarck’s torchlight birthday parade, 
Alfred von Waldersee turned 53 years old and, unlike the Chancellor, had a humble celebration.  
That morning, he and Mary took a long carriage ride, and when they returned, a military band of 
about 35 musicians performed for an hour in the plant-filled conservatory of the Military Staff 
Building.  Afterward, the couple had breakfast with the pastor who had confirmed Waldersee.  
For at least a week, gifts had been arriving at Herwarthstrasse 2 for the Quartermaster-General’s 
birthday, and Mary had kept them hidden from her husband in order to surprise him.  She and 
Mrs. Lee arranged all the gifts on a table, for as the latter wrote, “there cannot be a German 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.   
62 Waldersee, April 1, 1885, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 255.  Waldersee also commented on the 
political nature of the event: “The festival was a decidedly German and conservative 
demonstration, on whose peak stood the Emperor.  How small appeared the adversaries, with 
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63 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, April 24, 1885, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
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birthday without a ‘table.’”  There were plenty of flowers, and Waldersee’s cake, standing about 
a foot tall, was made to look like a beehive complete with bees and butterflies made of sugar.64   
 For Waldersee, birthdays provided a moment for reflection, thankfulness, and a new 
beginning.  On April 8, 1886, he wrote in his journal: 
 How much gratitude I owe to the Almighty for everything that He grants me!  I begin the 
 new year with fresh health and with fresh courage for the work, which can be humbling 
 to me.  Before all things go my wishes to continue happily with my dear Mary and 
 to not invest in pride and earthly things, but in the preparation for the next world.65 
 
In 1887, his birthday and Good Friday fell on the same day.  He attended religious services that 
evening at Berlin’s Friedrichswerder Church with Mary and Mrs. Lee, and after arriving back at 
Herwarthstrasse 2, he wrote, “I cannot begin a new year of life in a better manner.”66   
 Since arriving in Berlin in 1882, Alfred von Waldersee embraced the social life of 
Berlin’s high society and court.  The exclusive world of the upper class provided the backdrop to 
Germany’s political, military, and diplomatic developments.  At dinners, hunts, tea gatherings, 
and other social events, the men of the elite exchanged information and gossip, formed opinions, 
and forged and fostered relationships.  In this environment, Waldersee combined the suaviter in 
modo with the fortiter in re, and continued his relationship with the man who dominated German 
politics: Otto von Bismarck.  
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Prince Wilhelm had given Waldersee a photograph of himself costumed before, and it was hung 
on a wall in Waldersee’s room.  Prince and Princess Wilhelm had recently come from the 
Princess’s sister’s marriage, for which the guests appeared in costume.  The Prince had taken the 
opportunity to have himself photographed dressed like Charles X.  
65 Waldersee, April 8, 1886, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 288. 
66 Waldersee, April 8, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 323. 
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Ultima Ratio 
 
 On December 3, 1886, Baron Walter von Loë, a Catholic Westphalian aristocrat and the 
commander of the 8th Army Corps in Koblenz, Germany, wrote the following letter to Count 
Alfred von Waldersee: 
  From all sides one says to me, “The Chancellor does not want war.”  The situation 
 appears, however, not to culminate in the question of whether he wants war or not 
 because the time has past when the Chancellor set up the pieces on the European 
 chessboard and directed the game.  In today’s Europe, no man who has five good senses 
 and a trace of humanity can wish for a war, which for an unforeseeable duration would 
 ruin the prosperity of all people.  For Germany and its leading statesman, the main 
 interest at the current moment appears to me to be the European dilemma, which we have 
 gotten into through the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine (1871) and the Peace of Berlin 
 (Congress of Berlin, 1878), and which has cost us a great financial sacrifice.  The 
 Chancellor, who has rightly been preoccupied for years with the idea of the dilemma, has 
 until now sought to get out of it through the calming of Russia, [but this has been a 
 failure] because the intimacy between France and Russia is closer and more than ever 
 Germanophobia and insolence in St. Petersburg are at their greatest . . .   
  Certainly one must . . . be ready and determined for the ultima ratio (the last 
 resort; i.e. war), and whether the Chancellor is prevented from it through earlier 
 agreements with St. Petersburg, that I do not know . . . You believe the Chancellor can be 
 employed to create a political situation with a changed basis.  That may not be so simple 
 because first, his influence in Europe has declined simultaneously with the respect for 
 Germany’s power, second, the political constellations become fixed primarily through the 
 interests of individual countries.  The European antagonism toward Russia’s penetration 
 into the Balkans . . . is rooted simply in the interests of other countries to keep the 
 Dardanelles open.  Why the Chancellor has not been pleased about this basis for the 
 ultima ratio is not visible to the uninitiated.  From the military point of view, I can only 
 agree with you, that at this time, in a completely favorable situation, we could bring about 
 war on two fronts, and that otherwise the chances only become worse . . . What I . . . and 
 many others see with me, is that until now the game of the Oriental policy (Spiel der 
 Orientpolitik) has not run brilliantly, because it forms more than ever the quite 
 bothersome end of the dilemma.67 
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 Loë believed Europe was swiftly approaching a crisis, if not a war, and that even 
Bismarck could no longer control the situation he once mastered.  After the defeat of France in 
the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, the new and powerful German Empire sat in the middle of 
Europe surrounded by the other great powers.  To protect European peace and German security, 
Otto von Bismarck created a series of defense alliances with the overall goal of isolating France 
and preventing conflict on Germany’s eastern border.  In 1873 he formed the Three Emperors’ 
League, in which the rulers of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany promised to work together 
to resolve crises.  Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, however, Russia became an unstable factor 
in Europe because St. Petersburg’s assertive foreign policy in the Balkans antagonized Vienna, 
threatening the maintenance of Bismarck’s diplomatic system.  In 1879 Germany and Austria-
Hungary signed the Dual Alliance, a defense agreement aimed toward Russia.  If their eastern 
neighbor declared war on one of them, the other would come to its aid, but if either declared war 
on Russia, the other was not required to act.  Italy joined Austria-Hungary and Germany in the 
Triple Alliance in 1882, creating a defensive agreement aimed toward France. 
 Under Bismarck’s diplomatic system, Waldersee, as the new Quartermaster-General of 
the General Staff in 1882, began preparing for a possible war.  Until 1885, he would not question 
the Chancellor’s foreign policy skills, but from the end of 1885 through 1887, Waldersee would 
gradually come to see the Bismarckian system as unsustainable as events threatened the 
Chancellor’s carefully crafted alliances.  He looked out on the European situation and believed 
that a great war was not only inevitable, but also an opportunity to create a better diplomatic 
situation for Germany.  Although he originally maintained that Germany should wait and be 
prepared for the moment this war would erupt, from the end of 1886 through 1888, he believed 
the German Empire should actively seek to bring about a conflict.  He thus became a proponent 
   
	   41 
of preventive war, arguing that at the soonest, most favorable opportunity, Germany should 
launch a war that would give the empire the advantage to be successful; otherwise, he insisted, if 
the opportunity and advantage were lost, Germany’s future chances of success in the next war 
would become worse as warfare increasingly industrialized. 
 After the Second World War, historians, in their denunciations of German militarism, 
have rightly criticized Waldersee for his advocacy of preventive war, but they do not attempt to 
understand why he felt so passionately about this matter.  John Röhl states that his “obsession 
with war is unparalleled in German, if not world, history,” but he leaves Waldersee’s motivations 
unsettled: 
 Readers of [the] excerpts from his unexpurgated diaries must decide for themselves 
 whether the Count’s desire for war – at home and abroad – can be considered a legitimate 
 option available to the Reich’s policy-makers, or whether it needs to be classified as a 
 form of paranoid, megalomaniac derangement.  Some may perhaps be inclined to see 
 Waldersee’s preventive war as a relatively bloodless clinical operation, and view such a 
 ‘cabinet war’ as a legitimate continuation of policy by other means which even aimed at 
 preventing ‘something worse.’  Others will wish to consider that even in the ‘limited’ 
 Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1, some 40,000 German and 90,000 French soldiers lost 
 their lives.  They will recall that between 1801 and 1805 alone, 6 million soldiers died 
 during Napoleon’s campaigns.  They will say that an officer of the general staff must 
 have known what even a civilian like Holstein foresaw, that in every future war, armies 
 of millions would be mobilized thanks to the railways.  Was a ‘limited’ war even 
 conceivable under such circumstances?  Waldersee himself repeatedly observed that the 
 ‘preventive’ war which he urged Germany and Austria to wage against France and Russia 
 would almost inevitably escalate into a ‘world conflagration.’68 
 
The question is answerable, but not in the terms that Röhl sets.   
 In the late nineteenth century, Waldersee saw preventive war as a tool of the state; it was 
the ultima ratio – the last resort – in a situation he deemed hopeless for the continued security of 
the German Empire.  He viewed the European situation, as Loë did in his letter, as moving pieces 
on a chessboard; the policy in the Balkans was a game.  Raison d’état ruled his thinking, but this 	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idea was common in the nineteenth century; in fact, it was the basis of Bismarck’s foreign policy 
of Realpolitik.  Writing that Waldersee “was capable of expressing [his idea of preventive war] 
with a sang-froid which, even today, is disconcerting,” Gordon Craig quotes a sentence from one 
of the general’s letters in November 1887: “A good many men will be killed; however, as long as 
no one can prove to me that a man can die more than once, I am not inclined to regard death for 
the individual as a misfortune.”69  What Craig does not cite, however, is the preceding sentence: 
“The times are really serious; I have a firm confidence, however, that we will raise our flag 
through all storms and triumph over all enemies.”70  To Waldersee, the state was greater than the 
individual.  In his letter to Waldersee above, Baron voe Loë wrote, “no man who has five good 
senses and a trace of humanity can wish for a war” because of the unpredictable devastation it 
would cause, but he also stated, “from the military point of view, I can only agree with you.”71  
As the Quartermaster-General, Waldersee’s duty was to prepare for war to defend the empire’s 
interests and existence.     
 Waldersee knew Russia was modernizing, especially through railroad construction, and 
becoming capable of fielding greater numbers of men.  Defeating Russia or France in a war 
sooner rather than later, he believed, would allow Germany to dictate the peace and create a 
more sustainable balance of power in Europe.  The preventive war he proposed, at least 
subconsciously, would be similar to the Wars of Unification – relatively quick and decisive.  
Contrary to what Röhl insinuates, Waldersee would not have expected a war to be a “relatively 
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bloodless clinical operation.”72  He had seen plenty of men killed in 1866 and 1870-71, including 
one of his own brothers.  A war in the 1880s – and its casualty lists – would have most likely 
been similar to one in the 1870s than to one in the 1910s, after the increased industrialization of 
the 1890s-1900s.   
 In this section, I will argue that the development of Waldersee’s view on foreign affairs 
and his advocacy of preventive war were more complex and methodical than historians have 
assumed.  They have traditionally been too quick to judge Waldersee’s belief in preventive war.  
Typically citing a select few journal entries, historians have not sought to understand more 
deeply the development of his views and his advocacy of war; they have been perfectly willing 
to accept the conventional image of a reckless and dangerous Prussian general.  Isabel Hull, who 
states that Waldersee’s opinions “were a virtual parody of the Junker Weltanschauung,” writes: 
 Waldersee’s . . . anxiety to fight was so great that he was indifferent in his choice of 
 enemies.  He grasped at any opportunity to develop a small event into a casus belli (cause 
 for war).  In rapid succession he advocated preventive wars, now against France, now 
 against Russia, against them both . . .73  
 
The development of Waldersee’s views and advocacy of war in the 1880s was more complex 
than Hull’s description.  
 Because Otto von Bismarck dominated Germany’s – and Europe’s – diplomacy, I will 
also highlight in this section Waldersee’s relationship to the Chancellor from 1882 to 1887.  
Since meeting during the Franco-Prussian War, the two men had a friendly relationship; 
Bismarck had even made Waldersee his special representative in Paris to obtain the French 
reparations after the war.  In 1880, Mrs. Lee had spotted the Chancellor twice during a trip to the 
baths at Kissingen, and with a little exaggeration wrote to her cousin, “Had Alfred been with us 	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it might have gone better, for the Prince and himself are the best of friends.”74  Increasingly 
throughout the 1880s, Waldersee’s vocal interest in foreign affairs and his advocacy of policies 
that contradicted Bismarck’s became an annoyance, if not a threat, to the Chancellor’s efforts to 
maintain his alliance system in Europe; however, their cordial relationship would not be broken 










 On January 6, 1882, Count Alfred von Waldersee arrived at the Military Staff Building in 
Berlin to assume his new post as Quartermaster-General, the Adlatus – or assistant – to the Chief 
of Staff, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke.  The great strategist, who directed the successful 
military campaigns of the Wars of Unification, presented Waldersee to the department heads as 
their new supervisor.  Afterward, the Adlatus roamed through the halls of the military complex, 
introducing himself to the officers in the various departments.  That evening, he dined with 
Bismarck, who was “extraordinarily friendly and cordial.”75  Waldersee idolized the aging 
Moltke and took over many of his chief’s responsibilities.  Within the first few months of 	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75 Waldersee, January 6, 1882, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 218. 
Image 6: Waldersee as 
Quartermaster-General.   
Ed. Hans Mohs.  General-
Feldmarschall Alfred Grafen von 
Waldersee in seinem 
militärischen Wirken.  (Berlin: 
Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1929). 
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assuming his new position, Waldersee began having daily discussions with the Field Marshal 
about a possible war with Russia.76  He advocated urgent changes to their mobilization plans, 
especially by focusing attention on the eastern border because conditions in Russia, the 
“apparently weak and timid” Tsar Alexander III, and an uprising in Herzegovina were “quite 
alarming circumstances.”77 
 As a military planner in the Industrial Age, Waldersee had to take into consideration 
developments in foreign affairs, a realm that Bismarck dominated.  The two men maintained a 
very cordial relationship in the early 1880s and spoke to each other openly about Russia.  In 
March, Waldersee had dinner with the Bismarck family, and afterward the two men conversed 
for about an hour and a half.  They discussed the possibility of a war with Russia, but although 
Bismarck found conditions in Russia “alarming,” he did not believe there would be a war.  
Waldersee found the conversation particularly interesting and valuable as the Chancellor 
entertained his many questions.  Upon the Quartermaster-General’s departure, Bismarck invited 
him to stop by more often even without an invitation.78  The appointment of Nicholas de Giers as 
Russian Foreign Minister had not convinced Waldersee that relations with Germany’s neighbor 
would improve.79  By late November, Giers, who looked to establish good relations with 
Russia’s western neighbor, had visited Bismarck, but Waldersee believed Germany still needed 
to be cautious.80  “Our relationship with Russia is outwardly reasonable, but actually very 
uneasy,” he wrote that month, “they assemble constantly, prepare for war, and in contrast we 
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restrain ourselves most shyly.”81  In December, an article appeared in the prominent Kölnische 
Zeitung concerning Russian railroad construction and other preparations.82  A few days earlier, 
Bismarck had called on Waldersee.  The Chancellor, who was suffering greatly from neuralgic 
pain, spoke soft at first, but then stronger as he discussed relations with Russia, and, as 
Waldersee wrote, “opened up such wide perspectives, that I dare not write them down.”83 
 In his first year as Quartermaster-General, Waldersee’s focus on Germany’s eastern 
neighbor was nothing new, and his military concerns about Russia were not unfounded.  In late 
April and early May of 1873, Waldersee had accompanied the newly crowned Kaiser Wilhelm I 
to St. Petersburg, where they attended concerts, balls, grand dinners, and parades.84  After 
returning to Germany, he recorded his impression of Russia in his journal: 
 ‘Russia’ means another world.  One can, for example, orient oneself in French conditions 
 much faster and more easily feel at home than there.  The first impression must be 
 magnificent for anyone.  Russia has 60 million inhabitants; it has produced some 
 competent rulers, ministers, and generals and pursued high goals . . . Its leaders . . . see in 
 tsardom the future master of Europe.  The thought can certainly be very tempting.  What 
 was once the main obstacle – the vastness of territory – gradually becomes eliminated 
 through a very thought-out railroad system, of which hardly half has been tackled, but its 
 completion certainly is being carried out.  The allied armies would have surely been 
 unable to undertake the [1854] campaign in Crimea with the Russian railroad network 
 that exists today.  Now, it allows already great armies to quickly gather at our [border] 
 and the Austrian border, as well as at the Black Sea.  When  the railroad network is 
 finished, universal military service is implemented, and the shorter  service term of a few 
 years is in force, the numerical superiority must consequently make itself effective.85 
 
In the nineteenth century, the railroads had become a useful instrument in warfare because it 
allowed a state to rush its troops to a location and decide the place of battle.  The Prussian 
railroad had been integral to achieving success during the Wars of Unification, and during the 	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Crimean War, Russia’s lack of a sufficient railroad system had allowed French and British troops 
to amass more quickly on the Crimean Peninsula.  With Russia’s vast numbers of potential 
recruits and its developing railroad system, Waldersee was understandably concerned, especially 
as the Russian Empire was asserting itself in southeastern Europe.  It had defeated the Ottoman 
Empire in March 1878 and had given independence to a large Bulgarian state, which the other 
European powers feared would be a Russian satellite.  Bismarck restored peace to Europe at the 
Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878, but Waldersee became worried.  He realized 
Austria’s occupation of Bosnia, allowed by the Congress of Berlin, had created a permanent 
problem in its relationship with Russia, and increasing anti-German sentiments in Russia, 
especially on the pages of its newspapers, also troubled him.86    
 Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, German elites grew increasingly concerned about the 
possibility of military conflict with both France and Russia.  As an ardent monarchist, Waldersee 
feared a successful revolution of anti-monarchist radicals in Russia on its eastern border, 
especially with the monarch-less Republic of France on the western border.87  During a trip to 
Paris in September 1879, he noted that there were signs that St. Petersburg was reaching out for 
an alliance with Paris.88  He was relieved, however, to read in the Journal des débats – which 
had a connection to the French Foreign Minister – an article advocating against an alliance with 
Russia.  At a dinner, he noted the presence of a Russian Adjutant General, whose “physiognomy 
is unpleasant” and behavior was “fairly uncouth.”89 
 When he arrived in Berlin in 1882, Waldersee brought his anxieties with him, as shown 
above, and he would continue to concern himself with foreign affairs.  “In these times, politics 	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have occupied me a great deal,” he wrote in September 1883, “according to my firm convictions, 
the Russians prepare for war.  I have reported this a year ago already; now my opinion is further 
confirmed.”90  Several days earlier, he had had a conversation with the Russian military 
plenipotentiary, Prince Dolgoruki, and wrote a lengthy summary of it for Bismarck.  Waldersee 
spoke frankly, saying that German troop movements in the east were only “faint counter 
measures” compared to the considerable accumulation of Russian troops.  “No sensible man 
could believe that we would have the inclination to go to war with Russia,” he stated, “No one in 
Germany could have interest in such a war, and the most hot-tempered soldiers would also not 
have the slightest desire for it.”91  Despite Dolgoruki’s attempt to refute Waldersee, the 
Quartermaster-General listed the intelligence he had received: 
 I named the accumulation of cavalry groups along our border, the full covering of 
 ordnance and several munitions wagons of the corresponding horse-drawn batteries, the 
 higher peacetime budget of all standing troops in Poland, the noticeably high budget of 
 the standing reserve battalions there, finally most recently the advance of the 41st 
 Division from the Caucasus [westward] to Minsk and the 16. [Division] from Minsk to 
 Bialystock [near the East Prussian border], and the strong increase of cavalry through the 
 increase in the budgets of the regiments of four to six squadrons, which both measures 
 appear to me to be significant.  I then came to the construction of the railroads and the 
 laying of a second track on the existing lines, that do not have a proven commercial need 
 and whose purpose could alone be the quicker concentration of great masses of troops to 
 our [border] and the Austrian [border].  Furthermore I spoke of the extensive construction 
 of fortifications in Poland and Lithuania, of which, just like the railroads, is the unusual 
 haste in production most conspicuous, and touched finally the secrecy with which all 
 military measures were carried.92 
 
Although Dolgoruki wanted peace, the overall impression Waldersee gained from the 
conversation was that the Russian plenipotentiary was worried that the two countries were 
heading toward war.93  In October, Waldersee felt that Germany was losing its advantage by not 
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challenging Russian armaments and troop build-up in Poland, and he became worried when he 
heard reports that Denmark might be obliged to ally with Russia in case of war, thus threatening 
his already crafted plans.94 
 At the beginning of November 1883, after visiting the Foreign Office, he noted that 
Bismarck did not believe war to be imminent.95  Waldersee stopped by again about two weeks 
later, and discussed the possibility of allying with the Ottoman Empire should they reorganize 
their army, but the Chancellor “who operates extraordinarily carefully” did not want to make 
France and Russia suspicious.96  On November 20, the Russian Minister of War Peter 
Wannowski, who was in the process of returning to Russia from western Germany, was invited 
to the palace to have dinner with the Kaiser.  Waldersee was also there and took the opportunity 
to have a long discussion with Wannowski, who, he later wrote, “gave, like all Russian officials, 
the most peaceful assurances and denied all further troop movements.”97  This encounter must 
have only furthered his distrust, and Waldersee wrote the next day, that the Russians “are 
apparently trying hard to make their love of peace as convincing as possible.”98   
 Russo-German relations appeared to Waldersee to be much better in 1884.  In the 
beginning of the year, Herbert Bismarck, the Chancellor’s son, visited the Quartermaster-General 
before heading to St. Petersburg to become the Secretary of the German embassy there and 
convinced him that his father wanted to establish a good relationship with Russia.99  Thanks to 
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Herbert, Waldersee noted a month later, relations with Russia were improving greatly.100  In late 
February, he wrote that their friendship was now evident to the world when Grand Duke Michael 
of Russia arrived in Berlin with his entourage – which included Count Joseph Gurko, the 
Governor-General of Poland, and General Pavel Shuvalov – to celebrate the seventieth 
anniversary of Kaiser Wilhelm’s receiving the Russian Order of St. George in 1814 – when he 
was seventeen years old – for his service during the Napoleonic Wars.101  In May 1884, 
Waldersee accompanied Prince Wilhelm of Hohenzollern, the Kaiser’s grandson, on a trip to 
Russia to attend the coming-of-age ceremony for the future Nicholas II.  The splendor of the 
Russian court greatly impressed the Quartermaster-General, who then believed Germany should 
consider getting closer to Russia than Austria.102  In June, he wrote in his journal that in St. 
Petersburg everything went so well that he did not seriously engage anyone over the Russian 
troop buildups on the border for fear that it would disturb the developing good mood.  He even 
thought it would be worth making clear to Austria how much it should be thankful for Germany 
and that the German government could demand various things of Vienna.103  Later that month, 
Waldersee dined at Bismarck’s, where the Chancellor was “unusually chipper,” and told him that 
he “believed peace with Russia was secured for years to come.”104   
 On October 10, 1884, Waldersee reflected on the “strange changes” Germany’s foreign 
policy had taken during the summer.  Relations had improved greatly among the three eastern 
empires, and Bismarck was increasingly isolating France and England, who were at odds with 
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each other over colonial matters.105  Almost exactly a year later, Waldersee’s view of Bismarck 
and his foreign policy would change drastically.  Until then, however, European eyes turned 
toward two crises in Sudan and Afghanistan.  Although outside of Europe, these conflicts had an 
impact on the policymakers of Berlin and were of particular interest to Waldersee. 
 In Africa, the Mahdi tribe besieged British forces under the command of General Charles 
Gordon in Khartoum in April 1884, but a relief force under General Garnet Wolseley did not 
arrive until shortly after the town had fallen on the morning of January 26, 1885.  That evening 
in Berlin, Alfred and Mary von Waldersee had dinner with the Crown Prince, his wife, and their 
three youngest daughters.  Crown Princess Victoria, who Waldersee neither trusted nor liked, 
asked him many questions concerning care for the wounded in war and expressed concern about 
the expedition to Khartoum.106  In February, at a ball at the palace in Berlin, she engaged him in 
a conversation, speaking especially about the situation in Sudan.  He told her that he believed 
nothing could be done before autumn, and, very saddened, she confirmed the recent news that 
General Gordon had been killed.107  Several days before, Waldersee had worried about the 
potentially harmful influence the Crown Princess could exert in the future.  “How should the 
Chancellor propel foreign policy when the future empress . . . is English at heart?” Waldersee 
wrote, “Who should the Crown Prince, on the other hand name as Chancellor?  He has no one 
suitable!”108  Waldersee was still a full supporter of Bismarck’s foreign policy. 
 In Asia, on the morning of March 30, 1885, Russian troops attacked an Afghan force that 
had refused to withdraw from its position.  Later that day, Waldersee wrote, “the quiet and well-	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meaning people in Russia want to avoid a war with England.”109  Despite his past concerns about 
Germany’s eastern neighbor, Waldersee now became more pro-Russia and anti-Britain.  He 
believed that policymakers in London, especially Prime Minister Gladstone, were playing a 
dangerous game and risked not only losing their status as a great colonial power, but also internal 
collapse.110  Poor British foreign policy had, Waldersee wrote, left the island nation largely 
isolated, and he hoped that Germany would not find itself in a war for British interests.111   
 On April 23, Waldersee wrote that, although flattered, he could not answer the many 
questions he received about how the war would proceed and what role Afghanistan would play.  
That evening, he attended a soirée held by Their Majesties, sat at the table of Crown Princess 
Victoria, and spoke at length with her.  She was very anxious, Waldersee noted, and complained 
about “the unfaithfulness of the Russians.”  Gladstone, she claimed, was “the most harmless man 
in the world.”  Victoria was particularly saddened that the Duchess of Edinburgh, her Russian-
born sister-in-law, flaunted her Russian sympathies.112  In early May, Waldersee’s conversations 
with the British military attaché, Colonel Swaine, and the Russian plenipotentiary, Prince 
Dolgoruki, confirmed his opinion that war was coming, a sign “of the wickedness 
(Schlechtigkeit) of English politics, which in every way is the most reprehensible.”113  Three 
days later, he paid a visit to the Foreign Office, where, he wrote afterward, “one believes in 
peace there, but I cannot still go along with that.”114   
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 On May 7, he had a long conversation with Herbert Bismarck, who told him that Russia 
was beginning to disarm, an act that convinced Waldersee that peace was at hand.115  That 
evening, Alfred and Mary returned to Herwarthstrasse 2 after attending a dinner at the French 
embassy.  They told Mrs. Lee all about the grand banquet, but Waldersee’s mother-in-law was 
most delighted to hear that there would be no war.  She had shared her son-in-law’s pessimistic 
view and had hoped that God would prevent a war between Britain and Russia because “it would 
be the spark in the tinder box to set all Europe afire.”116  On May 10, Waldersee noted that the 
signs of peace were growing, and he had a long conversation with Dolgoruki, who said Russia 
had made a mistake letting itself be brought to make any concessions.  The Russian prince stated 
furthermore that his country would not completely disarm and would continue at an even faster 
pace to build a railroad from Ashgabat to Merv in present-day Turkmenistan, a transport route 
directed toward India.117 
 This brief episode in the history of diplomacy and imperialism was also a revealing one 
in the development of Waldersee’s foreign views.  Given the better relationship between 
Germany and Russia at that time, he was sympathetic toward St. Petersburg, but he was more 
than ever hostile toward policymakers in London.  Waldersee’s concern about British foreign 
policy, and especially about Britain pushing Germany to war, was fueled by his distrust of the 
Crown Princess, who, he believed, would put British over German interests when she would 
become queen.  When Bismarck and the Crown Princess developed a better relationship during 
the summer of 1885, Waldersee predicted that the British government would work its influence 
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on this alliance.118  This episode shows, more importantly, how volatile peace was in Europe and 
how Waldersee developed his opinions and gained his information by speaking with various 
people.  “Certainly very skilled,” Waldersee wrote about Bismarck, “the Chancellor has known 
to behave himself so that no one can accuse him of warmongering.  Whether one will thank us 
for it is another question.”119  Waldersee continued to support Bismarck, but the next 
international crisis occurred on the European continent and shook the Quartermaster-General’s 
faith in the abilities of the Iron Chancellor. 
 On September 6, 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia – a semi-
autonomous Ottoman province of ethnic Bulgarians created by the Congress of Berlin in 1878 – 
declared that they were uniting into a single entity.  On October 10, Waldersee noted that the 
unification surprised the Great Powers and threatened to spark another European crisis, 
especially because it endangered the relationship between Russia and Austria.  “Today, relations 
still remain completely unclear,” he wrote in his journal, “Bismarck wants to maintain European 
peace under all conditions, and I believe therefore, that he will also not become seriously 
disturbed (gestört).”120  The next day, he opined, “the whole world looks again to Germany and 
also has the confidence that the right thing will happen here.”121  Several days later, however, 
Waldersee jotted in his journal some thoughts he had never expressed before:  
 I return again always to the conviction that Europe finds itself in no normal condition, 
 and that our position above all is very endangered.  Until now, it was achieved through 
 Bismarck’s skillfulness, always concluding the right alliances for us at the right time, but 
 with much trouble.  Should this always be possible?  I see a way out for us only in a great 
 war, in which we actually permanently paralyze an opponent, France or Russia – but how 
 should one expect such a thing from an 88 year-old Kaiser and 70 year-old Chancellor.  
 Yet it must also offer itself at a convenient moment.  1873 or 1874 was the right moment 	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 for the settlement of accounts with France, when we saw that the country recovered and 
 had thoughts of revenge, and just as in the case of Russia toward the end of the Russian-
 Turkish War [1877-1878], when we could first let England loose on Russia.  If not 
 through a great war, we come then out of the dilemma only with internal commotions, 
 possibly upheavals in France or Russia.  The collapse of Austria, which absolutely 
 approaches, can also cause an impetus for great changes.  We have far too  many 
 enemies: the French, Slavs, above all the Catholics, and then the entire little rabble of the  
 dispossessed, with their supporters.122 
 
In this entry, Waldersee expresses his frustration with the seemingly hopeless diplomatic 
situation in Europe and Bismarck’s apparent inability to maintain peace and Germany’s security.  
As he states, the only way to break the encirclement is, in a “great war,” to defeat either France 
in the west or Russia in the east to such a degree that neither could pose a future threat to 
Germany.  This is the first time Waldersee expressed the idea of war as a solution for the 
diplomatic predicament, but this was not a call for preventive war.  The above quote also reveals 
his other thoughts about freeing Germany from its entanglements, from domestic problems in 
France and Russia – which he had observed developing for years – to Austria’s implosion, which 
could allow new alignments in foreign policy.123 
 Despite his view of war as a diplomatic solution on October 15, 1885, Waldersee still 
believed that there could be a peaceful way to resolve Germany’s troubles.  For the next month, 
there was still uncertainty over what would happen in the Balkans, and Waldersee continued to 
speculate and ponder different scenarios.124  The longer the crisis was unresolved, he believed, 
the greater the chance Russia and Austria’s relationship could deteriorate.  On November 4, 
Waldersee spoke to Bismarck: 	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 I was at the Foreign Office for a long time and made it understood that I did not like the 
 prolongation of the matter, and I maintained great complications to be unavoidable.  One 
 did not want, however, to grant that I was right.  I also said it was time to bring the great 
 Eastern Question to a decision, however, [this] provoked general dismay . . . the moment 
 is quite favorable [when] the other Europe (i.e. Britain and France) cannot achieve much 
 against the three united imperial powers.125 
 
On November 14, Serbia, with Austria’s tacit support, declared war on Bulgaria.  The next day, 
Waldersee was concerned about what could transpire: 
 In the matter, very skilled people play along, of those, however, one knows nothing, and 
 ours the least.  Bismarck should be very annoyed with how well I can think because his 
 last work, the Three Emperor’s League, can easily disintegrate.  I have objected nothing 
 against it, but when the rift comes, we must only take our precautions.126 
 
The crisis in the Balkans continued without any agreeable solution in sight through November 
and into December.  
 “By 1886 at the latest,” writes John Röhl, “Bismarck’s foreign policy system was in a 
state of permanent crisis.”127  Throughout 1886, while the revanchists were increasingly agitating 
in France against Germany, Bismarck was attempting to keep Austria and Russia from going to 
war over developments in Eastern Europe.   In the aftermath of the Bulgarian unification crisis of 
1885, the Russians, and especially Tsar Alexander III, were highly dissatisfied with Prince 
Alexander of Battenberg, whom they had originally selected to rule the Bulgarian state to which 
they had given independence.  With his liberal tendencies, Prince Alexander eventually showed 
that he had no desire to be a puppet of St. Petersburg.  Bismarck liked having the Battenberg 
prince, a favorite of Queen Victoria of Great Britain, on the throne because it provided a bone of 
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contention between Russia and Britain.  The Chancellor succeeded in getting the Kaiser to reject 
the proposed marriage between Prince Alexander and Princess Victoria of Hohenzollern because, 
as Otto Pflanze writes, it “threatened to deprive Germany of its freedom of choice between 
Russia and England and thereby endanger his whole strategy of foreign policy.”128  On August 
20, 1886, a Russian-backed coup forced Prince Alexander to abdicate.  Even though a 
countercoup succeeded a few days later in which the Battenberg prince was reinstated, he 
abdicated the Bulgarian throne again on September 7, 1886, recognizing that Russian opposition 
to him would make his rule impossible.  After his departure, Russia was not able to reassert its 
dominance over Bulgaria, but the region still remained unstable, threatening the Three Emperor’s 
League.129  
 At the beginning of January 1886, Waldersee wrote, “in international politics there is still 
always a certain uncertainty because of the Balkan affairs.”  After reflecting on and informing 
himself about the situation, his solution for the Eastern Question was “to bring Turkey to Asia 
and Russia and Austria to a peaceful agreement” while “such a solution is still possible.”  In his 
journal, he proposed letting Russia occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles, even allowing 
them to have a toehold on Asia Minor, but he did not state how this idea would become a reality.  
He knew this solution would make Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire permanent enemies 
of Russia, but the new dynamics would consequently strengthen the Three Emperor’s League 
and eliminate the Russian threat to Germany’s eastern border.130  At the end of the month, he 
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realized his idea was no longer possible because it became apparent to him that neither Russia 
nor Austria wanted to solve the Eastern Question.  He noted that Russia felt slighted by Germany, 
but more importantly, Waldersee recognized that he was wrong in believing that Russia’s desire 
to occupy Constantinople would outweigh “other considerations.”131  By March, he realized that 
the opportunity to solve the Eastern Question – in order to prevent a Franco-Russian alliance – 
had passed.132    
 In France, General Georges Boulanger became the Minister of War at the beginning of 
1886.  Known as Général Revanche (General Revenge), the “flamboyant Boulanger . . . and his 
conduct,” writes George Kennan, “had left no doubt in anyone’s mind of the depth of his 
commitment to both the general cause of revanche and to the idea of a Franco-Russian 
alliance.”133  While the German military attaché in Paris sent alarmist reports to Berlin about the 
French War Minister, the German ambassador reassured the Wilhelmstrasse that the French 
government would not allow the country to go to war with Germany.134  Waldersee did not 
believe Boulanger was a threat: “He is considered capable of the most ambitious plans, [but] I do 
not believe he is thinking of opting for Revanche in the immediate future.”135  Waldersee was 
convinced that, though France was clearly opposed to Germany, the former would not attack the 
latter outright because the French had “not the courage” to “strike first.”136  As John Röhl states, 
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Waldersee considered the threat of war with France “to be chronic rather than acute.”137  On 
October 27, 1886 the Quartermaster-General wrote: 
 I am of the unshakable conviction that France is making ongoing preparations for war, 
 although without having a particular time for attack in mind.  They intend to be ready so 
 that they can immediately take advantage of any opportunity that arises, e.g. 
 complications in the oriental question, whereby we might be at odds with Russia.  They 
 will not begin on their own, but would not hesitate to do so if Russia formed an alliance 
 with them.138 
 
The day before, he had written that the “point of uncertainty” was Russia’s “unpredictable 
stance.”139  Two weeks before, he had written, “the decision is put on the Neva.”140  
 In 1886, Waldersee was as usual concerned with Russia, Germany’s neighbor of 
questionable reliability.  In March, he lamented that Russia was still strongly suspicious of 
Germany and, always concerned with the Russians’ mobilization capabilities, complained that 
“[their] preparations for war, and especially the expansion of the railways system for military 
purposes, have gone on unabated for years.”141  The thought of Germany’s unpredictable eastern 
neighbor allying with its antagonistic western neighbor had been lingering for years, but in 1886, 
it appeared to Waldersee to have the potential to become a reality.  For the German 
Quartermaster-General, the specter of a partnership was alarming.  Not only was the number of 
Russian troops on the western border three-fourths the size of the German army, but the 
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combined numbers of troops from France and Russia would outnumber those of Germany and 
Austria.142   
 Although ministers and government officials were important for diplomacy, Waldersee 
believed in the ultimate decision-making powers and influence of monarchs.  When Prince 
Wilhelm of Prussia returned from a trip to Brest-Litovsk in September 1886, he told Waldersee 
that he considered Tsar Alexander III would be “a reliable man for us, as long as we make no 
difficulties for him in the Orient.”  Waldersee wanted to believe him, but noted there were far too 
many people in Russia who were working for an alliance with France.  “Throughout the world 
the idea is now widely accepted that at present our sole guarantor of peace is the person of our 
Kaiser,” wrote Waldersee, “when he dies, Tsar Alexander will feel less inhibited, specifically 
because the Crown Prince’s English sympathies are known to him.”143  On November 1, he 
wrote the following about the Tsar while assessing the European situation: 
 The sole factor to our credit is Tsar Alexander.  By no means does he love us, but he is 
 lazy, hates all agitation, and also has a resolute sense of justice, which tells him there is 
 actually no sense in making war.  Besides, he also has a distinct admiration for our 
 Kaiser.144 
 
Therefore, he was surprised and dismayed when he learned on December 1 that the Tsar had had 
“the idiotic cheek . . . to make the French an offer of an alliance!”145   
 Although the French government did not accept Russia’s offer of an alliance, the attempt 
– long-feared by Germany – showed Waldersee that Bismarck’s foreign policy of isolating 	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France and keeping Russia at bay was unsustainable.  In spring 1886, he had noted that along 
with the “formidable figure of the Kaiser, who is revered like virtually no other sovereign before 
him” and Moltke’s “renowned skills in the field,” Bismarck was the last leg of the stool holding 
up world peace with his “superior statesmanship and energy, admired by everyone, and to which 
everyone bows, although not without opposition.”146  On October 15, 1885, Waldersee had first 
questioned Bismarck’s foreign policy, but on October 29, 1886, he wrote in his journal that he 
believed the aging Chancellor “has become uncertain in his policy . . . [and] begins to become 
concerned his work could collapse . . . I cannot share his concerns and have confidence in the 
future; certainly there will be difficult times and hard struggles.”147  
 In autumn 1886, Waldersee began to lose his confidence in Bismarck and furthered his 
belief that war was the only way our of Germany’s diplomatic predicament.  On October 15, 
1885, he had first expressed his belief in an inevitable great war being fought at an opportune 
moment, but Waldersee did not explicitly advocate that Germany should launch the conflict.  In 
May 1886, he believed that if the Ottomans and the Greeks went to war, a European war would 
be “hardly avoidable,” noting that Germany would have a better chance at being victorious the 
sooner the war comes.148  On November 1, 1886, however, Waldersee’s view on this future war 
shifted from being reactive to proactive: 
 I say we have the duty to take advantage of every favorable opportunity that presents 
 itself and bring about a war with France.  Militarily speaking, we are definitely at an 
 advantage thanks to the new repeating rifle, and in other ways too.  But if we do not make 
 use of such opportunities, then politics has to provide us with better ones, although I see 
 no prospect of this.149 	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This statement was preceded and caused by his view of Bismarck and the Chancellor’s foreign 
policy: 
 [It] becomes clearer to me that the Chancellor seems concerned about the future and 
 actually does not know how it will come out.  We show Russia the greatest consideration, 
 and lately the Chancellor has repeatedly stressed that we will have nothing to fear from 
 them for years to come . . . instead we are still, as for the past 15 years, trying in vain to 
 bring about a reconciliation with them in the course of time.  There can no longer be 
 doubt in anyone’s mind that this has been unsuccessful, although it has gone hand in hand 
 with the greatest favors and even support for their policies on our part.  The Chancellor 
 does not want a war under any circumstances, he fears he will risk his own reputation and 
 hopes to postpone the matter for as long as he is in office.  For the future, and in 
 particular for his successor, that is not very nice.150 
 
John Röhl calls this entry a typical one, but when looking at Waldersee’s statements about war 
and foreign policy in the 1880s, November 1, 1886 is the first time he states in his journal that he 
no longer has faith in Bismarck and that Germany should take a proactive approach to bringing 
about the inevitable European war.151  More than two weeks later, Waldersee stated that 
Germany could no longer trust Russia and should promote its independence and assert its 
superiority:  
 We are certainly strong enough to stand on our own two feet.  I wish we would now state 
 quite unequivocally that we do not fear them, and I am convinced that even today Russia 
 and France would shy away from war.  If they were to take us up on it, I would fully trust 
 that things would be to our advantage.”152 
 
By the end of 1886, Waldersee wrote that despite French assurances that they did not want to go 
to war and Russia’s “friendlier face,” “I very much hope that we do not let ourselves be led 
astray, and that we vigorously prepare ourselves for imminent war.”153  On the eve of 1887, he 
began to promote a course of action: “After thoroughly weighting up all the prospects, I believe 	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that the best thing would be for us to provoke a war with France; waiting until our enemies find 
it to be the right moment is certainly not the right approach.”154 
 Although France was a concern for Waldersee, Austria appeared to be a highly uncertain 
and unstable factor in the European equation.  In 1886, Waldersee conversed more often with the 
Chancellor’s son and Foreign Secretary Herbert von Bismarck than with the Chancellor himself.  
On April 17, after visiting the Kaiser and Moltke, Waldersee stopped to see Bismarck in the 
early afternoon.  “It was the first time in a long time that I once again had a talk with him,” he 
noted.  Unlike their past conversations, which were usually long and cordial, this one, lasting for 
45 minutes, appears to have been short and terse.  “I found him somewhat weak, also he 
complained about pains in the face,” Waldersee wrote, “in the conversation, however, he was 
very lively, as well as clear and certain in his expression.”  Besides talking about France, Russia, 
and the Catholic Church, they discussed “above all our relationship to Austria and the future of 
this state.”155  Waldersee was worried about the Austrians’ policy in the Balkans because their 
expansion to the southeast would bring them into conflict with Russia and drag Germany into the 
unavoidable mess.  He believed Austria’s refusal to draw a line in the Balkans – which Russia 
agreed to – was “extremely short-sighted, for Austria’s domestic situation is in a complete 
shambles; an unsuccessful war will accelerate the decay that is now taking place gradually.”156  
Furthermore, Waldersee was worried that Austria’s multi-national army, “which has held the 
empire together . . . is losing its internal cohesion and will no longer be able to stave off total 
collapse.”  “I fear that as an ally, Austria will be almost worthless,” he concluded.157  Waldersee 
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was not alone in this view among the political elite of Berlin, where the continuation of the Three 
Emperor’s League appeared untenable.158  At the end of 1886, he concluded, “the tension 
between Austria and Russia always becomes greater and will not be able to continue for long.”159 
 On New Year’s Day 1887, Waldersee wrote in his journal: “there is a feeling throughout 
the world that we are on the verge of great events, that a war between us and France is 
unavoidable, which, by involving Austria and Russia, would inevitably turn into a world war.”160  
In the first half of 1887, Waldersee saw the opportunity for fixing the diplomatic quagmire 
through conflict on Germany’s western border; in the second half of 1887, he saw it in the east.  
Waldersee believed no one in France, even the revanchists, wanted war, and the French were 
preparing “because they fear that we intend to attack them in the spring.”161  There was certainly 
reason for the French to be concerned.  In January, Bismarck spoke before a packed Reichstag 
urging support for the early renewal of the Septennat – the controversial seven-year military bill 
– by stoking concern about a war with France.  Bismarck would later state, “I could not invent 
Boulanger, but he happened very conveniently for me.”162  After the majority in the Reichstag 
passed a three-year budget – against Bismarck’s wishes – the Chancellor, as Otto Pflanze states, 
“dealt the Reichstag opposition the hardest blow in its history”; he dissolved the Reichstag, 
called for new elections, and used the war issue to return a majority that supported the Septennat.  
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The German press kept alive the specter of war, and there was a rumor that a bill would be 
introduced in the Prussian Parliament appropriating 300 million marks for military spending.  In 
February, Germany called up 72,000 reservists for a short drill in Alsace-Lorraine.163 
 In this atmosphere, Waldersee naturally saw the potential for a war with France.  On 
January 27, he stated: “The world as a whole is becoming increasingly uneasy, and people 
everywhere believe that war could break out any day now.  But this is not the case.  The leading 
figures in France are quite frightened and are giving very peaceful assurances.”  He believed war 
would actually depend on whether Boulanger remained in the French government.  In February 
he wrote that Général Revanche was in conflict with other members of the government, who 
dare not dispose of him; “if that does not succeed, we then will have war in April despite the 
efforts of the Chancellor.”164  On February 26, Waldersee felt it was his duty to tell Bismarck 
that France was preparing for war.  Speaking on a range of topics with the Quartermaster-
General for about an hour, Bismarck “admitted that one could be prepared for everything with 
Boulanger, but did not believe, however, in an imminent decision.”165  On March 1, Waldersee 
was concerned about Boulanger and high-placed Russians plotting war on Germany.166  By the 
end of the month he took comfort in the renewal of the Triple Alliance – the defensive agreement 
between Germany, Austria, and Italy – and in Britain taking Germany’s side in certain instances, 
such as in Mediterranean affairs; “the French and the Russians will no doubt lack the courage to 
strike.”  “What a shame it is,” Waldersee wrote, “but I am still hoping that Boulanger will 
undertake an over-hasty coup.”167  A few days later, he stated that Boulanger was losing 
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influence and it appeared that peace would “endure for a long time to come.”168  Röhl writes, 
with an implicit criticism, that Waldersee did not embrace this possibility for peace, but when 
looking at the development of Waldersee’s advocacy for war, Boulanger had the most potential 
among the leaders of France to spark that opportune moment that could initiate war.  Given the 
complexity and uncertainty of French politics, Bismarck, writes Otto Pflanze, believed 
“Boulanger might easily become the ‘fuse’ for the explosion, perhaps without wanting to be.”169     
 On February 21, 1887, Waldersee was concerned that Bismarck’s policy toward Austria 
was making Vienna mistrustful, even though “we must get used to the idea of waging war 
together with them.”  “There is indeed still a good deal of trust in Bismarck’s skills,” he added, 
“but I do not see how he can extract us from the uncomfortable situation.”170  After the 
Quartermaster-General had talked to the Chancellor on February 26, Waldersee wrote the 
following in his journal: 
 We then spoke about the war itself, and he said – what for me was of the greatest worth – 
 that we should tread at best gently in the east, just as the Russians would not wage war on 
 us with full strength.  We must urge the Austrians to use their full strength.171 
 
In March 1887, Waldersee believed the possible Boulanger-induced opportunity for war had 
quickly diminished – by June 1, Général Revanche would no longer be the Minister of War – 
and he now looked more intently to Germany’s eastern border: 
 In the east, a new storm seems to be brewing, and this time we will not help to divert it.  
 The great trick here is to behave properly towards Austria.  In any case, it will be a 
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 considerable advantage if we do not immediately have to play the leading role when war 
 breaks out.172 
 
 In autumn 1887, Waldersee encouraged action in the east, and in the process annoyed 
Bismarck, but his advocacy of conflict had already begun to ruffle feathers earlier in the year.  In 
January, he noted, “Because I frankly state that we should take advantage of the still-favorable 
prevailing conditions to trigger a war with France, I often have the reputation of being a very evil 
person.  But it is obvious that I am right, and many acknowledge this as well.”173  “I am told I am 
regarded by the Chancellor, and therefore in wider circles, as the leader of the so-called War 
Party,” he wrote in May, “and indeed not with benevolent eyes because the Chancellor wants to 
avoid war completely.”  “I will soon believe myself that I am a rather bad man,” he added, 
“What will be thrown at me next?”174  Later that month, he wrote that numerous friends were 
warning him about his adversaries from a “certain coterie” who saw him, as Quartermaster-
General, as a thorn in their side.  He knew he had opponents at the Foreign Office and even 
among some military men who had connections to Crown Prince Frederick, but Waldersee 
believed that his friends were being too pessimistic and that he was secure in his position for the 
time being.175  After the winter of 1887, he would be accused of more, not just within the 
exclusive halls of power, but in newspapers for the public to see. 
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 In 1887, Tsar Alexander III decided not to renew the Three Emperor’s League, despite 
the urgings of his Foreign Minister, Nicholas de Giers.  In May and June of 1887, Bismarck and 
the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Paul Shuvalov negotiated what would become known as the 
Reinsurance Treaty, which stipulated that if either Germany or Russia were to engage in a war 
with another power, the other would remain neutral unless Russia were to declare war on 
Austria-Hungary or Germany were to declare war on France.  In the treaty’s secret protocols, 
Germany would leave Bulgaria to the Russians and would not interfere with their designs on the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles – the Turkish-controlled straits to the Mediterranean Sea.  Francesco 
Crispi, the new Italian prime minister who wanted his country to play a greater role in 
Mediterranean affairs, visited Bismarck at his estate of Friedrichsruh in October.  The Chancellor 
maintained that Germany had no interest in Bulgaria and the straits, but encouraged Crispi to talk 
with Vienna and London, and together those three powers formed a “Mediterranean agreement” 
in which they would support the Ottoman Empire’s interests in Bulgaria and authority over the 
straits.  Bismarck, however, warned Austria repeatedly that the Dual Alliance of 1879 was a 
defensive agreement that would not obligate Germany to support Vienna’s policy toward the 
Balkans.176  The web of alliances became tighter and the conflicting interests continued to clash.  
In July, Russia opposed the election of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Kohary, an officer in 
the Austro-Hungarian army, as the new ruler of Bulgaria.  Bismarck did not support the choice 
yet refused to get more involved on the side of St. Petersburg; however, he advised Austria to let 
the Russians invade Bulgaria if they wanted.  “The eastern question is a game of patience 
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[Geduldspiel],” Bismarck stated, “whoever can wait will win.”177  Alfred von Waldersee did not 
share the Chancellor’s opinion. 
 Despite the Reinsurance Treaty, Russian officials and the government-controlled press 
continued their anti-German agitation much to the annoyance of Bismarck, who, according to 
Waldersee, said of the tsar: “he is a false man (c’est un faux bonhomme).”178  “The mood in 
Russia becomes persistently worse against us,” Waldersee wrote in his journal, “there is general 
agreement that we are the opponent who is to be combatted first and above all things.”  He was 
disappointed that neither side was going to bring about a fight.179  Unaware of the Reinsurance 
Treaty’s secret protocols, he lamented that Bismarck still wanted to maintain good relations with 
St. Petersburg and that the Chancellor had passed up chances to engage Russia in the Balkans.180   
 On November 3, Waldersee heard the news that Tsar Alexander was going to stop in 
Berlin as his family travelled back to Russia from Copenhagen.  He believed the visit would not 
be politically beneficial and doubted whether the Tsar could change the anti-German mood in his 
empire; “he must now already swim with the current.”  Waldersee believed that the only thing to 
fear is that “we let ourselves be deceived through friendly words.”181  From reports he received 
on November 16, Waldersee thought that if they were accurate, Russia was calculating on war 
breaking out at the beginning of the next year.  He concluded that the tsar, not informed of the 
details, must have approved the movements of Russian troops and war materials to the west and 
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that, given the tsar’s unusually long absence from St. Petersburg, the ministers had to depend on 
themselves, ruling with “business-like anarchy.”182   
 After “thorough consideration” of the news of Russian military preparations, he believed 
according to his “fullest conviction” that Russia would strike sometime in early 1888.  “Then we 
are completely finished,” he wrote, “thus it is of consequence, if we decide quickly to go to war 
now.”  If a good, strong action – i.e. immediate mobilization – would not make an impression on 
the tsar, “we must then proceed resolutely.”  He then proceeded to predict the war: Austria feels 
even more threatened by the Russian preparations; things get serious; and the theater of 
operations will be in Poland, where a winter campaign is “no pleasure,” but rivers will be easy to 
cross, aiding the offensive.  “The difficulty is naturally in the old age and frailty of the Kaiser,” 
Waldersee added.  Suspecting that his wishes would not come to fruition, he believed that 
conditions would be “considerably worse” if Germany waited until early 1888.  Waldersee spoke 
to his superior, Field Marshal Moltke, who agreed with him.  He went then to Herbert Bismarck, 
who, after listening attentively, told him he wanted to discuss it with his father.  At his last stop, 
Waldersee talked to the War Minister, who did not believe a war was near because the Kaiser 
would not support it.  He did promise Waldersee to support railroad construction to the east.183  
 Around 10:30 the next morning – November 18 – the train carrying the Russian imperial 
family pulled into Berlin’s Lehrter Station, just across the Spree from the Military Staff Building.  
Awaiting them on horseback were the Kaiser and his aides, including Alfred von Waldersee.  
While the Romanovs were in the German capital for the day, Waldersee was charged with being 
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aide-de-camp to the Russian crown prince, the future Nicholas II (1868-1917).  Waldersee 
described the 19 year old as very small, handsome, intelligent, and a good conversationalist, but 
“somewhat awkward in his manners.”184  The Kaiser gave a dinner for his Russian guests, and 
Bismarck and Alexander III had an hour-and-a-half long private meeting, in which, according to 
the Chancellor’s account, both men expressed their grievances.  Notably, the Tsar stated that he 
had neither interest in a Franco-Russian alliance nor in warring against Germany.185   
 Before the family left that night to return to St. Petersburg, the Russian crown prince 
presented Waldersee with the star of the Polish Order of the White Eagle.  On the blue enamel 
ring in the middle of the eight-pointed gold star shone the gilded phrase, Pro Fide Rege et Lege 
(For Faith, King, and Law).  “I thought with you [that] Alfred had all the orders,” Mrs. Lee wrote 
to her cousin in Connecticut, “in fact he has more than he can wear, but the honor pleases 
him.”186  During the Tsar’s visit, the Kaiser had conferred on Paul Shuvalov, the Russian 
ambassador to Berlin, the Order of the Black Eagle – on the silver ring of the eight-pointed silver 
star shone the gilded phrase, Suum Cuique (To each according to his merits).  “A rather unusual 
decoration,” wrote Waldersee, because Shuvalov did not want to carry the responsibility if war 
broke out and planned to resign from his post.187 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Tsar’s visit, tensions relaxed, and a contented Bismarck 
returned to Friedrichsruh.  Waldersee considered peace temporary, believing Russia’s difference 
with Austria could result in “catastrophe,” and Germany’s chances for victory were becoming 
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worse.188  On November 23, Waldersee had a long conversation with Herbert Bismarck, in which 
the Chancellor’s son and Foreign Secretary stated that it was possible to let Austria wage war on 
Russia by itself.  The Quartermaster-General maintained that Germany was committed to 
standing with Austria if attacked, but if its territory were invaded, German troops would arrive 
too late and Vienna would likely soon make peace after a lost battle, leaving Germany stuck with 
the whole Russian army.  Austria, he stated, did not want to attack Russia – an idea he called 
“pure nonsense” – but Vienna would act “only in a state of self-defense.”  Germany, he insisted, 
had to prepare for conflict just like its eastern neighbors in order to be ready as soon as 
possible.189  That day, Waldersee sent the Kaiser an outline of a memorandum he would draft 
about the military capabilities of Russia.  In it, he emphasized the same points about Austria, 
Russia, and the necessity for offensive action that he had argued to Herbert Bismarck.  The main 
objective of war, he wrote, is to destroy the enemy’s means of resistance so other goals can be 
achieved; once the combined Austrian and German armies defeated the Russian forces in Poland, 
the allies’ success would quickly bring the war to an end.190 
 From the end of November through December, Waldersee discussed the war crisis with a 
number of important people.  Along with Moltke, he issued memorandums and made 
presentations about Russian preparations and a possible war to the Kaiser.  The German monarch 
originally believed his empire could stay neutral in an Austro-Russian conflict, but grew 
increasingly concerned about war, stating that he wanted command of the western army in the 
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event of a war against both France and Russia.191  The German ambassador to Austria, Prince 
Reuss, visited Waldersee while he was in Berlin and agreed with the Quartermaster-General that 
the situation was very serious, reporting that the Austrians were expecting Germany to tell them 
what to do.  Waldersee lamented that Bismarck wanted Austria to avoid provocations.  After the 
ambassador spoke with Bismarck and before he returned to Vienna, Waldersee paid him a visit, 
during which he learned that the Chancellor had instructed Reuss to advise the Austrians to do 
what they considered essential for their security yet communicate openly with Russia.192  
Waldersee, as he wrote, was in “very active” communication with the Foreign Office, which “is 
now in feverish activity.”193  In Dresden, he met with the King of Saxony, who wanted to be 
informed of developments and what role he would play; the king was “in particular, completely 
in agreement with his command in the east.”194  Another royal, the Grand Duke of Baden, visited 
Waldersee to express his concerns and hear the Quartermaster-General’s thoughts.195 
 Waldersee’s discussions about war with important officials eventually landed him in hot 
water.  On December 5, Waldersee visited the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, Count Emmerich 
Széchényi, who was displeased that Germany demanded Austria to take measures against Russia.  
Waldersee told him they should wait until the beginning of the new year, but quicken 
preparations.  The ambassador asked him whether Russia was planning a winter campaign, to 
which the Quartermaster-General responded, “No, I fear they do not.”  That evening, Herbert 
Bismarck visited the ambassador and told him that Austria must do something, but Széchényi 
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replied that Waldersee thought it would be better to do nothing.196  Two days later, shortly before 
going to dinner at Herbert Bismarck’s, Waldersee received a confidential letter, dictated by the 
Chancellor.  Bismarck expressed his displeasure with him and threatened to appeal to their 
sovereign: 
It is impossible for me, in my state of health to continue to conduct business, if I am 
exposed to such interference from the military side, and if alongside the official channels 
occur opposing influences of an authoritative nature on foreign representatives and their 
cabinets.  Considering our friendly relationship and the need of business-like care of His 
Majesty the Kaiser, I would lament it if, out of necessity, I were to call on the support of 
His Highness against the damaging of our policy.  In the interest of the country and our 
security I would, however, not be able to avoid this if I would have to fear the 
impressions, which Your Excellency’s remarks have made on the Austrian cabinet and its 
policy, could repeat themselves.197  
 
After the dinner, Waldersee talked to Herbert Bismarck.  Although mistrustful of Herbert, 
Waldersee wanted to maintain a cordial relationship with the Chancellor, who he believed 
wanted to do the same.198 
 Not only did Bismarck confront Waldersee about his advocacy for war, but he also 
confronted one of Waldersee’s military attachés.  On December 21, Major Adolf von Deines, the 
German military attaché in Vienna who maintained an active correspondence with Waldersee 
and shared his view on war, wrote to the Quartermaster-General that he had received a letter 
from the Chancellor reprimanding him for his behavior in the Austrian capital.  After reviewing 
the attaché’s reports, Bismarck told Deines tersely that in his conversation with Emperor Franz 
Josef he had overstepped the boundary between political and military questions.  The Chancellor 
stressed his uncontestable authority in foreign affairs: “The General Staff does not advise the 
foreign policy of His Majesty, but I do exclusively, and the honorable gentleman is not 
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authorized without my explicit instruction to attempt to have an influence of political 
consequence on the political circles of Vienna and on their resolutions.”199  Deines wrote to 
Waldersee that he would have to be more careful when writing future reports and maintained that 
he never encouraged the Austrians toward war, but only self-defense.200  In the final days of 
1887, Bismarck continued to remind Vienna that the alliance was strictly defensive in nature and 
to warn the Austrians of military interference in diplomacy:  
I cannot avoid the impression that it is the aim of certain military circles in Vienna to 
distort our defensive alliance . . . We must both take care that the privilege of giving 
political advice to our monarchs does not in fact slip out of our hands and pass over to the 
General Staffs.201 
 
Waldersee wrote that the Chancellor wrongly believed Austria was trying to get Germany to join 
them in a war of aggression; instead, he maintained, an offensive against Russia was in reality a 
defensive action.202   
 Although the Austro-Russian war scare would fizzle out in the beginning months of 1888, 
the war that Waldersee believed was inevitable and would need to be fought sooner rather than 
later never occurred.  As shown in this section, throughout the 1880s Waldersee gradually came 
to see Bismarck’s foreign policy as untenable.  In the 1870s and 1880s, Russia was clearly an 
unstable entity in Europe.  As George Kennan argues, the Russian Empire, whose statesmanship 
was “so obviously misguided and self-destructive” and whose elite was blinded by “heady 
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nationalism,” had no need to pursue an expensive and aggressive foreign adventurism in 
southeastern Europe as it struggled to modernize.203   Waldersee was not just concerned about 
anti-German Russian nationalism.  On January 29, 1887, he wrote, “We are surrounded by 
countries in which the prevailing conditions are unhealthy and untenable in the long term.”204  In 
Republican France, anti-German revanchism was alive and well, especially while Georges 
Boulanger was Minister of War.  In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany’s multi-national 
ally, Waldersee was concerned about nationalism infiltrating the emperor’s army. 
 To the monarchist Waldersee, Germany’s greatest asset during these difficult times was 
Kaiser Wilhelm I.  When the German emperor became ill in March 1887, he wrote that “every 
such illness always points to the fact that great events could be just around the corner, for with 
the Kaiser’s death circumstances will change the world over, and we will be facing crises at 
home and abroad.”205  As shown above, Waldersee believed that the respect and admiration Tsar 
Alexander III had for the Kaiser would prevent war with Russia, and thus, as John Röhl notes, 
Waldersee “turned this insight on its head” by arguing that Germany should start a war with 
France while the Kaiser was still alive.206  In December 1887, Waldersee wrote that it sent a 
“chill up my spine” when he heard the Kaiser say that he told the Tsar, “When you want to join 
with France in a war against us, you are then the stronger and can destroy us; however, believe 
me, Europe will not tolerate that.”207 
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 Calling Waldersee a warmonger – a pejorative term – belittles his genuine concerns about 
Germany’s security.  As shown above, for years he received ominous reports of Russian railroad 
construction, westward troop movements, and the buildup of forces near the border.  In the 1880s, 
there was actually fear on both sides of the border that fostered and increased the military 
buildups of the three eastern empires.  The Russians had the persistent sense that their military 
capabilities were inferior to those of their western neighbors.  A Russian assessment of the 
empire’s military preparedness in 1887 concluded that Austria could easily invade without the 
help of Germany.  In 1883, the Russian Chief of Staff reported to Giers, the Foreign Minister, 
that given the dense transportation networks of Germany and Austria, “our borders are 
completely open.”  In the early 1870s, the Ministry of War had identified eleven strategically 
necessary rail lines, but by 1888, only three were under construction.  With the lack of railroads 
and the financial challenges of building new ones, the Russian military decided that if it was 
going to have any chance at repelling an invasion, it needed to be more prepared for action than 
its western neighbors.  Beginning in 1880, the Russian deployment plans called for more active 
troops to be massed in the west (See Image 7).  As William Fuller has observed, there was the 
danger “that Vienna and Berlin might misread the redeployment as a gesture of hostility or, still 
worse, as a prelude to Russian aggression.”  This was certainly the case with Waldersee, who 
failed to see Russian war planning from the Russian perspective.  While Waldersee saw their 
deployments as offensive, the Russian Minister of War and Foreign Minister thought that the 
German and Austrian governments would realize they were for defensive purposes.208  The 
influence of modernization, and especially railroads, in military planning cannot be overstated. 
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 From 1882 to 1887 Waldersee’s view of diplomacy, and specifically of Bismarck’s 
foreign policy, evolved.  He adhered originally to the Iron Chancellor’s system, but grew 
increasingly mistrustful of Russia.  He believed in the ultimate authority and goodwill of 
monarchs, but the pressures of nationalisms and modernizing military capabilities caused him to 
regard the intricacies of Bismarck’s alliances and agreements as untenable and that the next war 
Image 7: The four main Russian armies according to the 1880 
Redeployment Plan.  William Fuller, Strategy and Power in 
Russia, 1600-1914, (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 340. 
   
	   79 
should be fought on Germany’s terms.  “A more complicated chapter of diplomacy than that 
dealing with the year 1887,” wrote William Langer, “could hardly be found in the history of 
European international relations.”209  In this atmosphere, Waldersee looked at the political, 
military, and diplomatic situation throughout Europe, and by late 1886, he decided that the best 
way to maintain the future security of the German Empire was to bring about the war he 
considered inevitable.  If one believes in the saying that “generals always fight the last war,” then 
Waldersee must have certainly expected that the next war would be like the Wars of German 
Unification – short and decisive with Germany able to dictate the conditions of peace.  
Waldersee had hoped in 1885 to sacrifice southeastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire to 
maintain the Three Emperor’s League and German security, but by 1887, he saw that was no 
longer possible because he thought Russia could not be trusted.  A German victory would make 
Russia, like France, a permanent enemy, especially if Poland was reconstituted – which 
Waldersee believed would be necessary.210   
 A preventive war launched by Germany in the late 1880s would not have brought lasting 
peace and security to Europe.  Waldersee’s greatest fault is that he urged war as a diplomatic 
solution when he did not fully understand the intricacies of the domestic politics of other 
countries.  The source of his paranoia was his inability to comprehend the reality behind the 
rhetoric of men like Boulanger and the actions of the Russian General Staff.  He looked intently 
at the European situation from a German perspective, but no one else’s.  As much as he 
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discussed international affairs with others – from the Bismarcks to the German military attachés 
– and gathered information – from newspapers to intelligence reports – there were still 
limitations to what Waldersee could know.  Without knowledge of the secret protocols of the 
Reinsurance Treaty, for example, he could not fully comprehend why Bismarck was acting the 
way he did toward Austria and Russia. 
 Although the Chancellor found Waldersee’s advocacy of war annoying, he did not seek 
to get rid of the Quartermaster-General, with whom he had maintained a cordial relationship 
since the 1870s.  Bismarck became alarmed, not by Waldersee’s challenge to his foreign policy, 
but by his increasing friendship with, and influence over, Prince Wilhelm of Hohenzollern, who 
came to share the Quartermaster-General’s views on foreign affairs and war by late 1887.211  
Waldersee’s relationship with Bismarck had survived their differences over foreign policy during 
the late 1880s, but his relationship with Wilhelm would become the issue that would begin to 
divide the two men.  
 
The Father Who Art in Herwarthstrasse 2 
  
 On April 8, 1885, many visitors stopped at the Military Staff Building to wish Waldersee 
well on his fifty-third birthday.  Of all the gifts given to him, Mary’s received special attention.  
In honor of the Kaiser naming her husband an Adjutant General – the nearest personal post to the 
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each side a gilded crown on top a “W” for Wilhelm I.  Prince Wilhelm the Kaiser’s 26 year-old 
grandson, arrived with his wife, and making his way through the salons to look at the table of 
gifts, he caught sight of the cloth and admired it.  “Offering I suppose from the General Staff?” 
he asked.  “Oh no, but from my life staff,” Waldersee replied as he waved toward Mary, 
delighting all present.  The prince presented the Quartermaster-General with a photograph of 
himself costumed as the seventeenth-century Charles X of Sweden.  Underneath his name, he 
wrote, “to my honored friend and military teacher, Count von Waldersee.”  The educator hung 
the photo of his pupil on the wall in his room next to another of the prince, costumed, as Mrs. 
Lee explained, in “curls and [a] sort of sloughed hat in Italian fashion.”212   
 In their analyses of the relationship between the two men, historians have tended to focus 
on Waldersee’s influence on Prince Wilhelm, portraying it as a sinister scheme of a politically 
ambitious general.  According to Gordon Craig, Waldersee “sought to make his position in the 
General Staff one of far-reaching influence” and “worked feverishly to ingratiate himself with 
both the crown prince and young Prince Wilhelm.”213  In his biography of Wilhelm II, Lamar 
Cecil writes that Waldersee “was ever ready with a soothing word, a moral injunction, or a 
cleverly constructed insinuation, all of which were calculated to appeal to Wilhelm’s feelings 
and to advance [his own] position.”214  Princess Augusta Victoria asked Waldersee in 1886 to 
advise her young husband if he had to accede to the throne sooner than expected.  This task, 
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Isabel Hull opines, was one “the ambitious Waldersee was only too happy to do.”215  In reality, 
however, Waldersee did not force a personal and political relationship on Wilhelm and did not 
see the prince as a tool for his ambition.  Instead, as historians and biographers have actually 
observed, there were things that naturally attracted Wilhelm to Waldersee and things that they 
both had in common.  Hull states, “Waldersee’s outspoken bellicosity, which Wilhelm 
interpreted as masculinity, made him attractive to the young Prince.”216  Cecil writes, “[Wilhelm] 
discovered in the general a fellow conservative, a staunch Protestant, and a foe of all forms of 
vice.”217  Giles MacDonogh observes that Waldersee “fitted the bill” to be one of Wilhelm’s 
friends, who had to be “male, anti-English, anti-liberal and opposed to the crown princess.  
Waldersee was all four.”218 
 All these historians have looked at the Wilhelm-Waldersee relationship in their quests to 
understand the future Kaiser Wilhelm II and his reign.  This section will examine Waldersee’s 
role in the relationship and explore specifically how and why he became a friend and father 
figure to the young prince and what this relationship – and thus Wilhelm – meant to him.  Their 
character traits formed the foundation of their friendship, upon which fell the building blocks of 
their shared experiences, those activities – like the social events described above – that provided 
occasions for exchanging information, gossip, opinions, and for fostering relationships.  
Although a diplomatic trip to Russia in 1884, an attempt to settle an affair in 1885, and an attack 
on the Union Club in 1885-86 were important events that brought the two men closer together, 
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the persistent animosity between Prince Wilhelm and his parents created an opening that allowed 
Waldersee to become the father the prince never had.   
 The liberal views of Crown Prince Frederick and Crown Princess Victoria, the eldest 
child of Great Britain’s Queen Victoria, were quite different from their son’s and Waldersee’s 
conservative views.  On a personal level, Waldersee was sympathetic toward the young prince, 
providing open ears and words of advice about military, political, and family matters.  On a 
political level, Waldersee was a staunch monarchist, who sought to defend traditional Prussian 
kingship against what he viewed as threats, such as the Crown Prince and Crown Princess’s 
liberalism.  It was this politically conservative attitude that eventually caused Waldersee to see 
and seek in Wilhelm a new hope for the future of the empire.  This idea was established on 
December 6, 1882 in Waldersee’s journal after he had his first serious encounter with the prince: 
 Today, [he] came to me in order to inform himself about French fortifications, resulting 
 in a long military and political discussion.  I have now seen the prince more often and 
 have begun to form an opinion.  He has an unusually fresh vigor and does everything that 
 he engages in with thoroughness and conscientiousness.  He appears to have much of his 
 grandfather in him.  If his parents had set the goal to raise him to be a constitutional 
 monarch, which bows obediently to the sovereignty of a parliamentary majority, they 
 have had misfortune.  The exact opposite has appeared to happen.219   
 
Although Waldersee developed at first a reserved optimism about the prince, over time, as events 
brought them closer together, he would show an increasing affinity for him. 
 In May 1884, Waldersee accompanied Wilhelm as a member of his entourage on a 
twelve-day trip to Russia to congratulate the fourteen-year-old future Nicholas II of Russia on his 
coming-of-age.  Historian John Röhl emphasizes that this trip was a crucial event in Wilhelm’s 
life because “it was here that he discovered that peculiar transcendental emperor ideology which 
satisfied his narcissistic needs and which he stressed to such an alarming degree throughout his 
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own reign.”220  His experience revealed trends that would characterize his later reign: he viewed 
all emperors as more than mere mortals; he initiated a secret, personal, and potentially politically 
dangerous (i.e. anti-British) communication with Tsar Alexander III; and he gave preference to 
his personal advisors over their official superiors. 
 In the later years of his life, Wilhelm noted that the Russian ceremony on May 18, 1884 
in St. Petersburg was “a splendid sight for a soldier’s eye,”221 and of course this view must have 
then been shared at the time with his Quartermaster-General, who loved his military profession.  
All of the militaristic trappings, the religious symbols, the people of the court, the size of the 
rooms, the oaths, and the entire monarchist ceremony must have impressed the conservative 
Waldersee just as much as Wilhelm, as seen in his detailed description of the ceremony:   
 In the colossal halls stood numerous deputations of all the troops garrisoned here, 
 together surely 2,000 men, which repeatedly made the Honneurs.  Hordes of generals, 
 high-ranking officers, court officials, senators, clergy, and naturally the entire diplomatic 
 corps and a great number of ladies in Russian costume completely filled the enormous 
 rooms.  The procession, with the Tsar and Tsarina in front, then Prince Wilhelm with the 
 Queen of Greece etc. went through all the rooms to the church.  Here was the first 
 ceremony of which I could only see little.  At the end the successor to the throne spoke 
 the oath with a loud voice.  From there, the procession passed back through the rooms to 
 the throne, where all flags were gathered and the soldier’s oath was taken, then back 
 through the arranged troops to the imperial apartments, where the family and the 
 diplomats congratulated him.222          
 
Earlier that morning, Waldersee had watched the Hohenzollern prince lay a wreath at the grave 
of Alexander II, who had been assassinated by anarchists just three years before.  This act of 
monarchical solidarity against dangerous elements certainly provided a powerful symbol to 
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Waldersee.  After the laying of the wreath and a tour of the Peter and Paul Fortress, he wrote, 
“Many political criminals should sit in the prisons.”223 
  Through the 1884 trip to Russia, Waldersee became part of the entourage Wilhelm 
formed around himself.  Upon returning to Berlin at the end of May, Waldersee noted: 
 To accompany Prince Wilhelm was of the highest interest for me.  I have been alone with 
 him for many hours.  He has spoken with much openness about many conditions, 
 including those in his family . . . I have been able to observe him everywhere he went in 
 the last twelve days, so that I have been able to complete my previous judgment about 
 him substantially.  I can summarize it by saying that he justifies our best hopes for the 
 future.  He will become the right man to maintain Germany’s position of power, perhaps 
 to expand it!224 
 
The reserved optimism Waldersee had expressed after their first serious encounter in 1882 had 
now become a ringing endorsement after the 1884 trip, which Waldersee saw as an important 
moment for Russo-German relations.225  Their shared experience increased their friendship, and 
in the future, Wilhelm knew he could turn to the Quartermaster-General for advice and 
assistance. 
 By the beginning of January 1885, Waldersee was developing a more sentimental and 
personal opinion of the prince: 
 Around 3 in the afternoon Prince Wilhelm came to me and stayed for an hour and a half.  
 I believe, indeed, that he has placed a real trust in me.  He discusses many delicate family 
 matters, and I almost feared he is not cautious enough concerning others.  In one matter 
 that now keeps him very occupied, he assures me that I am his only confidant.  I have 
 given advice several times to confide himself fully in no one in order that he not lose his 
 independence.  He is a very peculiar young man, who already now shows a strong 
 character and that is still the main thing.  He has an open head, a fresh mind, a great lust 
 and energy to work, and a strongly developed Prussian feeling.  Perhaps he is not 
 excessively of much heart, but I believe that this is excellent for him and his future.  In 
 his outward behavior he is friendly and pleasant.226 
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A few days later, Waldersee noted that Wilhelm arrived and stayed for about an hour.  The 
prince said many things that the Quartermaster-General did not wish to write down and stated 
that he held Waldersee to be a very good friend and was counting on him for later.227  This is the 
first time the prince referred to Waldersee as a friend, and in the above journal entry from 
January 16, Waldersee noted that he was the prince’s only confidant in a particular matter of 
importance.  One cannot understand what lay behind these statements through the published 
journal entries, which show the Wilhelm-Waldersee relationship reaching a new level for an 
unknown reason; however, John Röhl has put the pieces of the puzzle together and has 
discovered that Waldersee was helping Wilhelm settle a potentially politically and socially 
dangerous affair.   
 Prince Wilhelm had been in secret correspondence with Countess Wedel to obtain an 
Austrian repeating rifle that could shoot more rounds than the gun being used by the Prussian 
army.  Not much is known about her early life, but in the 1870s, Elisabeth Bérard became the 
mistress of Prince Friedrich of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who was believed to be the father of 
the twins to whom she gave birth.  From 1879 to 1884, Elisabeth Bérard was married to Count 
Hermann von Wedel, the brother of the German military attaché in Vienna, Carl.  Through her 
contacts in Austrian court circles, the countess knew the Austrian Archduke Carl Salvator, 
inventor of the repeating rifle.  Röhl believes that Wilhelm and Wedel met while the Prussian 
prince was on a hunting trip in Austria in October 1884 with Carl Salvator’s brother, Grand 
Duke Ferdinand IV of Tuscany.  While many historians have disregarded her memoirs – titled 
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My Relationship with H.M. Kaiser Wilhelm II (1900) – Röhl believes that archival findings 
confirm the basic points of her story – one that involved Waldersee.228   
 On Christmas Day 1884, Wilhelm sent a note to Waldersee asking to meet him that 
afternoon at the Military Staff Building: “Matter of utmost importance! periculum in Mora!”229  
By February 18, 1885, Waldersee wrote in his journal that they were meeting almost daily to 
discuss primarily the repeating rifle.  “He is going to get a trial model of one out of Austria,” the 
Quartermaster-General wrote, “and he expects great things of it.”230  The next day, Wilhelm 
went to Potsdam, where he met Countess Wedel, who had brought the gun.  On February 20, 
Waldersee and some other top generals watched as Wilhelm tested it. 
 Thereafter, the situation with Wedel began to deteriorate.  At a tea with the imperial 
couple, Minister of War General Bronsart von Schellendorf mentioned the presence of a mistress 
of the Archduke, a slip of the tongue that greatly angered Wilhelm, who had hoped to keep her 
involvement secret.  Wilhelm asked Waldersee to reprimand Bronsart severely.  He also asked 
his friend to loan him money so he could give it to Wedel, to whom, the prince claimed, Carl 
Salvator gave too little money for the trip.231  This was the first time Wedel asked for money.  
She would blackmail Wilhelm for money and favors for several years more because she 
possessed letters he had handwritten to her, in which it was evident that he was in love with 
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her.232  Waldersee became the go-between, the main agent for getting these letters back and 
helping solve the affair without it becoming a public scandal.  He even came up with the idea to 
use “W.W.W.” (Wilhelm, Waldersee, and Wedel) to sign their letters and to refer to Countess 
Wedel.  Wilhelm felt more compelled to get the letters when he learned that she had left Carl 
Salvator and moved into the Charlottenburg neighborhood of Berlin.  In late December 1885, 
Countess Wedel suffered several severe hemorrhages at her home.  Believing her death was 
imminent, she wanted to give Wilhelm custody of her children in her will, but the prince sent 
Waldersee to talk her out of this idea.   
 Wilhelm and Waldersee were unable to obtain all of the letters the prince had written to 
her, and when Wilhelm became Kaiser in 1888, his private secretary took over the task of trying 
to retrieve them.  After publishing her memoirs, which included a letter from Waldersee, 
Countess Wedel spent the last years of her troubled life in a Swiss insane asylum.  When she was 
transferred to a German institution in 1905, she disappeared from the record books.  Wilhelm’s 
handwritten letters turned up in Tehran in the 1950s.  They had remained in a safe in the Persian 
embassy in Berlin where Wedel had been a lady of honor until 1886.233 
 The Quartermaster-General did not apparently have much interest in the repeating rifle, 
but he was someone to whom Wilhelm could turn for support in this potentially devastating 
matter.  The question remains as to why the pious Waldersee was eager and willing to help the 
married prince who had violated at least one of the Ten Commandments.  On March 14, 1885, 
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after attending a soirée, Wilhelm stopped to see Waldersee before leaving for the wedding of his 
sister-in-law.  The latter wrote in his journal: 
 I have not noted down his visits recently because they were very frequent, for a time he 
 came to see me every day; initially he did so mainly because of a deal involving a 
 repeating rifle, in which he took a lively interest, and in which he desired my support; this 
 was then followed by a number of other matters as well.  In fact, we have indeed become 
 much closer, and I believe that I have been able to see into his soul.  He definitely has it 
 in him to achieve great things one day; he is clever, industrious, unbelievably active, 
 lively and dogged in pursuing an idea.  He is hard-headed and already displays decidedly 
 conservative tendencies and a marked awareness of the duties to which he will later have 
 to discharge.  I have the impression that he likes me and trusts me.  On more than one 
 occasion he has said to me that he considers me a good friend, and that he is a loyal 
 friend to me.  I hope I will one day be able to serve him well.234 
 
After the 1882 and 1884 reflections on Wilhelm, this quote reveals an increased bond that arose 
from the repeating rifle issue and Wedel Affair.  One can see the usual themes on which 
Waldersee reflects: Prince Wilhelm’s good characteristics, his proper conservative leanings, his 
great potential as a future leader, and his signs of favor and friendship.  These things attracted 
Waldersee to Wilhelm, but there were two new and important sentiments in this quote that speak 
to the heart of the maturing relationship between them.  First, Waldersee’s belief that he could 
now see into Wilhelm’s soul reveals how much, as Röhl insinuates, he was becoming a father 
figure to the young prince, who was almost always at odds with his parents (see below).  Their 
friendship was transforming into a familial relationship, which would become especially evident 
from Wilhelm’s increased appearances at the Waldersees’ home in the following years (see 
below).  Second, Waldersee’s written declaration that he hopes to serve the prince well in the 
future shows the staunch monarchist’s level of commitment to a future Kaiser.   
 The latter sentiment is more acutely articulated in a letter from 1889 that dealt with 
another potential scandal.  While attending the army maneuvers in Alsace in autumn 1879, 
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Prince Wilhelm met and had sexual relations with Emilie Klopp, who called herself “Miss 
Love.”  In a situation comparable to the Wedel Affair, Bismarck’s sons handled the difficult task 
of paying off Miss Love and retrieving the letters Wilhelm wrote to her.  When Miss Love did 
not receive a reply to her demands in April 1889, she wrote to Count von Waldersee.  He 
immediately wrote to Wilhelm, who was by that time Kaiser Wilhelm II: 
 My Most Serene, Most Mighty Kaiser! My Most Gracious Kaiser, King, and Lord!  I 
 believe it is my most humble duty to bring the following to Your Imperial and Royal 
 Majesty’s attention: Madame Love of Strasbourg has address me with the claim that she 
 possesses letters from Your Majesty and is probably entitled to monetary compensation.  
 Under no circumstances would I heed this were it not for the fact that due to certain 
 intimations I believe other persons could be drawn into Madame Love’s confidence and 
 this would entail unpleasantness.  I would hardly be showing Your Majesty due thanks 
 for all the proofs of the All-Highest graciousness and trust bestowed on me were I to 
 exercise cautious restraint in the manner as seems to be the case in other quarters.  
 Should Your Majesty after my audience of Saturday not refer to the matter, I shall 
 assume that Your All-Highest Self wishes to hear nothing more of this matter, and then it 
 would be erased from my own memory forthwith.235   
 
Here Waldersee’s sense of loyalty and duty to Wilhelm is clear.  As a staunch monarchist, Count 
von Waldersee believed his duty, especially as a soldier, was to defend the House of 
Hohenzollern against threatening forces.  In the case of Wilhelm’s love affairs, he was 
attempting to defend the monarchy from itself.   
 To Waldersee, the Christian – specifically Protestant – religion provided the bedrock for 
the monarchy, and anything that threatened its Christian well-being was deemed a threat.  
Although Waldersee’s anti-Semitism will be explored below (see “Christian Philanthropy and 
Anti-Semitism”), it played a minor role in a greater religious struggle, which John Röhl calls 
“the crusade against the Union Club,” lasting from November 1885 to June 1886.  The Union 
Club was a cosmopolitan court clique of German nobles, military officers, and rich bourgeois 
men, including Jews.  The group became a club for gambling, and it was a powerful influence, 	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for not only did it contain notable nobles, but it also had the official patronage of Kaiser Wilhelm.  
As a mistress and a wife at the German court, Countess Wedel had become very familiar with 
this group.  Possibly out of her own desire for revenge on members of this clique, she convinced 
Wilhelm that some of them despised him and were betraying Germany.  Her former lover, Prince 
Friedrich of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, she said spied for Russia.  Countess Wanda Perponcher, 
who came from the Moltke family and was married to the administrator of the Kaiser’s court, 
Wedel accused of selling classified military information to Greece.  Wilhelm was motivated to 
crack down on the Union Club because it had also become a center for gambling.  He saw this as 
a terrible vice that threatened the Christian well-being of the military officers that took part in it.  
He launched his attack on the Union Club by forbidding the officers of his Hussar Guards 
Regiment to associate with it.236 
 In this campaign, Waldersee became Wilhelm’s advisor and support.  On November 21, 
1885, the prince visited the Quartermaster-General to seek his advice about the Union Club, 
something with which Waldersee, as he noted, was happy to help: 
 He has namely the commendable intention to take action against gambling, which at 
 present is very widespread and claiming numerous victims.  In connection with these 
 plans, disciplinary action is being taken against the Union Club, that hotbed of 
 gambling . . . Prince Wilhelm is . . . quite the right man for the task, for he has the 
 position needed to perform it well.  The founders of the Club, [among others] the Duke of 
 Ratibor, have been circumspect enough to have persuaded the Kaiser to be its patron, thus 
 making it quite difficult to attack it.  I have urgently advised the Prince to proceed with 
 cunning, but urged him to take the matter up.  He will hardly have a better chance of 
 winning popularity in the widest circles than if he takes action against gambling, the Club 
 of ill repute, and a certain clique which unfortunately represents to the world the refined 
 society of Berlin.237 
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In the last few days of 1885, Waldersee believed Wilhelm was winning when the club’s 
president, the Duke of Ratibor, asked the prince to lift the ban and contended that officers never 
gambled there.  Wilhelm did not believe this to be true, and also complained about the presence 
of Jews in the club, with whom, he maintained, German officers should not associate.  The 
prince sent Ratibor’s letters to Waldersee, who believed that the club should be refashioned “on a 
somewhat different basis,” which, as John Röhl states, means without Jewish members.  
Waldersee believed the club was finished and that “Prince Wilhelm has done a great service.”238  
It remained to be seen, however, how Kaiser Wilhelm would react to his grandson’s crusade that 
was stirring up the court. 
 By January 1886, Kaiser Wilhelm had not mentioned the troubles in the Union Club, and 
Prince Wilhelm, who wanted some resolution of the matter, sought Waldersee’s advice.  The 
Quartermaster-General was confident that the prince would succeed and there would be “a great 
improvement in the lifestyle and attitude of a significant part of our officer corps.”239  A week 
later, however, Waldersee realized success would not come easily.  He had expected his friend 
and the Minister of War, General Bronsart von Schellendorf, to ask the Kaiser to withdraw his 
patronage of the Union Club, but the Head of the Military Cabinet, Emil von Albedyll, evidently 
prevented this and believed it was wrong for the prince to act on his own.  Waldersee stood by 
Wilhelm: 
 I support the prince; nobody has dared take action against the Club because everyone 
 immediately points to the fact that it enjoys the Kaiser’s patronage.  The prince is not 
 afraid . . . the Duke of Ratibor went to see the Kaiser several days ago, and naturally 
 painted the prince in a highly unfavorable light . . . Now, however, the masterminds 	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 behind the Club are quaking in their boots; they are attempting to stir up ill rumors about 
 the prince wherever possible, but yesterday they voted at the general meeting to propose 
 prohibiting gambling in the Club, partly in hope that bad elements will visit the Club less 
 frequently.  This is already a great success which we owe to Prince Wilhelm alone, and 
 the Club is thus admitting that the attacks are justified . . . I spoke with Prince Wilhelm, 
 [who] is quite determined and will not back off a single step; I even believe that 
 opposition only makes him more energetic.240 
 
Just as after the trip to Russia in 1884 and the Wedel Affair in 1885, Waldersee became in 1886 
an even more ardent ally of the prince, who “possesses the qualities which we need in a future 
Kaiser, and given his favorable development this portends well for the future.”241  Albedyll, 
Waldersee wrote, “is also mistaken with regard to [Wilhelm’s] determination and self-
confidence.”242  When it came to the prince’s behavior, what Waldersee saw positively as 
“determination and self-confidence,” Albedyll and others must have seen negatively as 
stubbornness and arrogance.   
 On January 20, 1886, Wilhelm visited Waldersee before and after discussing the issue 
with his grandfather, who apparently “was friendly and told him he had been somewhat 
overhasty with his Union Club prohibition.”243  The next day, Waldersee met with Albedyll and 
noted in his journal: 
 [Albedyll believes] that the Kaiser should have been spared this extremely unpleasant 
 matter, and in this he is certainly quite right; I merely have a different opinion as to the 
 cause of the affair: he considers Prince Wilhelm to be the instigator; I, on the other hand, 
 hold responsible the gentlemen who ran the club so improperly and scandalously abused 
 the Kaiser’s patronage.244 
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Waldersee was attempting to defend the monarchy from itself, a duty that became more difficult 
as the affair continued.  By throwing in his lot with the idealistic Prince Wilhelm the Crusader, 
Waldersee was in reality risking his relationship with the Kaiser and his standing at court.  The 
affair, he wrote in his journal, produced “great unrest in the uppermost echelons of our society” 
and “has lent quite clear expression to the unhealthy conditions in the upper classes . . . It has 
revealed a quite appalling machinery of hate, envy, and baseness.”  In February 1886, Waldersee 
rejoiced that the Kaiser had asked the Duke of Ratibor to investigate gambling in the club, but 
this was a Pyrrhic victory because the members of Berlin’s high society were becoming 
increasingly hostile to Wilhelm; Waldersee noted in his journal: 
 Among certain quarters, people are conspiring strongly against Prince Wilhelm; they are 
 trying to rehash old gossip and invent new rumors [i.e. Miss Love and Countess Wedel]; 
 their primary objective is to accuse him of marital infidelity.  I think that the miserable 
 pack will very much regret this one day.  I have come to know the Prince closely through 
 2 years of active dealings with him, and I vouch for him unconditionally; his is a blissful 
 marriage, and it is truly a joy to come to know his intimate family life.245  
 
Röhl states, “it is difficult to understand how Waldersee could write of Wilhelm’s ‘blissful 
marriage’ and harmonious family life then of all times, when Elisabeth Wedel was still living in 
Charlottenburg.”246  Considering Waldersee’s developing view of, and relationship with, the 
prince, he was apparently willing to overlook Wilhelm’s sins in the interest of protecting the 
future Kaiser. 
 From the end of February through June 1886, the Kaiser stopped his grandson’s crusade.  
Although Wilhelm recognized that he had been too forceful, tensions continued, especially with 
Albedyll, against whom Wilhelm would hold a grudge for years.  Waldersee attempted to calm 
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the prince down, and, as the monarchist he was, warned him “quite definitely and in all 
seriousness, that there could be no challenging an All-Highest Order, least of all by him, and that 
neither Albedyll nor any other third party can be involved, and begged him not to make a stink 
about it.”247  For Waldersee, the Kaiser’s firm stance on the issue ended it, and any appeal from 
Wilhelm or any ruckus he could cause threatened Waldersee’s ardently monarchist conviction.  
In June, Waldersee learned that the Kaiser was mad at Wilhelm, who wanted to discuss betting 
on horse races.  Two days later, the Quartermaster-General wrote in his journal: 
 I have tried to act as the intermediary in the above matter, and hope that I have managed 
 to arrange things so that the Kaiser initially does nothing.  I have written a very earnest 
 letter to the prince, pointing out to him that nothing could be allowed to come between 
 him and the Kaiser, and that he must therefore swallow his own pride here; he has many 
 enemies who are very active; he can laugh at them as long as he has the support of Their 
 Majesties.  He thanked me by telegram and assured me that he was not planning to 
 mention to the Kaiser anything about horse racing.248 
 
A few days later, neither the Union Club nor the horse racing issue was brought up in a 
conversation between the Kaiser and Prince Wilhelm.  The crusade was over.  In the aftermath of 
the affair, Waldersee may have been the biggest winner.  Not only had Wilhelm’s campaign been 
able to register some success in its mission against the Union Club, but Waldersee was also able 
to maintain good relations with both the Kaiser and the prince.  His support for Wilhelm 
increased their friendship, but it also brought him into conflict for the first time with Albedyll.  
Within the elite, Waldersee’s encouragement of Wilhelm made him an identifiable member of 
the prince’s entourage. 
 Wilhelm’s father, Crown Prince Frederick, did not like the budding friendship between 
his son and the Quartermaster General.  In February 1886, amid the Union Club affair, 
Waldersee noted that the Crown Prince knew “very well that the prince had also negotiated a 	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great deal with me on this matter; I believe that our relationship does not please him; he is 
incredibly suspicious and . . . jealous of his son.”  Although the Crown Prince, in a rare move, 
originally supported his son’s campaign, Waldersee believed that “both he and the Crown 
Princess are very happy to see that Prince Wilhelm does not fully concur with the Kaiser on this 
matter, and [that he] is quite dejected because the Kaiser has not declared him to be absolutely in 
the right.”249 
 The animosity between Wilhelm and his parents was a constant theme throughout the 
former’s early life.  They found him to be immature, arrogant, and tactless, and sometimes the 
family conflicts spilled into public view, producing “scenes.”250  Wilhelm would often go behind 
his parents back and appeal to his grandfather, such as in 1884 when Wilhelm was able to avoid 
joining his father, as the latter wanted, on a trip to Spain.  The Crown Princess, Victoria, was the 
eldest daughter of Queen Victoria of Great Britain and favored liberalism and constitutional 
monarchy.  Outspoken and assertive, she became highly unpopular among the conservative elite 
in Berlin, who feared the influence she had over her husband and would have when he would 
become Kaiser.  By 1884, fearing the dominance of the Crown Princess, members of the elite 
had already considered different plans to prevent Victoria from having any share of power.  In 
these schemes, Wilhelm was key because he was next in line for the throne.  As Friedrich von 
Holstein, a secretary in the Foreign Office wrote, “we want Prince Wilhelm; he’ll be a second 
Frederick the Great.”251  Bismarck played a direct role in the affairs of the House of 
Hohenzollern, and although he favored Wilhelm, he attempted to make peace with the Crown 
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Princess in 1886.  Wilhelm became popular in conservative circles, and Frederick feared that 
with their help, his son would seize power.  As John Röhl notes, Waldersee was willing to carry 
out a coup d’état to “restore kingship to its rightful position” if Frederick and Victoria would 
threaten the traditional political system and the army’s privileged position.252 
 Waldersee did not actively and purposefully attempt to further the discord in the royal 
family – he actually lamented it – but his support and advice, which were colored by his disdain 
for Wilhelm’s parents, certainly did not improve the situation.  The troubles in the Hohenzollern 
family had already begun when Waldersee had his first serious discussion with Wilhelm in 
December 1882, after which he noted that the Crown Prince and Princess were not having 
success training their son to be a constitutional monarch.253  To Waldersee, the traditional 
monarchist who did not admire Frederick, the Crown Prince’s views were simply incompatible 
with the Hohenzollern tradition in Prussia: 
 He is a very weak man, without firm opinions and most unclear in his goals.  
 Unfortunately he is biased in extreme liberal ideas and does not want to accept that in 
 these times a sovereign with such principles quickly digs his own grave.  What an 
 upheaval would arise in such a circumstance.254        
 
Waldersee lamented the poor relationship between Frederick and Prince Wilhelm, but saw that 
the son, unlike the father had a strong character, was uncompromising, and held firm views.255   
 After a dinner at the New Palace in Potsdam on June 10, 1884, Waldersee noted that even 
Mary detected how poor the mood was there.  Under the influence of his scheming, liberal wife, 
Waldersee stated, Crown Prince Frederick was upset that he had to continue waiting for the 
throne because the Kaiser was living a long life.  “The intellectual superiority of his wife has 	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become a great misfortune,” Waldersee wrote, “From a simple, brave, and honest prince of a 
good Prussian conviction, she has made a weak man, who does not have confidence in himself, 
who is no longer open and honest, who no longer thinks like a Prussian.”  Waldersee and Prince 
Wilhelm were both concerned that the Crown Prince and Princess were not acting in the best 
interests of the German state and its national tradition.  He noted that it pained the proud Prussian 
prince to see that his mother had not embraced her German home, but remained English in her 
way of life and her politics.  Wilhelm “knew that she worked for English interests over Prussian 
and German ones,” thus saddening him deeply and making it difficult for him to restrain his 
“fiery temperament.”256  On Christmas Day 1884, Wilhelm visited Waldersee for a long time and 
brought along a number of notes about the English expedition against Khartoum.  He observed 
that the prince took a strong position against England because it was “in large part a natural 
reaction against the efforts of his mother to make her children Anglomaniacs.”257 
 The more Wilhelm became estranged from his own parents, the more he found a home at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 in the Military Staff Building.  He often occupied a chair at the Waldersees’ 
dining table, sometimes without much warning.  When the Quartermaster-General returned from 
Potsdam before Bismarck’s torchlight birthday parade on March 27, 1885, he told his wife and 
mother-in-law that Wilhelm would be joining them to eat and to watch the parade.  Mary and 
Mrs. Lee worried that their dinner would not be fitting for the prince, but they were relieved 
when Wilhelm seemed to make himself at home and acted very naturally.  “He seemed greatly to 
enjoy the absence of ceremony,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “and declared he was coming some evening to 
tea!”  One evening in April 1885, the Waldersees were having dinner at their apartment when a 
servant told the Quartermaster-General that the prince was in his room.  Waldersee immediately 	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went to retrieve Wilhelm, who helped himself to a seat at the table.  In good spirits, he assured 
them that he had not come expecting to eat this time.  Dressed in full uniform, he had just dined 
with his grandfather.  He brought a bundle of documents to discuss with Waldersee and after 
dinner, they conversed for a long time in the latter’s room.258  For Waldersee’s birthday in 1886, 
Wilhelm sent his friend a bust of himself and his Trumpeter Corps, which performed in the 
Military Staff Building’s conservatory after the Waldersees had lunch with Prince Wilhelm and 
his wife, Augusta Victoria, who gave the general a gift of flowers.259  One day in March 1887, 
Wilhelm announced he was coming over for lunch – which the Waldersees called “second 
breakfast” – and Mrs. Lee wrote, “His liking for Alfred continues – he fancies coming to 
breakfast as he only sees the family and can talk more with Alfred.”  Some time afterward, 
Alfred and Mary gave a dinner for Prince Wilhelm, who requested that, besides Mary, only 
officers be invited so, as Mrs. Lee stated, “he could talk more freely of [the] present state of 
affairs.”260    
 In March 1887, the situation for Berlin’s political elite began to change drastically.  
Crown Prince Frederick had been experiencing a persistent hoarseness, and on March 16 a 
German throat specialist removed a small growth with an electric needle in the Crown Prince’s 
vocal cord.  The procedure was repeated unsuccessfully as the growth kept recurring, and in May, 
a group of eminent German doctors diagnosed it as throat cancer and, with the consent of the 
Crown Princess, scheduled an operation.  Bismarck had Dr. Morrell Mackenzie, a Scotsman who 
was experienced in laryngeal diseases, called in from Britain, and there began tense discussions 
over whether the risky operation was even necessary, especially when the Crown Prince’s life 	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was at stake.261  With the ninety-year old Kaiser Wilhelm expected to die any day from his old 
age and with the Crown Prince Frederick’s health in question, the political elite looked to Prince 
Wilhelm.  On May 21, Waldersee took note of this change in his journal: 
 It is interesting to see that certain clever people have immediately changed their 
 assessment of Prince Wilhelm; yesterday then grumbled about him, found him heartless, 
 not prudent and I do not know what else, thus today he has a strong character and is much 
 talked about for the future.262 
 
In 1886, expecting Frederick to assume the throne, Bismarck reached an understanding with the 
Crown Princess, but Waldersee did not believe it would last because, he noted, she hated both 
the Chancellor and her son.  “The only way a reconciliation is possible,” he wrote, “is that the 
Chancellor would have to abandon Prince Wilhelm, but I hardly believe he will do this.”263  With 
the increased possibility of the Crown Prince’s death in May 1887, Waldersee observed that the 
Chancellor “stood before a completely new constellation” and had to reattach himself to the 
prince.  In a foreshadowing of the future relationship between Bismarck and Prince Wilhelm, 
Waldersee wrote, “According to my conviction, [the Bismarck-Wilhelm alliance] is not feasible.  
The lively and ambitious twenty-eight year old prince and the seventy-two year old 
Chancellor!”264 
 In the midst of the Crown Prince’s failing health and the shifting political situation in 
Berlin, Waldersee was increasingly at Wilhelm’s side.  Early in the morning of May 22, Wilhelm 
stopped at the Military Staff Building to ask Waldersee where Dr. Ernst von Bergmann lived.  
One of Germany’s leading surgeons, Bergmann was also the director of the Medical School of 
the University of Berlin and had advised an immediate operation for the Crown Prince.  Wilhelm 	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took Waldersee with him to the Bergmann residence, and after he concluded his private visit 
with the doctor, told Waldersee that Bergmann believed his father’s sickness was serious and at 
best he would lose his voice; at worst, “a deadly exit” (einen tödlichen Ausgang) was possible.265 
On the evening of June 5, Waldersee was at the Marble Palace (Marmorpalais), the late-
eighteenth-century home of Prince and Princess Wilhelm on the shore of the Holy Lake (Heiliger 
See) in Potsdam.  Walking alone with her husband’s confidant, Augusta Victoria expressed her 
fear that Prince Wilhelm was still too young to become Kaiser.  He assured her that on the whole, 
his good qualities would outshine his occasional expressions of “youthful haste.”266  In March 
1888, as the crisis worsened, she would implore Waldersee to come often and “to stand at the 
prince’s side with advice.”267 
 On Monday November 5, Wilhelm arrived at the Military Staff Building around 11 
o’clock.  He told Waldersee that there was now new swelling further down his father’s throat and 
that his grandfather ordered him to find out the truth about his father’s condition at San Remo, 
Italy on the Mediterranean coast, where the Crown Prince was sent so the climate could aid his 
health.  Waldersee did not believe William could help the situation and worried that if he tried to 
dismiss Dr. Mackenzie, he would instigate a scene with his mother that would only cause more 
anxiety for his father.268  On Sunday November 13, Mary and Alfred went to church where 
prayers were offered beseeching God to help the Crown Prince.  Early the next day, Wilhelm 
returned to Berlin, and after speaking with the Kaiser, Count Stolberg, and Albedyll, arrived at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 around noon to report the latest news.  “The condition of the Crown Prince is 
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hopeless,” Waldersee wrote, “He should know the full truth and await death as a hero.”  
Although Wilhelm “was full of admiration for his father,” Waldersee noted, he told his confidant 
that his mother “has treated me as a dog.”269  “Prince Wilhelm has been here three times this 
week,” Mrs. Lee wrote to her cousin, “He has his father’s duties to attend to, is very busy, and 
seems to look on Alfred as his right hand man – the liking is mutual.  I think Alfred is fond of 
him.”270 
 On one mid-December day in 1887, Wilhelm sent word to the Waldersees that he was 
coming over to join them at their midday meal.  Mary decided to serve leftovers from a large 
dinner they had hosted the night before.  “I told her he would think her lunch better than his own 
and was likely to come soon again!” Mrs. Lee wrote to her cousin.  At one o’clock, Wilhelm 
arrived with an aide de camp, and they joined the Waldersees at the table.  “The prince was very 
pleasant and seemed to feel quite at home,” Mrs. Lee wrote.271  Herwarthstrasse 2 had become 
Prince Wilhelm’s home, and Alfred von Waldersee his sympathetic confidant, dedicated friend, 
loyal advisor, and, above all, father figure.  The shared experiences of the trip to Russia in 1884, 
the Wedel Affair in 1885, the Union Club crusade in 1885-86, and the persistent troubles in the 
Hohenzollern family nurtured the Wilhelm-Waldersee relationship that had been planted at their 
first meeting in 1882; their similar worldviews and soldierly attitudes provided common roots.  
This relationship would continue to grow in the imperial capital where the Kaiser was quickly 
aging, the Crown Prince was slowly dying, and the young prince was a bright hope to some and a 
worrisome concern to others in the political and social elite.  By 1887, Bismarck became alarmed 
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by Prince Wilhelm’s desire for preventive war and by the influence Waldersee had over him.  
Although this development troubled the Chancellor, who struggled to maintain peace in Europe, 
the relationship between Waldersee and Wilhelm became a serious issue for him when, at 
Herwarthstrasse 2, the prince appeared to support an institution founded by the anti-Semitic 
Court Preacher and founder of the Christian Social Party, Adolf Stoecker. 
 
Christian Philanthropy and Anti-Semitism 
 
 On February 3, 1882, while Count Alfred von Waldersee was settling into his new 
position and home, Adolf Stoecker, Court Preacher and founder of the Christian Social party, 
spoke before a gathering of his party at Berlin’s Tonhalle.  In his speech, titled “The Jews in 
Public Life, a Danger for the German Empire,” Stoecker addressed the Jewish Question:  
 We interpret the Jewish Question not as a religious or even a racial question; even 
 though it is rooted in both, however, it appears in expressed form as a social-ethical 
 one . . . We want to solve the Jewish Question not in a radical, violent way, but gradually 
 in a quiet, peaceful one . . . We do not hate the Jews, but we hate with our whole soul 
 their system as a corrupting influence on our German-Christian folklore.  We allow the 
 Jews to live among us, to earn their bread in an honest manner, to become prosperous and 
 enrich themselves, we are tolerant children of the nineteenth century, but we do not let 
 the Jews exploit and master us.  (lively applause)  When the Jews have only sought their 
 existence among the peoples, lived their religious customs, and not disturbed the native 
 population, there would be no Jewish Question.  Jews do not want, however, to merely 
 exist, they want to rule – attack our best goods, Christian religion, Church, German 
 culture, and German nature – but not be embarrassed . . . We will continue in the struggle 
 against the overgrowth of this Jewishness, until it is put in the corner of public life where 
 it belongs. (lively applause and amusement)272 
 
 In the early decades of the German Empire, Adolf Stoecker was one of the founders of a 
new kind of anti-Semitism that was political, racial, and vehement.  In 1874, the 39 year-old 	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pastor became one of Kaiser Wilhelm’s Court Preachers.  By 1879, he had founded his own 
political party, and been elected to the Prussian parliament, where he proclaimed the Jews to be 
“leeches,” “parasites,” and “an alien drop in our blood.”273  In 1881, Stoecker named his party 
the Christian Social Party and was elected to the Reichstag.  By the late nineteenth century, 
industrialization had produced a large and generally impoverished industrial working class.  
Laborers were turning increasingly toward socialism, a movement that advocated the overthrow 
of capitalism and the political order.  To oppose this, Stoecker sought to initiate a religious 
revival that would promote German Protestantism and loyalty to the monarchy.  In this effort, 
Stoecker found a scapegoat in the Jews, who were well represented in business and left-wing 
parties.  Although he was a popular and passionate speaker, the Christian Social Party never 
received a significant number of votes. 
 Alfred von Waldersee established an association with Adolf Stoecker in 1885 that would 
become controversial and make Waldersee a public figure by the end of 1887.  Historians have 
often associated Waldersee with the anti-Semitic Court Preacher and political leader, but it is 
worth examining how the Stoecker-Waldersee relationship developed and what effect it had on 
Waldersee’s anti-Semitism.  This section will examine these two issues along with the related 
topics of Waldersee’s anti-Catholicism, his social and religious views, and Mary’s philanthropy.  
As an orthodox Protestant, Prussian general, and ardent monarchist, Waldersee viewed Catholics, 
Socialists, and Jews as threats to the German Empire. 
 According to the published entries of his journals, Waldersee was an ardent anti-Catholic 
in the 1870s and early 1880s.  He had an irrational fear of the Catholic Church’s supposed power 
in Germany and believed German Catholics were more loyal to Rome than Berlin.  On January 9, 	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1885, he believed that a “bold agitation” from Catholics was underway through a planned 
conversion campaign.  “The ultimate goal of the Jesuit-ruled Church is naturally to smash 
Germany first, then Prussia.  We have enemies everywhere, and the Church tries to unite them 
against us,” he opined in his journal.274  On October 15, 1885, he wrote that of all of Germany’s 
enemies, the worst were “above all Catholics.”275  Waldersee’s delusions about Catholics would 
be matched then surpassed by his absurd views of Jews, with whom he would replace Catholics 
as Germany’s greatest enemy in late 1887.  Interestingly, General Walter von Loë was Catholic, 
but, as Waldersee wrote about his friend in 1885, “Loë is a sensible (vernünftiger) Catholic, an 
absolutely reliable man, and loyally devoted to the royal house.”276 
 By the late 1870s, Bismarck was calling off the Kulturkampf, which he had begun in the 
1870s to suppress the Catholic Church in Germany.  This campaign had given rise to the German 
Center Party, the main Catholic political organization that since the 1870s had developed and 
gained strength as a result of Bismarck’s anti-Catholic laws.  Recognizing the growing threat of 
the Socialist Party, Bismarck needed the Center Party’s support.  Waldersee believed this party 
was composed of “hypocritical blackguards without a Fatherland, intent on the collapse of 
Germany and the destruction of Prussia.”277  He was, however, glad the Kulturkampf was over 
because he believed that Germany now had one less enemy to worry about, but he remained 
skeptical, regarding Catholic leaders as too fanatical.278  
 With the complete end of the Kulturkampf in 1887, Waldersee noted that Protestant 
circles were concerned about the future, and he bemoaned the fact that Bismarck refused to 	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promote the Protestant Church and make it independent, the only way, he believed, to create a 
“dam” against Catholicism.  “There is worry that Bismarck might convert Prince Wilhelm to his 
ideas,” Waldersee wrote and then noted, “It has been a long time since I have had a serious 
discussion with the Prince.  I now want to find an opportunity to talk to him.”279  He was glad the 
Kulturkampf was over for the Kaiser’s sake – because the monarch never fully supported it – but 
he believed that “not many years will pass before the Protestant Church is forced to take up the 
battle again in order to save its own skin.  I only hope that Prince Wilhelm’s heart remains true to 
our Church and that he conducts the battle with a strong arm and a sharp mind.”280 
 With his concerns for the well-being of Protestant Prussia and its monarchy, Waldersee 
must have found appealing Adolf Stoecker’s social and religious movement to turn the working 
class away from atheistic socialism.  In February 1886, Waldersee noted that “the social specter 
begins to become dangerous.”281  The next month, he opined that working class agitation in 
Belgium provided a window on the present time and the future.  “Currently the glow of fire 
shines from burning factories and palaces from Belgium over our border,” Waldersee wrote, 
“this should be a serious warning.”  He believed that ending universal suffrage was not only 
“naturally a measure of enormous importance,” but also inevitable because “everywhere the 
masses are on the move, everything drives rebellion against authority, the negation of all religion, 
and the generation of hatred and envy against the wealthy.”282  He did not put much faith in 
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“laws for bettering the material lives of the lower classes” because “men can never be satisfied 
with their lot on earth”; they should find peace and happiness in God and religion.283  His 
mother-in-law shared his sentiments.  “I know not what the world is coming to – sects are rising 
– satisfied with nothing,” Mrs. Lee wrote after an anarchist shot and wounded the Kaiser on 
March 11, 1878, “I suppose you’ve heard of that execrable [radical sect] now rife in Russia and 
I’m saddened to hear communism is getting the upper hand in America, but with it we have the 
solace that God rules over all.”284  After another failed assassination attempt that June, 
Waldersee wrote that because the shooter said he was a Social Democrat, it was “the holy duty of 
all men who have influence” to take action against “malicious elements.”285  To Waldersee, God, 
king, and order were the foundation of the German Empire. 
 Although Stoecker’s advocacy of Protestantism and monarchism were not controversial 
in Berlin, his brand of racial and political anti-Semitism was – especially at court.  Crown Prince 
Frederick and Crown Princess Victoria, who associated with liberals and Jews, were not afraid to 
vocalize and show their contempt for the rabid anti-Semites, such as Stoecker, who were also 
opposed to liberalism.  In early 1880, the Crown Prince participated in a service at Berlin’s 
synagogue in full military uniform, and a few days later publicly condemned anti-Semitism as a 
“shameful blot on our time.”  Before the first debate on the Jewish Question in the Prussian 
parliament, he and Victoria attended a concert at the synagogue in Wiesbaden “to demonstrate as 
clearly as we can what our convictions are.”  In a private letter, the Crown Prince wrote that he 
and his wife “are ashamed of the Judenhetze (Jew-baiting) which has broken all bounds of 
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decency in Berlin but which seems to flourish under the protection of the court clerics.”286  As 
John Röhl states, the Crown Prince and Princess’s public support for Jews “only fuelled the 
growing conviction” in reactionary and “chauvinistic” circles “that the Crown Prince and his 
liberal English wife were an alien, un-German force that must not be allowed to accede to 
throne.”287  To the monarchist and anti-liberal Stoecker – and to Waldersee – the Kaiser’s 
support was more important than the Crown Princes and Princess’s. 
 In 1880, Stoecker wrote to the Kaiser asking for his full, public backing, stating, “In the 
eyes of the friends of the Fatherland it is clear that in Berlin the Jewish and Christian spirit are 
fighting one another for domination; them or us – that is the battle cry.”288  Unlike his son and 
successor, Kaiser Wilhelm was an anti-Semite and tacitly supported Stoecker by neither 
dismissing him nor interfering with his political activities.  In 1885, however, the anti-Semitic 
preacher became an embarrassment to the court when he was sued by a Jewish newspaper editor 
for libel and found guilty.  At the end of July 1885, after learning that the Kaiser wanted him to 
resign, Stoecker wrote to his sovereign that his departure would give victory to atheist and 
democratic forces, which are concurrently “the enemies of Christendom and Monarchy.”289  On 
August 4, the Kaiser asked directly for his Court Preacher’s resignation by the end of November 
at the latest, but the next day Prince Wilhelm protested in a letter to his grandfather: 
 From all sides, from far and near, I am receiving letters with the question ‘Does the 
 Kaiser know what is going on?  Does he realize what the score is?  How the Jews – and 
 behind them the Socialists and the Progressives – are trying everything to get Stoecker 
 sacked?’  One even says the Jews have tried to secure friends in court circles in order to 
 work on you against Stoecker! . . . Stoecker – for all his mistakes – is the most powerful 
 pillar, the bravest, most fearless fighter for Your Monarchy and Your Throne among the 	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 people! . . . He has personally and alone won over 60,000 workers for you and your 
 power from the Jewish Progressives and Social Democrats! in Berlin! . . . O dear 
 Grosspapa, it is disgusting to observe how in our Christian-German, good Prussian land 
 the Judenthum [Jews], twisting and corrupting everything, has the cheek to attack such 
 men and in the most shameless, insolent way to seek their downfall.290 
  
The Kaiser changed his mind.  Stoecker wrote to his wife, “The letter from Prince Wilhelm 
certainly must have made an impression.”291 
 In The Kaiser and His Court, John Röhl stated that “it is not difficult to discern in this 
letter the influence of Wilhelm’s Ersatzvater (father figure) Count Waldersee,” and in his more 
recent work on Wilhelm II, Röhl claims that Waldersee – and Prince’s Wilhelm’s orthodox, anti-
Semitic wife – would have eventually introduced the Hohenzollern prince to Stoecker’s brand of 
anti-Semitism.292  From 1880 to 1883, however, the prince and Court Preacher not only met, but 
also had private discussions on a number of occasions.293  In these encounters, Stoecker, who 
was then also very active in Berlin, must have certainly influenced Prince Wilhelm’s anti-
Semitism.  The language Wilhelm used to defend Stoecker in his letter to the Kaiser appears very 
much like the Court Preacher’s. 
 Before considering how Stoecker influenced Waldersee’s anti-Semitism, the question of 
how the general came to develop an association with the Court Preacher needs to be answered.  
According to sources, Waldersee appears to have developed a relationship with Stoecker through 
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Mary’s philanthropy.  The countess had been very active in charitable organizations during her 
time in Hannover and soon after she arrived in Berlin, the Empress gave her a tour of the 
Augusta Hospital and made her a member of its governing committee.294  On January 16, 1884, 
at the request of the Empress, the Kaiser sent Mary the Order of Louise in recognition for her 
charitable work.295  By the end of 1886 she was quite active in the German capital.  “Mary keeps 
up her good work in this Berlin – though at Christmas time I thought it would be too much for 
her,” Mrs. Lee wrote to her cousin, “Christ said ‘the poor ye have always with you’ – Oh how 
true! – In spite of all effort they increase yearly.”296   
 Mary’s desire to help the poor and needy out of her religious convictions and her 
connections to the royal family – she was Princess Wilhelm’s aunt through her first marriage – 
undoubtedly led her to Court Preacher Adolf Stoecker and his City Mission, which, Martin 
Kitchen states, would lead “the working class away from the Social Democrats with a bowl of 
soup and a Bible.”297  On February 5, 1885, Princess Wilhelm headed the opening of a bazaar for 
the City Mission, with which Mary assisted; Waldersee also attended.298  Two months later, on 
the evening of April 30, 1885, Mary had a group of thirty ladies over at Herwarthstrasse 2 to sew 
for the poor.  A pastor and several gentlemen, who Mrs. Lee did not identify, were interested in 
her sewing society and also attended.  After tea was served, they all sang while Mary played the 
harmonium.  Stoecker led a prayer and then read from a bible that the Waldersees received on 
their wedding day.  After he explained the sixteen verses he read from Chapter 26 of the Gospel 
of Matthew – Judas’s betrayal – the Court Preacher made, Mrs. Lee wrote, “an interesting 
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address,” and the group finished the service in song.299  Although Stoecker and Waldersee may 
have met at court, these two events in early 1885 must have provided opportunities for the two 
men to know each other better.    
 In May 1885, Mrs. Lee sent her cousin one of Stoecker’s mass-printed sermons so she 
could “know of the effort Court Preacher Stoecker makes to disseminate Christianity.”  After 
receiving an invitation, Mary went for the first time to the Lazarus Hospital for a celebration of 
its anniversary.  “It is a real charity – taking in ‘incurables’ – men, women, or children, which 
other hospitals decline to do,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “no end of ‘sisters’ are attached who devote 
themselves to taking care of the sick and bestowing on them all the comfort possible.”  Mary 
took her mother along with her, but because the religious service was to be in German – “all 
Greek for me” – she decided to go home, where she wrote to her cousin.  “Later Mary told me 
she found the services very interesting,” Mrs. Lee noted, “Pastor Stoecker preached the sermon – 
excellent and appropriate – and she was glad she went.”300 
 Beginning in 1886, some officials, which would include Waldersee, asked Prince and 
Princess Wilhelm to chair events to support the City Mission, but war scares and the Crown 
Prince’s illness caused delays.301  On March 1, 1887, Waldersee hosted a meeting at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 that was chaired by Prince Wilhelm.  The count noted that they had to 
postpone their plan until the next winter, though they wanted to stay together as a committee.  
They wanted to hold a Riding Festival (Reiterfest) to benefit the City Mission.302  When the 
Waldersees lived in Hanover – and were important socialites there – they decided in the 
beginning of 1880 that instead of throwing their traditional, yearly ball, they would donate the 	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money to the poor of Hanover, where there was much unemployment that winter.  The military 
officers stationed there decided to throw a Riding Festival and put Waldersee in charge of 
carrying out.  The festival was an elaborate affair, for which nobles traveled from Berlin to 
attend.  The city provided a large building that was decorated with evergreens and flags, filled 
with the music of a 100-piece military band, and illuminated with electric light.  For four 
evenings, soldiers on foot and horseback paraded inside the building, costumed as Roman 
legionnaires, Crusaders, and troops from other eras; there was also a “hunting scene,” in which 
dogs leapt over hedges.  The event raised 15,000 marks for the poor.303   
 Certainly, the success of the 1880 Riding Festival in Hanover provided the blueprint for 
the Riding Festival that Waldersee wanted to hold sometime in 1887-88 for the benefit of the 
City Mission.  Of course, the circumstances were now different.  The festival would be held in 
Berlin and would thus have to be an even more elaborate affair, but it would also aid the City 
Mission, which, given Stoecker’s reputation at court and in Berlin, would undoubtedly be 
controversial.  Knowing that it would cause divisiveness perhaps is the reason the committee that 
assembled at Herwarthstrasse 2 on March 1 decided to postpone it.  Waldersee pressed forward, 
however, with encouraging Wilhelm to patronize the City Mission.  In April, he wrote to 
William that he had spoken with Herr von Wilmowski, the Head of the Civil Cabinet about the 
City Mission.  “To my delight, it transpired that [he] is an enthusiastic admirer of the Mission 
and its goals,” Waldersee wrote, “he was much taken with the idea that Your Royal Highness 
should become its patron, and he will certainly, should Your Royal Highness enlist him as an 	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intermediary, speak in support of the matter to His Majesty the Kaiser and King.”304  After May 
1887, when the Crown Prince was diagnosed with cancer, the volatile, shifting political situation 
in Berlin became a dangerous environment for Waldersee to pursue Wilhelm’s patronage for an 
institution founded by someone who was already controversial in more politically stable times.  
Waldersee failed to see the controversy he was about to unleash inadvertently.   
 On Monday November 7, 1887, Mrs. Lee wrote to her cousin about the day’s activities at 
Herwarthstrasse 2: 
 Mary’s sewing society for City Mission surrounded [the] long table in [the] dining room.  
 Dr. Stoecker, one of the Court Preachers, read to them the report of the year.  At the other 
 end of [the] apartment is Alfred’s room.  He was there alone, but soon [was] surprised by 
 Prince Wilhelm coming in, who said he had come to lunch.  We don’t have that meal as 
 ‘second breakfast’ is often after 11.  The dining room could not be had so Alfred ordered 
 lunch got up in his room for [the] prince and himself.  When that was over several 
 gentlemen came by appointment to arrange with Alfred a fair for [the] City Mission.  
 [The] prince stayed and assisted at this Committee.  I have gone into this detail for the 
 sake of the sequel.  The prince really came to tell Alfred bad news had come from his 
 father at San Remo – another swelling had come lower down in [the] throat.305 
 
On November 28, about forty individuals arrived at the Waldersees’ apartment in the Military 
Staff Building for a meeting, officially called together by Prince and Princess Wilhelm, to 
discuss fundraising for the City Mission.  Most of the attendees were Protestant conservatives, 
and a number of them held high-ranking positions: Prussian Minister of the Interior Robert von 
Puttkamer, Prussian Minister of Ecclesiastical, Educational, and Medical Affairs Gustav von 
Gossler, Chief of His Majesty’s Civil Cabinet Baron Karl von Wilmowski, Acting Minister of 
the Royal Household Count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, and of course Prince and Princess 
Wilhelm and Court Preacher Adolf Stoecker.  There were two representatives of the press: Pastor 
Heinrich Englel, editor of the Protestant, conservative Reichsbote, and Baron Wilhelm von 	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Hammerstein-Schwartow, editor of the conservative Kreuzzeitung and a member of the 
Conservative Party in the Prussian parliament and Reichstag.  Some important people were 
invited, but did not attend: Superior Court Chaplain Rudolf Kögel, Chief of His Majesty’s 
Military Cabinet, Emil von Albedyll, and the leader of the National Liberal Party, Johannes 
Miquel.306    
 Waldersee stood up to address the gathering: 
 [He] pointed out that representatives of all parts of Germany and all religious and 
 political points of view had been invited because the city of Berlin, where the shortage of 
 churches and the need for religious work were so great, was made up of people from all 
 parts of Germany.  The City Mission, he said, represented ‘absolutely no definite political 
 viewpoint, belonged to no political party, but its only norm is loyalty to the king and the 
 cultivation of patriotism.’  The only effective means of combating the anarchistic, 
 revolutionary tendencies threatening the state, he stressed, was spiritual care, which 
 should be accompanied by material support in poverty and sickness.  Only thus could a 
 person be made to be ‘satisfied with his lot.’ 307  
  
 Prince Wilhelm then spoke to the group: 
 As against the revolutionary tendencies of an anarchistic and irreligious party [the 
 Marxist Social Democrats] the most effective protection of throne and altar must be 
 sought in leading the irreligious masses back to Christianity and the church and thus to 
 recognition of legal authority and love for the monarchy.  The Christian-socialist idea 
 must therefore be given greater consideration with more emphasis than previously. 308 
  
 After some other speeches, the group organized a committee to coordinate fundraising 
efforts.  Later that day, Waldersee reflected in his journal on the meeting, which, he wrote, “went 
very well and is, I believe, of far-reaching significance, since Prince Wilhelm thereby not only 
took up a firm Christian standpoint, but also advocated it.”309 
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  Waldersee and the conservative group, J. Alden Nichols states, “probably had not 
intended the Stoecker meeting to be a public demonstration but merely wanted quietly to 
establish a sort of right-wing beachhead among influential circles and with Prince Wilhelm in 
preparation for future developments.”310  Like the other meetings for the City Mission mentioned 
above, this one on November 28, 1887 appears not to have been intended to be a public political 
stand or an attempt for Protestant conservatives to gain control of Prince Wilhelm.  Given what 
has been shown about Waldersee’s relationship to Wilhelm, to Stoecker, and to Mary and her 
philanthropy, his consistent belief in monarchy, and his growing fear of the social threat, 
Waldersee had the sincere intention to raise money for the City Mission, despite the institution 
being founded by a vocal anti-Semite.  He was not looking to gain control of Prince Wilhelm 
because of his father’s illness; he had already been encouraging Wilhelm to take a role in the 
City Mission before the seriousness of the Crown Prince’s condition became known.  Regardless 
of Waldersee’s intentions, the meeting would initiate what has become known as the Stoecker 
Affair. 
 Before discussing the significance of the Stoecker Affair, there remains the question of 
Stoecker’s influence on Waldersee’s anti-Semitism.  As an orthodox Protestant and Prussian 
officer, there is little doubt Waldersee was a traditional Christian anti-Semite in the early 1880s, 
but according to the Denkwürdigkeiten and Röhl’s research, Waldersee made no statement about 
Jews before 1887.  Given the available source materials, there is very little that explicitly 
demonstrates that Waldersee heard Stoecker’s anti-Semitic ranting and adopted the new brand of 
anti-Semitism before the Stoecker Affair.  Until more conclusive research can be conducted, it 
can only be assumed that the vocally anti-Semitic Stoecker did have an effect on Waldersee’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 33.   
   
	   116 
anti-Semitism before late 1887.  Currently, the only evidence comes from a letter Waldersee 
wrote to Prince Wilhelm a week before the meeting at Herwarthstrasse 2: 
 All those who, under the first impression of the news from San Remo, saw themselves 
 seriously threatened are now starting to think more calmly and are plotting their defense.  
 They are all the Progressives and their supporters, the entire Judenschaft, and a large 
 number of foreign countries.  That is to say, taken together formidable foes, especially as 
 they are prepared to stoop to any means.  In view of the colossal influence  which the 
 Jews [die Judenschaft] wield by virtue of their wealth, through which they  have secured 
 the services of Christians in influential positions, even though they  themselves are few in 
 number, they are by far the most dangerous of our enemies.311 
 
His use of the term Judenschaft, his emphasis on the perceived disproportionate influence of 
Jews, and his calling them the greatest of Germany’s enemies point toward Stoecker’s influence 
on Waldersee’s anti-Semitism. 
 According to the Denkwürdigkeiten and Röhl’s research, it is largely after the meeting at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 began the Stoecker Affair, that Waldersee makes anti-Semitic statements in 
his journal that reflect Stoecker’s influence.  Two weeks after the gathering, the liberal elite and 
the press saw Prince Wilhelm’s participation in the City Mission as scandalous.  “These people 
are all myopic,” Waldersee wrote on December 15, “The prince in no way intends to get 
involved in politics; he wants to get people from a very broad spectrum of parties interested in 
the City Mission and thus to take the latter out of the hands of the orthodox clique and put it on a 
broader Protestant footing.”  He added that Stoecker “must retreat a little into the wings.”  
Waldersee believed discussing his and Prince Wilhelm’s intentions was fruitless because “too 
many people are under the influence of the Jews,” yet he also then states, “there has not been any 
talk of this race from the start, and yet they are the ones making a real hullabaloo and kicking up 
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a fuss in the domestic and foreign press.”312  The resulting attacks on Waldersee in the liberal 
newspapers furthered and appear to have fed his hatred of Jews (See “The Stoecker Affair”). 
 His belief that the Catholic Church and Jews posed serious threats to the Prusso-German 
monarchy was completely irrational and unfounded.  Anti-Semitism, however, did not appear to 
play a direct role in Waldersee’s interest in the City Mission and his effort to get Prince Wilhelm 
involved in the institution.  He was motivated by a desire to combat socialism in the interest of 
defending the monarchy and the socio-economic order of the empire.  Mary’s philanthropy 
brought him into serious contact with Stoecker and this connection would lead to a controversy 
that would make Waldersee a public figure by the beginning of 1888. 
  
 December 1887 was the threshold of a new chapter in Waldersee’s life.  His relationship 
with Mary was strong, and they were active and popular participants in the social life of the elite 
in the imperial German capital.  Waldersee had become a leading voice in the General Staff and 
trusted greatly by its aging Chief of Staff.  Amid the turmoil in the Balkans and the fear of a 
diplomatic dilemma in Europe, Waldersee’s advocacy for war, grounded in the foreign military 
threats he perceived, had annoyed Bismarck, but did not cause any true enmity between the two 
men.  Prince Wilhelm discovered a friend and father figure in the Quartermaster-General, who 
found in the young Hohenzollern the hope for a promising future for the empire, grounded in its 
Christian and Prussian monarchist traditions.  Waldersee’s attempt to get Prince Wilhelm to 
patronize a philanthropic institution founded by Stoecker caused the liberal and progressive 
political parties to become alarmed at the perceived reactionary influence over the future Kaiser, 
a fear heightened by Crown Prince Frederick, for whom death was imminent.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 721.  Waldersee, December 15, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 343. 
   
	   118 
 Not only in the exclusive world of the elite, but also in the general public – through the 
press – Waldersee became identified with Prince Wilhelm, Stoecker, ardent anti-Semitism, and 
reactionary conservatism by the end of 1887.  His firm belief in traditional Prussian monarchism 
influenced his actions, and he was not able to comprehend fully the complex, fluctuating power 
dynamics at court and in the government.  “Unfortunately he wholly lacked the ability to assess 
his own limitations or to see himself from the outside,” writes Walter Goerlitz, “This was a pity, 
for despite his charm, his very naiveté sometimes made him mildly ridiculous.”313  In the next 
several years, Waldersee’s star would continue to rise, but he would be confronted with the 
realities of a new era and a changed monarchy. 
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Part II: A Transformational Time, 1888-1891 
 
 On an average morning during late 1888, within the walls of Herwarthstrasse 2, the 
Waldersees would have been going about their normal routine.  After eating an egg or two, 
Alfred von Waldersee, who by this time had succeeded Helmuth von Moltke as Chief of Staff, 
would have then gone to his office to coordinate military planning or to the palace to see Kaiser 
Wilhelm II to discuss political matters.  After breakfasting on some citrus fruit, Mary would have 
gone to assist one of the charitable institutions with which she was involved.  Mrs. Lee, while 
enjoying her daily coffee and bread, would have probably been writing to her cousin, telling her 
about the things she saw both inside and outside the Military Staff Building.1  On that same 
given morning hundreds of miles away in Paris, a French newspaper reader would have perhaps 
come across the title, “Le Général Waldersee” and read an illuminating article that gave a rare 
glimpse into the world of the German General Staff: 
  We find in the New York Herald the interesting report of a visit to General 
 Waldersee, the personal confidant of Kaiser Wilhelm and the successor of Marshal von 
 Moltke in the management of the great German General Staff.  It is in a Moorish edifice 
 constructed of dark red stone . . . that the great General Staff is lodged.  No sentry; no 
 functionaries pace up and down before this palace that shelters the most advanced 
 military machine that the human spirit has ever organized.  A concierge takes the card of 
 visitors and one ascends two floors to arrive at the office of  the great chief, the general 
 Count Waldersee.   
  The walls of the staircase and the antechamber are garnished with . . . ancient 
 halberds, old swords from Brandenburg, there next to foreign armor, lances, and Japanese 
 sabers.  The stairs are full of the comings and goings of young officers in full 
 uniform . . . who are coming to report.  In the antechamber . . . after a few minutes of 
 waiting, [the visitor] is found in the presence of Count Waldersee. 
  The successor of Marshal von Moltke is a man of average size, a little older than 
 50.  The hair is very thick, but with the whiteness of snow.  His eyes are clear and placid, 
 but his look is of an unusual fixedness.  When the Count speaks, it is slow, and each word 
 is pronounced clearly and vigorously.  The attitude of the man, the manners, the voice 
 and the gestures, or rather the complete absence of gestures, give an impression of cold 	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 determination that nothing would disturb.  The general’s office, of average size, is very 
 simply furnished. 
  The Count, in full uniform, but without his sword, wears braids of gold and silver 
 which indicate his rank of General of Cavalry, and the red bands on his trousers of an 
 officer of the General Staff. 
  The long, low table where he works is covered with maps published by the 
 department of which he is the great chief.  A vast library, placed behind the armchair of 
 the count, contains the principal works on history of the art of war and the complete 
 reports of the Prussia General Staff on the campaigns of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71. 
  “The count,” says the American journalist, “points me to a seat and asks me the 
 purpose of my visit: I respond that the newspapers have declared that he considered war 
 as inevitable, and that in his opinion, it would be better for it to break out.” 
  “In one corner of the office, supported by a thin pedestal of iron, a bronze bust of 
 Marshal von Moltke appears suspended in the air.  The general contemplates for a few 
 minutes, then, without hurry, without the slightest excitement, expresses himself thus: 
  “To say I desire war is absurd.  I only wish one thing: that our enemies renounce 
 completely the idea of attacking us.  I know too well what war is and am convinced that it 
 is my duty as an honest man to wish that it be used only as a last resort, as much in the 
 interests of my Fatherland as in the interests of the entire world.” 
  Count Waldersee added: “I think then it is my duty, if I believe it is possible to 
 avoid [a war], to do everything in my power to arrive at this goal.  If Providence, 
 however, imposed on us a war, I will have every hope to succeed in the task which is 
 entrusted in me.  I am familiar with Germany’s spirit of sacrifice.  I know with such 
 confidence they will march behind their young emperor.  I am familiar also with our 
 army and I am certain of its superiority.  The other nations can adopt our tactical 
 formations and our weapons, but what they cannot imitate is the moral force which is the 
 principal element of the strength of the German army.”2 
  
This article was unique for Alfred von Waldersee.  The correspondent wrote originally for the 
New York Herald, but the article was reprinted in a French newspaper, showing how print media 
was becoming a greater form of international communication.  For the first time, Waldersee was 
questioned directly by a member of the press, and his responses were printed for an international 
audience to read and discuss; his clothes, looks, manners, and even the details of his office were 
now public knowledge.  Waldersee had always been a private figure, a member of the exclusive 
German elite, with whom he shared opinions and socialized.  In the aftermath of the meeting for 
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the City Mission at Herwarthstrasse 2 on November 28, 1887, however, Waldersee also became 
a public figure; he and his ideas were discussed not just in the salons of notables and the halls of 
power, but also in newspapers for the general public to read, understand, and discuss.  
 In the politically unpredictable and critical years of 1888-1891, when he was in his late 
50s, Alfred von Waldersee encountered the challenge of continuing to be a central figure at court 
and in high society, the private world in which he had always inhabited, while also being 
dragged into the public sphere.  His world was changing.  In terms of politics, Wilhelm I passed 
away in March 1888, and Frederick III succumbed to throat cancer a few months later.  Wilhelm 
II then acceded to the throne in June 1888, and Otto von Bismarck resigned the chancellorship in 
March 1890.  For Waldersee personally, for the first time in his life he became a political 
celebrity, a recognized, leading personality in Kaiser Wilhelm II’s entourage and empire.  When 
he officially succeeded his friend and mentor Helmuth von Moltke in August 1888, the new 
Chief of Staff received letters of congratulations from people he had never met; one of them even 
sent him a long poem.  Strangers and old friends of Mary who had not communicated with her in 
years wrote to her, too; the author of one letter from New Jersey wanted the autographs of 
Waldersee, Moltke, and Bismarck.3  While on a visit to Dresden with Kaiser Wilhelm II, among 
the great crowd there to greet them, Mrs. Lee wrote, “Alfred could hear them say one to the other 
‘that’s Waldersee.’”4  By 1892, there were even busts of Waldersee in wax museums in 
Hamburg and London.5  Waldersee’s experience with the development of his public image from 
1888 to 1892 reveals how one could become a celebrity at this time – for better or worse. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 7, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
4 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 12, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
C. 
5 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, January 6, 1892, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C. 
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 During this period in the history of modern Europe  – one of increasing literacy, of 
greater and speedier access to knowledge and information, and of expanding political 
participation – public opinion mattered more than ever.  Bismarck had a history of privileging 
newspapers with government information and attempting, with the help of subordinates and 
supporters in the political and media elite, to utilize the press for his personal and political 
advantage.   For example, he launched press campaigns against individuals, such as the historian 
Heinrich Geffcken and the British ambassador Sir Robert Morier, and for his policies, whether it 
was a domestic program or a foreign policy matter, the most famous of which was his Ems 
Dispatch that helped provoke the Franco-Prussian War.6  “The influence of Bismarck’s secret 
press apparatus cannot be underestimated,” writes historian Robert Keyserlingk about the liberal 
newspapers before 1884, but his basic conclusion still applies to the rest of Bismarck’s 
chancellorship: “Journalists needed good stories and information, while Bismarck needed to pass 
into the public mind his sort of news.”7  Kurt Koszyk observes that the chancellor’s “press policy 
was based accordingly on an instinctive seizing the necessity of the moment, not on a great 
plan.”8  Although the first part of that statement is true, Bismarck’s overall strategy was in fact to 
maintain power, especially by identifying himself in the press as representative of the nation.  In 
1875, Friedrich von Holstein called Bismarck the “sovereign of German public opinion.”9   
 Waldersee’s influence on Prince (later Kaiser) Wilhelm became a threatening political 
issue for Bismarck by the end of 1887.  In the first section, “The Stoecker Affair,” I will explain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Fortification, 1888-
1898, Volume III, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 304-305.  
7 Robert Keyserlingk, Media Manipulation: A Study of the Press and Bismarck in Imperial 
Germany, (Montreal: The Renouf Publishing Company, 1977), 144-145. 
8 Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Presse im 19. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der deutschen Presse, Teil II, 
(Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1966), 250. 
9 Friedrich von Holstein; quoted in, Koszyk, Deutsche Presse im 19. Jahrhundert, 305. 
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Waldersee’s role in this event and its importance for him.  As described in Part I, on November 
28, 1887, he hosted a meeting at Herwarthstrasse 2 for the City Mission.  Because of Prince 
Wilhelm’s participation and apparent support for far-right conservatives, Bismarck would use the 
opportunity to begin a press campaign against Waldersee to reduce the Quartermaster-General’s 
influence on the young Hohenzollern.  I argue that the Stoecker Affair became a watershed 
moment in the relationship between Bismarck and Waldersee and thrust the latter into the public 
spotlight.  In this section, I also revisit the issue of Waldersee’s anti-Semitism. 
 In the aftermath of the Stoecker Affair, Waldersee continued to be an object of press 
speculation.  In “The Coming Man?” I illustrate his public image that formed in the late 
nineteenth century and has persisted until today.  In this section, I will argue that, contrary to the 
beliefs of historians since World War II, Waldersee did not aim to become chancellor.  He 
enjoyed being a Prussian officer and saw no need to obtain a political, civilian position.  
Historians have recognized that Waldersee was ambitious, but his motivations were not based on 
a desire to expand his own power, but to defend the power of the monarch.   
 The manipulation of information through the press was a central feature of politics in late 
nineteenth-century Germany.  Waldersee had connections to military writers and the editors of 
conservative newspapers, but questions about his relationship to the press – whether he 
attempted to utilize friendly newspapers like Bismarck, and if so how much – cannot be fully 
answered until more archival research is completed.  After his removal from the General Staff, in 
an addendum in his journal titled, “About my alleged press bureau,” Waldersee stated bluntly, “I 
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never personally arranged for a political or military article in any newspaper.”10  Historian 
Helma Hink has looked, however, at Waldersee’s correspondence and discovered that the Chief 
of Staff not only knew his adjutant Major Zahn was actively engaged with the media, but he kept 
Waldersee informed of his doings.  Evidently, Zahn took it upon himself to pen positive articles 
about his chief for the conservative Kreuzzeitung and arranged to leak military information to 
other newspapers, including those that were organs for the chancellor.11  Therefore, we can 
assume for now that Waldersee, as he stated, did not personally try to influence public opinion, 
but he was aware of Zahn’s efforts, which were perhaps done more in the interests of the General 
Staff than just of Waldersee.  Nevertheless, because the Bismarck-inspired image of Waldersee 
that persists today is essentially the same one that circulated on the streets of Germany, I will 
only discuss that depiction of him.   
 Newspaper reports about Alfred von Waldersee typically included at least a mention of 
Mary, and eventually, the press – especially American newspapers – became fascinated with the 
American wife of such an important figure in Germany.  They started to speculate about her role 
in the society and politics of Berlin, and in the process, produced a distorted image of a pious 
woman who simply wanted to pursue her religious and philanthropic interests.  In the third 
section, “The American Egeria?” I show how and why Mary was misrepresented in the press as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Alfred von Waldersee, February 23, 1891, Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeldmarschalls 
Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, Volume II, ed. H. O. Meisner, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), 
191.  He also sought to keep his distance from the editor of the Kreuzzeitung, Freiherr von 
Hammerstein.  Waldersee, Febraury 9, October 13, and October 21, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 
36-37, 70-71, 73-74. 
11 Helma Hink, Bismarcks Pressepolitik in der bulgarischen Krise und der Zusammenbruch 
seiner Regierungspresse, 1885-1890, (Las Vegas: Peter Lang, 1977), 139-146.  Waldersee, 
February 23, 1891, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 191.  Also see Walter Goerlitz, History of the German 
General Staff, 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 109.  
Without citing evidence, Goerlitz states that the editor of the conservative Kreuzzeitung, Freiherr 
von Hammerstein owed Waldersee with friendly coverage because with the help of Mary’s 
money, he donated 100,000 marks to Kreuzzeitung.   
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political intriguer who helped her husband’s career and was one of Bismarck’s greatest 
opponents.  I argue that she had no interests in politics, but remained devoted to her 
philanthropic work. 
 In the fourth section, I return specifically to Alfred von Waldersee.  After Bismarck’s 
dismissal in March 1890, which Waldersee helped facilitate, Wilhelm II started to show signs 
that he was growing tired of his Chief of Staff’s political activities.  In the last section, “The 
Monarchist and the Changing Monarchy,” I illustrate the Waldersees’ last years in the German 
capital, through Waldersee’s dismissal in late January 1891.  I argue that he mistakenly believed 
that Wilhelm II would reign like his grandfather, Wilhelm I.  When the grandson failed to live up 
to expectations, Waldersee’s belief in the young monarch – and thus the monarchy itself – was 
shaken.  Through the 1880s, Waldersee fought to maintain the power of the monarchy, but he did 
not anticipate that Prince Wilhelm would assert his own dominant and erratic authority over 
imperial policymaking, which did not live up to the ideal of a good ruler, i.e. Wilhelm I. 
 Throughout this chapter of Waldersee’s life and time in Berlin, mass media would play 
an important role in shaping the public image of Waldersee, who was slow to confront the 
realities of a changing, modernizing world.  He had always been a private figure who inhabited 
the exclusive world of the elite, but beginning in late 1887, the press would spread rumors that 
he was unable to contain.  One incident neatly demonstrates Waldersee’s difficulty in managing 
the osmosis between his private and public lives during this transformational time.  In September 
1889, he paid a visit to his brother, the military governor of Hanover, and while looking at the 
framed pictures on the wall, Waldersee was surprised to spot one that looked familiar.  One day 
during the previous winter, Wilhelm II, Augusta Victoria, and Waldersee returned to the Military 
Staff Building after a promenade in the Tiergarten.  At the request of a General Staff 
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photographer, Waldersee allowed a picture to be taken of them in the courtyard.  The original 
hung in his room, but, Mrs. Lee wrote, “how a copy got to [the] Province of Hanover, we don’t 
know.”12  In 1887, an event in the Military Staff Building would escape the private world of the 
















 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 12, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
C.  “Alfred stood at the side talking,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “his favorite Badger Dog (Dachshund) 
[named] Tanker near him also the Raven – which Alfred will keep and I always call ‘that black 
thing.’  Alfred follows my example!” 
Image 8: Their Majesties and Waldersee in the courtyard of the Military Staff 
Building.  Mary Root, Chapter Sketches: Connecticut Daughters of the 
American Revolution.  (New Haven: Connecticut Chapters, Daughters of the 
American Revolution, 1904), 312.   
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The Stoecker Affair 
 
 After the fundraising meeting for the City Mission at Herwarthstrasse 2 on November 28, 
1887, a political firestorm erupted.  On the morning of December 30, 1887, the lead article of the 
liberal Viennese Neue Freie Presse stated: 
 The impression of that curious conventicle continues to be deep and lasting, which a 
 month ago took place at the home of Count von Waldersee in Berlin. One has again seen 
 Court Preacher Stoecker suddenly reemerge on the scene, in which he has remained 
 hidden for some time, and he appeared in such high society.  One has heard the melody 
 of the merger of all conservative elements against anarchy with one voice, which is 
 certain to speak a decisive word about the fate of Germany in the future.13 
 
Although Waldersee had intended that the gathering not be political, as demonstrated in Part I, 
Prince Wilhelm’s association with, and apparent support for, the anti-Semitic founder of the 
Christian Social Party, Adolf Stoecker, caused alarm among the elite and the press.  Beginning in 
December 1887 and largely ending in February 1888, what became known as the Stoecker Affair 
was more than just a controversy about the prince’s presence at an apparently right-wing meeting, 
but a larger debate among the political parties and the politicized press about the future of the 
German government.  With Wilhelm I expected to die any day and Crown Prince Frederick 
suffering from throat cancer in San Remo, Italy, the prospect that Prince Wilhelm could accede 
to the German throne sooner than expected was a distinct possibility.  Given the climate of 
political uncertainty in Berlin, the young Hohenzollern’s involvement with Stoecker’s City 
Mission fueled the fear of liberals and progressives that Prince Wilhelm would favor the anti-
Semitic and ultra-conservative parties during his imminent rule. 
 In this section, I will focus on Waldersee’s role in the affair and revisit the issue of his 
anti-Semitism.  Because the City Mission meeting took place at Herwarthstrasse 2, Waldersee’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Neue Freie Presse, December 30, 1887, GStA, Nachlass Waldersee, C. I Nr. I. 
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name would become associated with Stoecker, the Conservative Party, and the ultra-conservative 
Kreuzzeitung and its founder Baron von Hammerstein.  The controversy thrust him into the 
public spotlight.  At the same time that the Stoecker Affair was taking place, Waldersee was 
arguing for preventive war as shown in Part I.  On December 17, 1887, Prince Wilhelm attended 
an audience with the Kaiser, in which Waldersee, Moltke, the War Minister, and the Chief of the 
Military Cabinet made their case for a war with Russia.14  J. Alden Nichols notes that the 
Quartermaster-General’s relationship with, and influence on, Prince Wilhelm and his advocacy 
of a foreign policy that contradicted the chancellor’s, “even more than the Stoecker Affair, [was 
what] provoked Bismarck the most.”15  This statement is true, but it was the affair itself that gave 
the chancellor a chance to reduce Waldersee’s influence on Prince Wilhelm.  In this effort, he 
had the help of the liberal press, who were just as concerned about Waldersee, Stoecker, and the 
far-right’s influence over the future monarch.  The liberal Frankfurter Zeitung neatly 
summarized their fear: “Worried patriots believe that the future of our Reich depends basically 
on the question whether a fanatical cleric and an equally pious as well as warlike general have 
already laid their hands upon one of the next heirs to the throne.”16   
 In Part I, I also showed how Waldersee, though an anti-Semite, was motivated to support 
the work of Stoecker’s City Mission because he believed it would be a useful means for the 
monarchy to fight against socialism.  Ironically, the press attacks on him from the liberal and 
left-leaning newspapers, which were largely owned and edited by Jews, caused him to express 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Alfred von Waldersee, December 17, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeldmarschalls 
Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, Volume I, ed. H. O. Meisner, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), 
344-345. 
15 J. Alden Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers: Bismarck and the German Succession, 1887-
88, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 71. 
16 Frankfurter Zeitung, January 17, 1888; quoted in Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 72. 
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his anti-Semitism in his journal more often in the aftermath of the City Mission meeting.17  In 
March 1890, he wrote that Jews were “mostly fellows with no homeland, who have no interest in 
anything but making money, and who – wonder of wonders – mostly support the Progressives, 
and often even vote for Socialists at elections.”18  In summer 1889, Waldersee, then Chief of 
Staff, would come to detest Bismarck’s banker – “the Jew” – Gerson Bleichröder, whom he 
accused of supporting the Russian military through financial transactions and hurting Austria’s 
credit.19  In his book about Bismarck and Bleichröder, Fritz Stern states that Waldersee used 
“ferocious anti-Semitism” in his criticisms of the two men.20  Despite the anti-Semitic nature of 
Waldersee’s descriptions of Bleichröder – and Jews in general when it came to the Russian loan 
controversy – the Chief of Staff’s overriding concern was foreign policy, as illustrated in Part I, 
not Judaism; he feared hordes of Russian troops more than a handful of successful Jewish 
bankers. 
 In December 1887, when the Stoecker Affair commenced, there were people at court who 
were concerned about Wilhelm’s apparent support of Adolf Stoecker and his politics.  Waldersee 
noted that Prince Wilhelm’s own court marshal, Eduard von Liebenau, “put himself on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As Nichols writes, “Jews at the time were mostly associated with Liberals since the Liberals 
had been responsible for their recent grant of full citizenship in 1869.  Many emancipated Jews 
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Denkwürdigkeiten I, 380. 
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enemy side.”21  In a letter to the sick Crown Prince, Liebenau stated that the day before the 
meeting, he had spoken to Waldersee about its significance for the prince, and the 
Quartermaster-General “was at first surprised and then crestfallen.  I had the feeling then that he 
was embarrassed by the fact that he was party to the matter and I believe this even more so now.”  
“Waldersee and his comrades,” the prince’s court marshal continued, “had not realized the 
impact their actions would have until the storm broke in the press over the meeting in 
question.”22  Waldersee may have regretted the political predicament he put himself and the 
prince in, but discussion of the affair in the press would only confirm his fear and disgust of the 
people whom he felt were the princes’ enemies.  The meeting, he wrote at the beginning of 
December, was “answered by a cry of indignation from the extreme-progressive papers that are 
completely under Jewish influence, the same naturally from the Social Democratic papers, but 
also the Germania [the newspaper of the Catholic Center Party].  I believe that these attacks just 
help the cause.”23  On December 23, 1887, Waldersee wrote that “careful inquiries” showed the 
alarm in the press came from Jews, who as supporters of the Crown Prince, “have the feeling that 
Prince Wilhelm is their enemy.”  Frederick’s illness, he added, “has coincided with the matter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Waldersee, December 2 and 3, and 15, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 339, 343. 
22 Liebenau to Crown Prince, December 20, 1887; quoted in John Röhl, Young Wilhelm: The 
Kaiser’s Early Life, 1859-1888, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Rebecca Wallach, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 723.  “All I can do, if only to facilitate [Wilhelm’s] backing 
down, is to draw his attention to the general opinion in the form of newspaper cuttings.  For 
some time now, I have been reading solely on the Prince’s behalf 7-8 of the major dailies of the 
most diverse political color, both German and foreign, and no sensible article on his social-
political debut is kept from him.  Incidentally, I believe that it is starting to dawn on the Prince, 
too, that he has made a political error.” 
23 Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 34.  Waldersee, December 2 and 3, 1887, 
Denkwürdigkeiten I, 339. 
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the City Mission, and the Judenschaft is agitated in the extreme.  Its attacks are aimed much less 
at Stoecker than at the Prince.”24   
 Mrs. Lee seconded her son-in-law’s opinion.  Before the prince left Herwarthstrasse 2 
after a dinner one evening in January 1888, Mrs. Lee shook his hand and told him that she was 
glad he took an interest in the City Mission, “especially by his moral courage in acknowledging 
it, [and] that God would reward him and it mattered not what man said.”  As she explained to her 
cousin, Prince Wilhelm’s participation in the City Mission “gave umbrage to some Jews and 
unbelievers.”25  In April 1888, Mrs. Lee hoped that her cousin would not think poorly of 
Wilhelm because “as you know, all the world over the Jews have money, which is a power in the 
press . . . [they] do all they can to disparage Prince Wilhelm.  They dislike him because he stands 
so firm on Christian faith, hence they know he will be no friend to them.”26   
 On December 21, 1887, while Prince Wilhelm was writing a letter to Bismarck about the 
affair, Waldersee arrived.  The Quartermaster-General did not dictate the wording, but he “did at 
least provide [Wilhelm] with the key notions and helped set the tone,” argues John Röhl.27  In the 
document, the prince contended that Stoecker fought for the monarchy and Christianity and that 
he was not going to be involved directly in the City Mission’s work.  Prince Wilhelm also 
reaffirmed that he did not want his interest in the institution to have a political overtone, but, he 
noted, “I am thoroughly convinced that unifying these elements for the purpose mentioned is a 
worthy aim and the most effective means of combating social democracy and anarchism in the 
long term.”  The prince did not finish without saying a word about the newspapers.  “I hope I 
have thus dispelled the suspicion, artificially nurtured by the deliberate distortions of the press, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 721.  Waldersee, December 23, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 347. 
25 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, January 18, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
26 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
27 Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 725. 
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that the initiative was connected specifically with Stoecker.”28  On Christmas Day 1887, 
Waldersee had paid a visit to Prince and Princess Wilhelm, who were both angered by the press, 
“which indeed conducts itself shamelessly,” Waldersee wrote.  He also noted the Prince was 
determined to “stay firm against the chancellor.”29  On January 6, 1888, Bismarck wrote an 
eight-page reply, in which he emphasized that the monarchy needed to stay above parties and 
warned that Protestant preachers were just as theocratic as Catholic priests.30  Tens days later, 
Waldersee stated that he understood the purpose of the letter: 
 The tenor of [the letter] is to advise the Prince to withdraw from such bad company and 
 to drop such evil counselors and to remain like Frederick the Great above the parties . . . 
 The Chancellor fears that the Prince has fallen into the hands of those who might drive a 
 wedge between the Prince and him or his son and is attempting to redress the situation.  
 He is initially trying to achieve this by flattering him and then admonishing him . . . If the 
 Chancellor does not give a little ground now, then I believe a permanent rift with Prince 
 Wilhelm to be probable and imagine that the Chancellor is quite willingly causing this 
 break.  He has got himself into a rut with his policies and would gladly find a way to 
 extricate himself with a good excuse.  Should the Prince become Kaiser, then Bismarck 
 will immediately declare that he cannot stand at the side of someone who wishes to adopt 
 such an extreme denominational stance and will resign amid great hurrahs and cries of 
 approval from the entire liberal and Jewish pack.  At present, the Chancellor evidently 
 still hopes to overwhelm the Prince and to shackle him to his and his son’s side, but I 
 think he is miscalculating the situation badly.31 
 
Just as Waldersee had supported Prince Wilhelm through the Union Club affair, he would once 
again stand with the young Hohenzollern.  This time, however, he would become a clear 
opponent and target of Bismarck.  The ambitious young Prince and his confidant Waldersee 
posed too great a threat to the policies that the chancellor had forged.   
 Otto von Bismarck decided that he had to maintain his and Herbert’s influence over 
Wilhelm, even if that meant attacking Waldersee in the press and at court.  When the affair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Prince Wilhelm to Bismarck, December 21, 1887; quoted in Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 725-726. 
29 Waldersee, December 25, 1887, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 347. 
30 Bismarck to Prince Wilhelm, January 6, 1888; quoted in Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 730-732 
31 Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 733-734.  Waldersee, January 16, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 351-352. 
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erupted, he commented that the general was politically incompetent, and Herbert Bismarck wrote 
that he was “really and truly annoyed with Waldersee, who, together with his wife, stirred up the 
whole thing, instead of concentrating on his General Staff.”32  On January 17, 1888, Prince 
Wilhelm dined at Herwarthstrasse 2.  He had spoken about the City Mission affair with the 
Kaiser, who was obviously perturbed by his grandson’s endeavor.  Wilhelm I also told the Prince 
that he had become strongly influenced by Mary von Waldersee, “who goes somewhat far in 
religious matters.”  Her absence from court had caused some suspicion, but Waldersee 
maintained that she had been away for the past couple of years because she wanted to stay with 
her mother who had health problems.  “It saddens me whenever the Kaiser believes such lies,” he 
wrote, noting the “despicable way” in which the monarch is influenced and resolving to correct 
the untruth for the Kaiser.33  The next day, January 18, members of the Free Conservative and 
National Liberal parties attended a meeting, at which the chamberlain for Princess Augusta 
Victoria – both strong supporters of the City Mission – explained the situation about this 
institution, as Waldersee noted: 
 While [the Bismarcks] had told the Prince unequivocally that they had no part in the 
 articles printed in the Norddeutsche and the Post, indeed had done nothing in the whole 
 affair to counter the intentions of the Prince, several of the gentlemen present stated that 
 they had proof that the Chancellor had whipped up opposition to the Prince in other 
 newspapers, such as the Hamburger Korrespondent.  These revelations are very sad, but 
 are no longer to be denied.  Some of the gentlemen were quite horrified by the 
 Chancellor’s fork tongue.34 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Count Radolinski; quoted in Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 728-729.   Herbert Bismarck to Rantzau, 
January 6, 1888; quoted in Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 729.  
33 Waldersee, January 17, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 352. 
34 Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 734-735.  Waldersee, January 20, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 353-354. 
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A few days later, he complained in his journal of the “unheard of fact that the Imperial 
Chancellor and his son – they are one and the same firm, after all – have dared to attack the 
future Kaiser in the press, cannot unfortunately be undone.”35 
 On February 2, Waldersee noted that he stood well with Prince Wilhelm and that from 
what he heard through “slimy gossip,” the Bismarcks were most likely developing a “war” 
against him.36  On February 14, the Deutsches Tageblatt published an article insinuating the 
presence of a War Party working against the Chancellor.  “Hardly is the City Mission conflict 
over than a new ones threatens,” he wrote.37  In February 1888, Bismarck’s campaign against 
Waldersee – and the dissemination of rumors that would surround him until today – had begun 
(see “The Coming Man?” below).  On February 29, Waldersee had a conversation with Count 
Maximilian von Berchem, the Undersecretary of State, who admitted that Bismarck had quite a 
lot of resentment against Waldersee because of the Stoecker Affair, but that was now over.  
Waldersee’s relationship with Prince Wilhelm, however, was “the main reason for hostilities.”38 
 After a meeting for the City Mission in the hall of the Prussian House of Lords on May 
28, 1888, Waldersee wrote that the controversy was coming to an end.39  By February 1889, 
however, he noted that the “hunt against Stoecker” was once again underway.  “[He] has without 
question many weaknesses,” wrote Waldersee, “but he remains always a fearless fighter in the 
best cause, he fights for the Christian faith and for the kingdom against the approaching heavy 
thunderclouds.”40  Wilhelm, now king and emperor, was facing agitation from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Waldersee, journal entry for January 26, 1888 not reproduced in Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten; 
quoted in Röhl, Young Wilhelm, 735. 
36 Waldersee, February 2, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 357. 
37 Waldersee, February 14, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 359. 
38 Waldersee, February 29, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 364. 
39 Waldersee, May 28, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 401. 
40 Waldersee, February 19, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 38-39. 
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Wilhelmstrasse to deal with the anti-Semitic court preacher and politician, but Waldersee told 
him that “Stoecker’s fall would mean a triumph for the Jewish and progressive circles” and that 
he spoke in the Kaiser’s interests more than Stoecker’s.  He also heard that the Bismarcks 
watched him “with the highest mistrust.”  Although they wanted Waldersee to join with them, 
the Bismarcks were “uncomfortable” because he would not do it, and, as he noted, “I have a 
good position with the Kaiser.”41  Despite Waldersee’s attempts to convince the monarch not to 
give in, Wilhelm II believed that the conflict between the preacher’s position at court and his 
political agitation was causing too much trouble, and on April 25, 1889, Stoecker was forced to 
give up politics in exchange for being able to keep his prominent position as a Court Preacher.42  
“I am happy about this settlement for the Kaiser’s sake,” wrote Waldersee.   
 Stoecker did not refrain permanently from politics, however, and after falling out of the 
Kaiser’s favor, he submitted his resignation on November 4, 1890.  “The Kaiser will take note of 
the wholehearted applause of the Jews, Social Democrats, and Liberals of all shades which he 
will receive for this!” Waldersee wrote.43  On November 23, he continued to lament the 
situation: 
 The saddest thing about it, as ever, is that the Kaiser allows himself to be so easily 
 influenced; in this case – naturally without suspecting it – he gave in to Jewish pressure; 
 he is in the process of undermining the foundations on which he stands, by paralyzing 
 one of his best resources at a time when as he himself has often said the forces of 
 insurrection are at work.  If Stoecker were not such a dangerous enemy of revolution he 
 would certainly not be attracting so much hostility.44 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Waldersee, February 25, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 39-40. 
42 Waldersee, March 18 and April 25, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 45-46, 49. 
43 Waldersee, journal entry for November 4, 1890, not reproduced in Meisner’s 
Denkwürdigkeiten; quoted in Röhl, Wilhelm II, 402.   
44 Waldersee, journal entry for November 23, 1890, not reproduced in Meisner’s 
Denkwurdigkeiten; quoted in Röhl, Wilhelm II, 402-403. 
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Mary von Waldersee continued to be involved with the City Mission and Stoecker at least 
through May 1889.45  The Stoecker Affair had opened the door for Bismarck to begin his 
campaign at court and in the press against Waldersee’s influence on Prince Wilhelm.  This 
crucial moment in the relationship between Wilhelm and Bismarck had caused Waldersee to 
rally further to the side of Wilhelm and initiate his own full break with Otto von Bismarck, 
which would culminate in his advocacy of the Iron Chancellor’s dismissal in March 1890.  The 
Stoecker Affair brought Waldersee into the public eye and initiated his confrontation with the 
clash of his private world and the public.  This first episode in a new, transformative chapter of 
his life had begun with a meeting for the City Mission at Herwarthstrasse 2, a charity with which 
his wife had been involved.  On May 9, 1889, in all the rooms of Herwarthstrasse 2 – except 
Waldersee’s – Mary held her annual tea for the women of the Magdalene Society.  Adolf 
Stoecker was there to address them.46     
 
The Coming Man? 
 
 Beginning in 1907, Maximilian Harden, the pro-Bismarck founder of the journal, Die 
Zukunft, gained much notoriety when he publicly accused Wilhelm II’s friend Prince Philip zu 
Eulenburg and other members of the Kaiser’s entourage of homosexuality, initiating a series of 
libel trials that developed into one of the German Empire’s greatest scandals.  In 1888, he had 
begun his career in journalism as a writer and theater critic for the liberal Berliner Tageblatt, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, May 27, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C. 
46 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, May 9, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C. 
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he soon thereafter became a political supporter of Bismarck.47  On July 15, 1889, amid an uproar 
about Waldersee in the press, the Berliner Tageblatt published a short “patriotic play,” written by 
Harden, titled, “Der Frictionarins.”  In this satirical, humorous, and weird story, the General Staff 
Colonel – “a dashing gentlemen in his prime” – bursts into a room in Berlin and asks Germania – 
“a medieval lady” – why she is reading “the obsolete pages of doctoral questions” from the 
Foreign Office’s mouthpiece.  “How old-fashioned!” he exclaims, and when Germania tries 
proudly to defend the author, the General Staff Colonel retorts, “Ridiculous!  He searches for 
relaxation in rural seclusion!”  “And you want to become his successor?!  With this naiveté?” 
Germania asks impertinently.  “You cannot flutter your bushy eyelashes at him,” she states, 
“Become old and live well, mein Herr!  I require no other stream because my drinking water 
flows from proven state leadership.”  After Germania calls him a warmonger and questions him 
about his understanding of the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the General 
Staff Colonel fumes: 
 Don’t tell me about Clausewitz!  That is the old school.  We are we.  Was Clausewitz 
 bold?  I am.  I will arrange for you a small springtime war – perfect!  Are you familiar 
 with my motto?  “To East and West the storm hits; in the interior rules Hammerstein 
 [the editor of the conservative Kreuzzeitung]!”  Therefore, give me your hand, my dear, 
 and come with me to my red castle! 
 
Germania, breaking her hand free from his grasp, declares, “He said you were ever the villain, 
and I believe Him.  He has put me in the saddle.”  “And I will teach you to ride, Madame!” the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Harry F. Young, Maximilian Harden, Censor Germaniae: The Critic in Opposition from 
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General Staff Colonel thunders, eventually proclaiming, “I am war, I am youth, I am marvelous!  
Follow me with God for king and Fatherland!”48 
 In creating this character of the General Staff Colonel, Harden clearly intended to parody 
Waldersee, who had become Chief of Staff in August 1888 and who continued to be a friend and 
advisor to Wilhelm II.  The caricature above reveals in a humorous way the public image of 
Waldersee; he is presented here as a warmongering adversary of Bismarck who wanted to 
become chancellor.  In this section, I will show how and why Waldersee was depicted in the 
press and his reaction to his public image, one that would persist until today.  In Part I, I 
illustrated the development of his view on preventive war and argued that his advocacy of war 
was not irrational.  In this section, I will argue that he did not aspire to become chancellor 
because he had nothing to gain by obtaining the position.  Although ambitious and interested in 
politics, Waldersee sought to defend the authority of the monarch against any force that 
threatened it, including Otto von Bismarck.   
 “Hardly is the City Mission conflict over with than a new one threatens,” Waldersee 
wrote on February 14, 1888.  That day, the Deutsches Tageblatt published an article that claimed 
a War Party was intriguing against Bismarck and his foreign policy.  The paper also accused 
military men of interfering in politics and charged a “spiritus rector” with disseminating “war 
scare” articles that emphasized Russian troop movements.  With the exception of the 
conservative Kreuzzeitung, the other German newspapers did not take the report seriously.49  The 
Kölnische Zeitung called the existence of a War Party a “strange idea” that not even foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “Der Frictionarians” by Maximilian Harden, Berliner Tageblatt, July 15, 1889, GStA, 
Nachlass Waldersee, C. I Nr. 3. 
49 Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 144.  The Kreuzzeitung called the article, “the most 
monstrous ever perpetuated by a German paper in this difficult, sad time,” and did not like that 
the article insinuated that Germans needed to get behind a united domestic policy, i.e. 
Bismarck’s.  
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newspapers had proposed, and it criticized the Deutsches Tageblatt for making a fuss about “war 
scare” articles when there was a general anxiety among the press and political elite about 
Russian troops near the border.50  Waldersee knew the piece was directed against him and 
intended for Prince Wilhelm’s eyes.  “The affair would be laughable,” he stated, “if I were not 
convinced that the attack comes from the Wilhelmstrasse.”51  Waldersee was annoyed that 
someone would use anonymity in the press to attack him, and although the author’s identity 
never became known, he remained convinced the article originated from “the House of Bismarck 
and its Mamelukes.”  He also noted that liberals now targeted him, fearing that he would remain 
a confidant of Wilhelm II and “we would then make war together.”52   
 In February 1888, Wilhelm, then still a prince, sent Bismarck the article from the 
Deutsches Tageblatt.  Believing it to be a “pathetic Russian effort,” he told Herbert Bismarck on 
February 19 that no German could write such a thing.  After hearing of this, Waldersee hoped 
this “salutary lesson” would not be lost on the chancellor’s clique.53  The next day, the German 
military attaché stationed in Paris, Ernst von Hoiningen, better known as Huene, had dinner with 
Bismarck.  While the two men conversed in the chancellor’s workroom, the Foreign Office’s 
press director suddenly appeared and delivered the Deutsches Tageblatt article, claiming that it 
must have come from a Russian source.  Stating the article would then naturally upset the 
General Staff, Bismarck asked the attaché if the staff had heard anything about it.  “No, nothing,” 
he replied.  The whole thing was an “arranged comedy,” Huene later told Waldersee, who readily 
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51 Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 144.  Waldersee, February 14, 1888, 
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agreed.54  If the press director’s appearance was arranged, the chancellor was clearly attempting 
to throw Waldersee off the scent.  A connection between the Bismarcks and the Deutsches 
Tageblatt article is plausible, for, as J. Alden Nichols states, the paper had recently undergone a 
reorganization which involved a variety of members of Bismarck’s new political coalition and 
which the father and son “appear to have sponsored and pushed.”55  
 Waldersee wrote on March 6, 1888 – a few days before Wilhelm I’s death – that the press 
attacks on him were now becoming more direct.  For the first time, the rumor that Waldersee 
could be reassigned to command an army corps spread in the German press, including the 
Deutsches Tageblatt, which Waldersee recognized as “for some time the Foreign Office’s 
mouthpiece.”56  That day, the Bohemia of Prague stated that his replacement would be a favorite 
of Crown Prince Frederick, given Waldersee’s “ominous political influence on Prince 
Wilhelm.”57  The Quartermaster-General did not believe the chancellor had a direct hand in the 
report, but did not doubt it contained Bismarck’s views.58  Without the protection of his late 
friend and sovereign, Waldersee grew concerned about his future and spoke to Moltke and 
Wilhelm, knowing that the chancellor, jealous of his relationship with the new Crown Prince, 
wanted him out of Berlin, as evidenced through the articles about his possible replacement.59  
Mary Hoppin, Mrs. Lee’s cousin in Connecticut, heard Waldersee might be sent to the Rhineland. 
Blaming the false reports on Jewish influence in the press, Mrs. Lee wrote that she had received 
several inquiries about her son-in-law’s possible transfer from people who “had read it as a fact 
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in newspaper.”60  The new monarch, Kaiser Frederick III, however, did want to get Waldersee 
away from Berlin in order to sever his relationship with Crown Prince Wilhelm, a rapport, which, 
Moltke told his deputy, “is evidently your crime.”61 
 On May 10, 1888, Ascension Day, Waldersee paid a visit to the Crown Prince.  “The 
chancellor has the fixed idea that [he] wants war and is in the hands of the so-called War Party,” 
Waldersee wrote afterwards in his journal, “yesterday, I had already received confidential reports 
about this with the warning that I was naturally regarded as the evil advisor.”62  With Wilhelm’s 
accession to the German throne, for the first time, Waldersee’s friendship with the Kaiser gave 
reason to speculate that he could be a possible successor of Otto von Bismarck.  On the morning 
of June 22, 1888, the left-liberal Berliner Börsen-Courier reported that “recently, Quartermaster-
General of the Army, Count von Waldersee has been named many times as the one man who 
would be well-qualified and, in the end, also willing to become Imperial Chancellor in place of 
Prince Bismarck.”  Whether he actually had such thoughts, the paper’s editors acknowledged 
that they did not know.63  That day, Waldersee complained about the “democratic” and foreign 
press and how they portrayed him, but he believed that these newspapers were attempting to 
bring the chancellor into conflict with Wilhelm II.   
 After this incident, the Bismarcks, through Herbert, made peace with Waldersee in the 
interest of the new Kaiser, but Waldersee acknowledged that he would now be cautious because 
“my trust is shaken too much.”64  He would continue to find it difficult to trust the chancellor in 
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the future.65  In August 1888, Waldersee officially succeeded Moltke as Chief of Staff.  On 
September 21, 1888, the L’Éclair  made him the “Man of the Day,” stating that if Waldersee 
would become chancellor, it would be the first time that position would be filled by someone 
who is both a political and a military power; “What will be will be,” added the French 
newspaper.66  Bismarck continued, however, to hold tightly to the chancellorship, and the 
ambitious young Kaiser embraced the power of his throne.  Uncertainty reigned.   
 By December 1888, the rumor and potential of Waldersee’s becoming chancellor 
intrigued Baroness Althea Salvador (née Kimpson).  Born into an affluent American family, she 
was brought by her mother to Europe, where she met her future husband, a Spanish nobleman.  
Tall, thin, and blonde, she spoke several languages and entertained the social and political elite 
of Paris in the salons of her home on the ritzy Avenue du Bois de Boulogne.  The Baroness’ 
background was similar to Mary von Waldersee’s, but while the latter became a philanthropist, 
the former became a journalist.  Salvador was essentially the embodiment of the increasing 
information exchange through mass media between the public and the exclusive elite.  In 1891, 
The Morning Call of San Francisco called her “one of the most charming and graphic writers of 
the day.”67  On December 10, 1888, after stopping in Berlin during a trip through Germany, 
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Baroness Salvador submitted an article to the New York World titled, “Waldersee may succeed 
the aged German Chancellor.”  She interviewed one unnamed diplomat who stated the following: 
 Waldersee succeeds Von Moltke, and I believe that some day, when Bismarck shall be 
 superannuated, Waldersee will be not only chief of the army but the chief of political 
 affairs in Germany . . . You ask if Count von Waldersee is a favorite?  I cannot answer, 
 but his rising fortune occupies the German mind, and although his star only rose 
 yesterday, at present it shines modestly, yet like electricity, it is more remarkable from 
 the length of its rays than from the intensity of light. 
 
Another anonymous diplomat the Baroness questioned also spoke about Waldersee:  
 
 Before Von Moltke’s resignation we heard of him only as one hears of hundreds of 
 German officers.  Of course he is the son of a general, and has been in service nearly 
 forty years.  He has great capacity, and many times has displayed his zeal, [and] his 
 talent . . . 
 
The Baroness gained the following impression:  
 
 From what I heard in official circles in Berlin there is no doubt about the jealousy 
 existing between Count von Waldersee and Herbert von Bismarck.  The old Chancellor 
 must die and Herbert thinks he must be the successor of his father, and now Gen. von 
 Waldersee appears already successor of von Moltke and the possible successor of Prince 
 von Bismarck. . . .68 
 
Given that Baroness Salvador does not name her sources and that she was writing for the New 
York World – one of the leaders in yellow journalism – the validity of her article is questionable.  
Nonetheless, it is yet another that furthered the image of Waldersee as a future chancellor.  
 According to Waldersee’s published journal entries and archival sources, from June 1888 
through January 1889, newspapers only sporadically mentioned the Chief of Staff as a 
conservative opponent of Bismarck or a possible chancellor.  It was also during this period when 
the correspondent from the New York Herald visited Waldersee at the Military Staff Building 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 New York World, date of publication unknown, but article submitted on December 10, 1888, 
HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 5.   
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and questioned him about his views on war.69  At the beginning of February 1889, however, 
Waldersee faced a great wave of media attention.  Upon discovering his name in an article about 
a post-Bismarck chancellorship in the Hamburger Nachrichten, a recognized pawn of the 
chancellor, Waldersee became concerned.  He had no doubt that the piece came from Bismarck, 
who, he claimed, had for some time been having him closely watched in order to obtain material 
to use against him.70  “My candidacy for the post of Imperial Chancellor is now discussed in all 
possible domestic and foreign newspapers, in which I am portrayed as the main opponent of the 
Chancellor,” he wrote the next day, “a few Berlin newspapers try to throw dirt at me.”  A 
Russian newspaper, in discussing the position of the chancellor, mentioned that the Emperor and 
Empress visited Herwarthstrasse 2 every morning.  The paper then asked its readers what the 
meaning of this “known secret” could be.  Waldersee was convinced there was now a “hunt” 
against him.  He believed the reprinting of the Hamburger Nachrichten article in the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, another pro-Bismarck paper, was proof that the chancellor not 
only produced the article, but had also intended for the Kaiser to come across it.71  Waldersee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 “Ein Konflikt,” Berliner Tageblatt, 1888, specific date unknown, GStA, Nachlass Waldersee, 
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Nr. 3.  “Le Général Waldersee,” GStA, Nachlass Waldersee, C. I Nr. 2. 
70 Waldersee, February 8, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 35-36.  Waldersee also made this claim on 
January 15, 1890, when he received a visit from a commanding general, who had already visited 
Bismarck.  The general reported that the chancellor said, “It is somewhat new to us that the Chief 
of the General Staff involves himself with youth associations.”  Waldersee believed Bismarck 
must have been referring to the opening of the Young Men’s Christian Association.  “One sees 
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opening of the Young Men’s Christian Association, at which the Empress was also present.  
Waldersee noted that in barely one and a half years they had raised 130,000 marks for the 
institution, with which Mary was an active member during her time in Berlin.  Waldersee, 
November 21, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 79.  Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 9, 1888, HH, 
Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 1, 1891, HH, Von 
Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C.   
71 Waldersee, February 9, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 36. 
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detested the chancellor’s ability to work public opinion through his press, “which is dishonest 
above all other terms,” but especially Bismarck’s manipulation of information either to influence 
or to attack the Kaiser.72 
 After hearing about the Hamburger Nachrichten article, Wilhelm, Waldersee recorded, 
immediately told Herbert Bismarck that he should have made sure that no more press attacks on 
Waldersee would see the light of day.  The Chief of Staff was quite delighted when he heard 
about this development and expected the Bismarck family would now become uneasy; they must 
have sensed that the Kaiser suspected them of producing the article.73  Waldersee’s prediction 
seems to have been well-founded, for the next day, February 14, the chancellor quickly 
responded to the Chief of Staff’s request for a visit to have a frank conversation.  That afternoon, 
Bismarck explained that he had never held anything against Waldersee and that he never 
believed the Chief of Staff wanted to make his position more difficult.  He also stated that 
through their long acquaintance, and especially in the interests of the person of the Kaiser, any 
animosity between them was to be ruled out.  Bismarck finished by thanking Waldersee for 
seeking a dialogue and assuring him that if differences were to arise in the future, he should 
request a meeting again.  Although Waldersee still had his disagreements with Bismarck, he left 
satisfied by the warm tone of the conversation.  That evening the Kölnische Zeitung reported that 
the two men had met for over an hour.  Waldersee was glad that the public and the Kaiser could 
see that he maintained an amicable relationship with Bismarck.74   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Waldersee March 3, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 44-45.  On January 2, 1890, Waldersee 
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73 Waldersee, February 13, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 37. 
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  146 
 Despite this reconciliation, newspapers continued to discuss the Chief of Staff as a 
possible future chancellor; in Waldersee’s view, they wanted to annoy Bismarck into getting rid 
of him.75  Not specifically naming the Chief of Staff, on February 11, the Kleine Journal hoped 
that the next chancellor would not come from an extreme party and would not damage the 
dynasty that Bismarck had strengthened.  “The German people,” stated this paper, “want no 
chancellor who could return the empire to the barbarity and misery of the Thirty Years War.”76  
The liberal Frankfurter Zeitung was more direct, stating: 
 It is necessary to spread the belief that whenever Bismarck goes, Waldersee will come 
 naturally as a founder of an arch-reactionary era, to which there is no other means of 
 prevention than to convince the proper authority that the will of the Nation is embodied 
 in Bismarck’s Politik.77   
 
Noting that the Kaiser had recently attended a dinner at Bismarck’s house and that the Chief of 
Staff had shown no signs of political ambitions, the Münchener Fremdenblatt questioned the 
recent “Waldersee Anxiety” of the governmental papers.  This Bavarian paper mocked the pro-
Bismarck press for their “almost comical anxiety of ‘the coming man’” every time the Kaiser 
showed some favor towards Waldersee, whose name “deprives them of peace and makes them 
nervous.”78  The anti-Waldersee Frankfurter Zeitung and the neutral Münchener Fremdenblatt 
had different opinions about a possible Waldersee chancellorship, but both papers at this time 
admitted that they did not know if the Chief of Staff desired or felt qualified for the highest 
political post.79  At the end of February, the press was beginning to quiet down, but once again 
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77 Frankfurter Zeitung, February 26, 1889, GStA, Nachlass Waldersee, C. I Nr. 3.  
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79 Frankfurter Zeitung, February 26, 1889, GStA, C.I.Nr.3; Münchener Fremdenblatt, March 3, 
1889, GStA, C.I.Nr.3  
  147 
Waldersee believed Bismarck was the source of the gossip.80  On Sunday, March 3, 1889, the 
front-page headline of the Breslauer Gerichts-Zeitung asked, “Who is the future chancellor?”  
This Silesian newspaper presented its readers with the sketched portraits of two mustached faces 
beneath the simple, yet engaging question.  On the left was Count Waldersee in a medal-adorned 
military tunic; on the right was Count Herbert Bismarck in a civilian coat.  Not only had the 
question been debated in the press for several weeks, the paper noted, but public opinion had also 
been swaying between the two men.81  A year later, neither Alfred von Waldersee, Herbert 
Bismarck, nor Otto von Bismarck would have the title of Imperial Chancellor. 
 A number of historians writing in the decades after the Second World War – such as 
Gordon Craig, Walter Goerlitz, Edward Crankshaw, Martin Kitchen, Otto Pflanze, J. Alden 
Nichols, Gerhard Ritter, Lamar Cecil, and Fritz Stern – have stated or strongly presumed that 
Alfred von Waldersee actively aspired to the chancellorship.82  None of these historians, 
however, have sufficiently described why he would want to be chancellor.  Waldersee gives 
some explanations in his journal.  On February 9, 1889, the day after the first article mentioning 
him as a possible chancellor appeared, he wrote the following: 
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 When the chancellor imagines I have the inclination to become his successor, he is 
 mistaken tremendously.  Right now, I wish that he continue holding his office and that 
 he sees for himself how poorly he has operated recently.  I consider anyone who wants to 
 accept the succession to be very bold (verwegen).  When one or another successor has 
 broken his neck, perhaps there is room for discussion (liesse sich vielleicht darüber 
 reden).83  
 
Ten days later, he complained bitterly in his journal about the Bismarckian press, who “must 
now explain that I always keep myself away from politics and only want to be a military man.  
This is quite right to me, and I state as often as possible that I have no ambition to become 
chancellor.”  He believed the chancellor “evoked my image . . . to dispose of me.”84  On 
February 24, in a private letter to his friend and military attaché in Warsaw, Waldersee reported 
the positive meeting with the chancellor on the 14th and noted, “The fear that I would like to 
become Imperial Chancellor is completely unfounded.  I very much like my position and want 
nothing more than to complete it satisfactorily.  I maintain each who wants to assume the 
inheritance of the chancellor to be a thoughtless man.”85  In November 1889, he wrote that 
people say he must become chancellor because Bismarck was quickly losing power, Herbert 
Bismarck was unsuitable, there was a lack of good choices, and he was a confidant of the Kaiser.  
“I hope strongly,” he stated, “that I always, that is as long as my strength is sufficient, can remain 
in my position.”86   
 In February 1890, when it appeared that Bismarck would soon be forced to resign, 
Waldersee restated his “old resolution” of not wanting to succeed the chancellor, writing, “I 
would be a fool if I wanted to have ideas of becoming chancellor [Kanzlerideen].”  If Bismarck’s 	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Meisner, Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1928), 223. 
86 Waldersee, November 13, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 76-77. 
  149 
replacement became a disaster, he added, then he would possibly be open to discussing it.87  
After Waldersee’s death in 1904, a reader of the Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung recounted that in 
the last years of Bismarck’s chancellorship, during a General Staff trip, the then Chief of Staff 
spent a couple of days in Augsburg, Bavaria.  The mayor asked him bluntly if the rumors of his 
becoming chancellor were true, to which Waldersee reportedly replied, “Whoever becomes the 
successor of a dead Bismarck is not to be envied; however, to become the successor of a living 
Bismarck, do not consider me to be so stupid.”88  In March 1890, two days before Wilhelm II 
accepted Bismarck’s resignation, Waldersee wrote in his journal his most straightforward 
explanation about his position in the chancellor question: 
 I am now being approached often about the chancellor succession.  My viewpoint is 
 absolutely clear.  Right now, I do not believe that the Kaiser will offer the position to me, 
 but I do not wish to obtain it.  I have a high position of responsibility that is satisfying 
 and occupies me greatly.  Why exchange it for a much more difficult one, which is 
 associated with continuous agitation and great disappointments.  The vanity of becoming 
 chancellor does not really affect me.  My excellent relationship with the Kaiser would 
 also very likely suffer because it is not at all easy to get along with him.  Should he 
 directly order me to become chancellor, I would thus interpret the matter like a true 
 soldier and do what is commanded of me.89  
 
For Waldersee, there was simply nothing to gain personally by becoming chancellor.  On July 5, 
1888, even before he officially became Chief of Staff, he had written, “things go as well for me 
as they do for few mortals; perhaps I stand at the zenith of my life.”90  Among all the positive 
developments he had going for him, the greatest was his strong relationship with the Kaiser, who 
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“thinks a great deal of me, likes to hear my opinion on many things, and in fact has friendly 
feelings towards me.”91  If Waldersee wanted influence, he did not need the chancellorship. 
 As many historians recognize, Waldersee was ambitious, but his motivation was not to 
gain power for himself through the chancellorship, but to preserve the independence of the 
military and its commander, the Kaiser, against the intrusions of civil government.  With 
Bismarck’s support in 1883, he worked with the Chief of the Military Cabinet to reduce the 
powers of the War Ministry in Germany's military establishment because, if not, “we would 
undoubtedly come to French conditions, in which the minister commands the army.”92  In 1882, 
with Bismarck’s blessing, Waldersee met unofficially with the chief of Austria’s General Staff, 
Friedrich von Beck.  The German Quartermaster-General wanted the staffs to use military 
attachés instead of the embassies to communicate with one another because, notes Beck’s 
biographer Scott Lackey, there was an “overriding concern for military secrecy since presumably 
contacts might eventually include the exchange of deployment plans.”93  Throughout the 1880s, 
Waldersee pushed for the independence of Germany’s military attachés so that they would not 
have to show their reports to the civilian heads at the empire’s embassies.  Isabel Hull has 
interpreted Waldersee’s use of the attachés as a way to build up his own political power, 
especially against Bismarck and the civilian authorities.  She also states, “Waldersee probably 
did not intend this step to benefit Wilhelm so much as to weaken Bismarck.”94  Although the 
attachés were used as a means to undermine the chancellor’s own manipulation of information, 
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Waldersee did want their reports to strengthen the monarch’s hand.  In January 1889, Waldersee 
asked the Kaiser to allow the attachés to be directly under the sovereign’s authority, not the 
chancellor’s, especially since a number of attachés were the Kaiser’s Flügeladjutanten, his 
personal aides-de-camp.  The Chief of Staff argued that insightful, independent military men 
were better informants than civilian diplomats who would be biased towards the chancellor’s 
policies.95  More importantly, he believed the Kaiser needed to hear different views.96  Bismarck 
reacted accordingly.  “The chancellor in his suspicious manner fabricates now a whole structure 
of fantasies,” Waldersee wrote on December 26, 1889, “He believes I maintain an organized 
political bureau, in which the correspondence with all the military attachés plays a leading 
role.”97   
 In Bismarck’s attempt to maintain power, Waldersee became a target after the Stoecker 
Affair, and with Wilhelm’s accession to the throne, he became a hostile partisan against the 
chancellor because he wanted to defend royal prerogative.  “Count Waldersee himself, 
represented the ancient Prussian nobles’ traditions of an absolute monarchy and a Hohenzollern’s 
unlimited power – traditions which were all at war with this Bismarck usurpation of authority,” 
wrote a correspondent for The New York Times in 1890.98  In December 1888, Waldersee wrote 
that he heard the chancellor, residing at Friedrichsruh, had said, “I must soon go to Berlin 
because I must see the Kaiser often.  Actually, it is necessary that I speak to him twice a week.”  
By having to stay in Berlin and communicate with Wilhelm in person, not in writing, Bismarck 
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admitted he “no longer constrains (zwingt) the Kaiser,” Waldersee opined.99  “The chancellor 
wants to rule everything,” he wrote at the beginning of 1890,” [but] no longer has the strength to 
do it.”100  Along with Friedrich von Holstein in the Foreign Office and the Kaiser’s friend and 
diplomat Philip Eulenburg, Waldersee sought to have Bismarck’s allies at court and in 
government removed, and, though he agitated against the chancellor, he did not play a leading 
role in getting him to resign.101  Given the press campaign against him, Waldersee did not just 
have a political animosity toward Bismarck, but a personal one.  “I have not the least desire ever 
to have any dealings with him again,” he wrote on March 2, 1890, “he has acted despicably 
towards me too often and I want no more to do with him.  The only question, now that he is in 
decline, is whether I should forgive him everything or call him to account for it.”102  On March 
15, 1890, the “great clash,” as Waldersee termed it, between the Kaiser and Bismarck occurred, 
and the latter would be forced to submit his resignation.103  The Wilhelmine era had begun.  
 Throughout his time in Berlin, Waldersee did not need to be chancellor to gain access to 
the Kaiser.  In the late 1880s, the Wilhelm-Waldersee relationship remained strong and the two 
men would often discuss politics while strolling through the Tiergarten or spending time together 
in one of the royal palaces.104  On his birthday in 1889, Wilhelm said he wanted Waldersee to be 
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affairs.  Noting that Bismarck looked upon him as a rival, he wrote, “I have the awareness to not 
be equal to such tasks, and was thankful to be able to remain in my real profession.”105  There 
was no need for a Prussian officer, friend, and courtier of the Kaiser to seek a political, civilian 
office.  A desire for the chancellorship was not Waldersee’s motivation for agitating against 
Bismarck.  He sought to protect and promote the power of the monarch and his military.  On July 
22, 1892, a correspondent for The New York Herald arrived at the Hotel Titlis in Switzerland, 
where Waldersee was vacationing with Mary.  Not happy about the visit from a member of the 
press, he nonetheless answered the journalist’s questions about his rumored political dealings 
and aspirations: 
 I am . . . not a politician . . . Once and for all, I beg you not to believe the absurdities 
 which malicious people seem to be publishing about me.  I am contented with my 
 military calling (‘Ich finde volle Befriedigung in meinem Beruf als Soldat’ were the 
 Count’s exact words) and have no higher ambition than to do credit to the post with 
 which my sovereign has entrusted me.106 
 
Waldersee never became “the coming man” that liberals and progressives feared in the late 
nineteenth century, and he was clearly not aiming to become chancellor as historians have stated 
or assumed in the late twentieth century.  
 
The American Egeria? 
 
 On January 21, 1889, an unidentified person wrote to the editor of the New York Tribune 
asking about the identity of the American wife of Count Alfred von Waldersee and the extent of 
her political influence in Germany, if she had any.  The editor replied that she was the former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Waldersee, January 27, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 33-34. 
106 The New York Herald, July 24, 1892, GStA, Nachlass Waldersee, C. I Nr. 6.  Waldersee 
noted the visit in his journal, stating that he had said nothing that he had not been telling others.  
Waldersee, addendum for July 21, 1892, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 252. 
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Mary Esther Lee of New York, who “undoubtedly has had great political influence in Germany, 
especially over the present Emperor while he was yet Prince Wilhelm.  By some she is 
represented as an ambitious political intriguer; by others as a humble-minded Christian 
philanthropist.”107  “In truth, she was both,” wrote amateur historian and Mary’s distant relative 
Alson Smith in his 1962 book, A View of the Spree: The extraordinary career of the American 
grocer’s daughter who became a ‘sanctified Pompadour’ to Germany’s last Kaiser.108  Smith 
presents a far-fetched account of the Waldersees, claiming Mary was an ambitious and powerful 
political intriguer in imperial Berlin who had an intimate relationship with Kaiser Wilhelm II.  
After mentioning this book, John Röhl writes, “We shall not waste further time on this unproved 
and implausible story.”109  I will not either, but Smith’s fallacies were based largely on – apart 
from his imagination – newspaper articles, which had mischaracterized Mary von Waldersee, too.  
 The press, when dealing with Alfred von Waldersee, was certainly a political tool, but 
Mary – unintentionally – provided interesting material for the newspaper industry during the 
early stages of yellow journalism.  As demonstrated in Part I, Mary was a devoted, pious wife 
whose interests and activities were philanthropic, not political.  In 1885, her charitable work had 
brought her husband into contact with Adolf Stoecker, an association that would begin press 
speculation about the Count’s role in politics.  Consequently, American newspapers became 
intrigued by the American-born Countess von Waldersee and her possible power and influence 
in the German capital.  In looking at the issue of Mary in the late nineteenth-century press, we 
can see how the old, private circles of the elite became merged with the world of the general, 	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Smith, A View of the Spree: The extraordinary career of the American grocer’s daughter who 
became a “sanctified Pompadour” to Germany’s last Kaiser, (New York: The John Day 
Company, 1962), 145. 
108 Smith, A View of the Spree, 145. 
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increasingly literate public.  What members of the upper class did or said in private – for 
example, Prince Wilhelm’s visits to the Waldersees and the Stoecker meetings at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 – became material for public gossip and affected the way someone was seen in 
society-at-large and in history. 
 Newspapers did not begin talking about Mary until the beginning of the reign of the 
cancer-stricken Frederick III in March 1888.  Everyone knew that after his imminent death the 
next Kaiser would be his son Wilhelm, to whom Alfred von Waldersee was a close friend and 
advisor.  The development of the idea that Mary was an ambitious political intriguer and the 
fascination with her were founded on four basic facts that were shown in Part I.  First, Alfred and 
Mary von Waldersee were friends with Wilhelm and Augusta Victoria.  Second, Mary had an 
especially close relationship to Crown Princess Augusta Victoria, to whom she was a great aunt 
through her first marriage to the Prince de Noer and with whom she assisted the City Mission.  
Third, Mary was an American, a nationality that was neither traditional nor common among the 
German elite.  Lastly, Alfred von Waldersee became identified as a member of the young 
Hohenzollern’s entourage and as a strong political supporter of the conservatives.  Journalists 
connected these facts and produced articles such as the following, which was printed in The 
Daily Graphic of New York on March 27, 1888 and titled “An American Mme. de Maintenon”: 
  It is possible, nay, it is too probable, that Emperor Fritz has not long to live. . . .  
  . . . Countess Waldersee has been for years the chief enemy in Berlin society of 
 the present Empress [Victoria]. . . . [Prince von Noer] died in six months and left her very 
 rich and titled.  That marriage makes her, however, aunt of the present Crown Princess, a 
 rather stupid party.  The Countess is the most consummate female politician in Berlin on 
 the Conservative side.  Her salon has been the center of court and Junker hostility to the 
 present Empress. . . .  
  There is one thing of interest to us in all these intrigues, and that is the fact that 
 the Countess Waldersee is a New Yorker, having been Mary Esther Lee, daughter of 
 David Lee, formerly a well-known banker of this city.  She is a very able and brilliant 
 woman of forty-eight years and has long been a most important figure in Prussian social 
 life.  It is worth noticing that the most conspicuous American women who have married 
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 abroad into prominent political and State families are most closely identified with ultra 
 conservative affairs and politics.  This marked in the case of Lady Randolph Churchill, 
 for example, and still more so in that of the Countess Waldersee.  Other instances might 
 be named. 
 
The author ended then with a misogynistic note: 
 
 In the Berlin case it will be well for Germany if the Lady’s influence shall be speedily 
 neutralized.  It represents all that is most offensive, bigoted, and domineering in Prussian 
 life and German policy.  It is said that when “Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of 
 war.” Substitute woman for Greek and we have the Berlin situation.110 
 
This article reveals the overarching image of Mary that would persist for years: an ambitious 
political intriguer who operated out of the salons of her home and used her relationship with 
Wilhelm and Augusta Victoria for political ends.  On March 25, 1888, an article in the New York 
Daily Tribune – titled “The Empress’s American Rival” – stated that although Mary’s 
relationship with Augusta Victoria was a source of influence over Crown Prince Wilhelm, “the 
real secret of her power in society and politics is inherent energy of character directed by 
ambition.”  The article, calling the Waldersees Wilhelm’s “confidential advisors,” claimed that 
Mary fueled the Crown Prince’s “prejudices against the English circle in Berlin and also against 
the Hebrew element; and it was from her salon that he drove recently to Dr. Stoecker’s mission.”  
The correspondent predicted that “the American, Mary Lea [sic], is destined . . . to be the power 
behind the throne when the present ill-fated reign comes to an end, and Prince Wilhelm succeeds 
to the Imperial title . . .”111  “Her salon is the most popular in Berlin, as far as high officials are 
concerned,” stated the New Haven Union in January 1890, “She is the pride of the American 
colony, and the only woman in Germany of whom it can be said that she is the friend of the 
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Emperor in the highest and most intellectual sense.”112  In August 1890, a correspondent for the 
New York Times wrote that the relationship between Mary and Augusta Victoria brought Alfred 
and Wilhelm closer together, “the results of which have been tremendous in Germany.”  He also 
stated that Mary, “with the privilege of an American,” was able to unite the otherwise 
antagonistic elements of German politics in her home, which became “the center of the rising 
opposition to the Bismarcks.”113 
 Not only did the press portray Mary as an opponent of Empress Victoria – the wife of 
Frederick III – but they also gave her the role as Otto von Bismarck’s political opponent.  One 
paper, after discussing all the meetings at the Waldersees’ home, stated that although Herbert 
Bismarck was being prepared to become chancellor, “the wise ones say that all the plannings and 
plottings have been in vain, for the Countess Waldersee, the fair American, has held a winning 
hand, and before her influence at court that of the once powerful Bismarck is as nothing.”114  Not 
only was she powerful enough to challenge Bismarck, but also to bring her husband success, 
according to the New Haven Union in January 1890: “Unquestionably much of Count 
Waldersee’s success has been due to his brilliant and highly accomplished wife.  He is the 
coming man in Germany, as she is the leading lady in Berlin.”115 
 Newspaper sometimes described her appearance and manners.  The New Haven Union 
article also noted that Mary’s “hair is snow-white, but she has all the vivacity and sprightliness 
of a lady of middle age [and] is a fine conversationalist.”116  In one newspaper article titled, “The 
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Queen of the German Court [Interview in Atlanta Constitution],” the correspondent stated the 
following: 
 . . . [The Countess] is now the first lady at the German Court . . . She lives like a Queen in 
 the palace adjoining Van Moltke’s [sic].  Though everything about her is royal, she 
 herself  follows the most severe simplicity.  From her fine forehead her soft silver hair is 
 brushed smoothly back.  Her complexion is as fresh as a girl’s; her face, with its 
 beautifully chiseled features, is full of expression, and her figure and carriage are regal.  
 At home she wears dark cashmeres of finest quality, but made absolutely without 
 trimming, while the neck and sleeves have plain linen collars and cuffs.  Yet with all this 
 simplicity hers is the most magnetic presence I have known.117 
 
 The articles I have mentioned or reproduced in this section have generally had factual 
errors: printing “Lea” instead of Lee, stating Mary was Augusta Victoria’s cousin, and reporting 
her age and the year she married incorrectly.  They – and even the errors made in them – show, 
however, what the American newspapers really wanted to report: her connection to the Prussian 
royal family and high politics, her American background, the goings-on at her home, the way she 
looked, and, most importantly, what influence the daughter of a New York grocer could have in 
the capital of the powerful German Empire.   
 In comparison to the American press, European newspapers did not mention or discuss 
Mary as often.  The Times of London mentioned that she was American and the widow of the 
Prince von Noer once in 1882 and once in 1888; in 1890 Waldersee was reportedly going to Italy 
for vacation, especially for the health of “his wife.”118  The French press occasionally promoted 
the idea of Mary’s political influence.  On September 21, 1888, L’Éclair noted that the “salons of 
Madame de Waldersee” were opened to Adolf Stoecker, “champion of anti-Semitism and 
advocate of Christian Socialism” and that she “is a superior woman (supérieure femme) and, one 
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says, the political Egeria of her husband,” who “put the successor of Moltke” in great position of 
influence.119  The reference to Mary as Egeria – a nymph who in Roman mythology was a 
counselor to the second king of Rome – appears to be unique to French newspapers.  In June 
1888, the German Kölnische Zeitung had reported that “another Frenchman” had mentioned “the 
Egeria of the new Kaiser of Germany” in a newspaper article and believed that he must have 
been referring to Count von Waldersee, “of whose mysterious influence – of course! – a whole 
novel is then produced with the most malicious childishness.”120  German newspapers rarely 
discussed or mentioned Mary.  In July 1888, the Neue Bayerische Landeszeitung of Würzburg, in 
a feature about Alfred von Waldersee, stated that Mary was an intimate friend of Empress 
Augusta Victoria and that both of them “work diligently for the relief of poverty and misery and 
are active members of the Berlin City Mission.”  The paper claims also that the meeting at the 
Waldersee’s home for the City Mission was “reason enough” for the liberal press “to splash both 
high ladies with their very nasty slobber.”121  From the newspaper articles for the period 1888-
1891 available in the Waldersee Papers (Nachlass Waldersee) at the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in 
Berlin and at Harvard University’s Houghton Library in Cambridge, the image of Mary as an 
influential political heavyweight in Berlin was largely a phenomenon in the American press, but 
two pieces of evidence from Waldersee and Mrs. Lee shown below reveal that this portrayal may 
have been more widespread in the German and British press than the archived newspaper 
clippings show. 
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 How American newspapers acquired information on Mary – at least enough to speculate 
about her – is not entirely clear.  Correspondents may have read about Alfred von Waldersee in 
German newspapers and drawn their conclusions about Mary from his reported influence, but 
they most likely talked to members of the Berlin elite who would have probably been personally 
familiar – for better or worse – with the Waldersees.  Baroness Althea Salvador, for example, 
noted in her article that she had talked to diplomats and people in “official circles.”122  Mary’s 
mother, Mrs. Lee, now and then reminded her cousin, Mary Hoppin, not to spread what she was 
reporting from the very salons in which Mary was believed to be exerting political influence: 
“Be careful dear Mary not to let what I say get into print – it is meant only for you”; “It would be 
better dear Mary to consider what I say of the ‘powers that be’ as confidential – there is so much 
printing about – I should regret that any of my sayings should come back to Berlin.”123  It would 
be difficult – perhaps impossible – to argue and prove that the information Mrs. Lee was sending 
to her friends and relatives in the United States somehow fueled the gossip about Mary in 
American newspapers.   
 Mrs. Lee did not desire that what she wrote be circulated.  She rarely exaggerated or 
purposefully bragged about her experiences.  On March 30, 1888, Mrs. Lee turned 85 years old – 
and she would live for another eleven years – and she was finding it increasingly difficult to 
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write and see.124  She never learned enough German to feel comfortable at large gatherings, and 
on January 23, 1888, she wrote to her cousin that she could no longer hear.  Since then, people 
communicated with her by writing what they wanted to say in a little notebook.125  As she 
became older, Mrs. Lee felt increasingly isolated in a world to which she had not adapted as 
easily as her daughters.  Writing letters to Cousin Mary in Connecticut provided a continued 
connection to her homeland and her past; this decades-long activity allowed Mrs. Lee to share 
her experiences with someone who would not just be able to understand her language, but also 
care enough about her to write back until her death in 1899.  
  During the late 1880s, Mary did not actively combat the gossip about her in the press.  
She did, however, clarify one issue for Mrs. Hoppin.  On August 31, 1888, while on the annual 
vacation to Lautenbach, her sister’s estate in southwest Germany, Mary added a postscript to her 
mother’s letter “to answer the question, which you say, is now, so often mooted – how my sisters 
and myself met our husbands.”  After describing their engagements, Mary wrote, “now dear 
cousin, you see how we have been led, step by step, to make our homes in Europe – and not, as 
some might think, did my mother bring us abroad, with such an object!”126  Mary did have at 
least one defender.  On March 26, 1888, a Mr. Charles Porter submitted a letter to the editor of 
The Tribune in response to an article it printed about Mary titled, “An American Princess”: 
 The writer [of the article] quite intentionally does injustice in some respects to one of the 
 most noble characters that have conferred honor upon the American name abroad, a 
 woman utterly incapable of any of the arts or motives attributed to her, who brings to her 
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 high position a humble Christian heart, devotes her means and influence to doing good, 
 and must be deeply pained, even at being made conspicuous.127 
 
Porter, from Schnectady in central New York State, may have most likely been an old friend or 
relation to the Lee family because he provided a short, truthful biography of Mary, in which he 
emphasized how she met the Prince de Noer and Count von Waldersee. 
 The articles about the daughter of a New York grocer playing a leading role in the 
politics of the great German Empire may have fascinated readers, especially in the United States, 
but they were annoying to the residents of Herwarthstrasse 2.  At the beginning of June 1888, 
Mrs. Lee complained to her cousin, stating that reports of Mary’s influence were “utterly false” 
and were designed to “break the beautiful friendship between Prince and Princess Wilhelm and 
Mary and Alfred.”128  Towards the end of the month, Waldersee grumbled in his journal about 
the “[German] democratic press,” which reported that his wife had an unlimited influence on 
both the Kaiser and his wife and “more of that kind of rubbish.”  “The foreign press naturally 
joins in,” he added.129  
 These articles did, however, provide comedic material.  At the end of March 1888, a 
British newspaper called Mary the commander-in-chief of the Crown Princess’s household.  “To 
me it seemed the hope was to cool off the friendship I’ve spoken of,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “You will 
be pleased to hear it has had the contrary effect.”  After the article appeared, Wilhelm and 
Augusta Victoria invited the Waldersees over to dinner, where the Crown Prince “laughingly 
announced – Countess Waldersee is our commander-in-chief!”  From that point on, whenever 
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Waldersee left Wilhelm, the latter would say, “remember me to ‘Commander-in-Chief’!”130  
Almost a year later, in March 1889 – after much press discussion about whether Herbert 
Bismarck or Waldersee would be chancellor – Otto von Bismarck’s son escorted Mary to her 
seat at a dinner table to the left of then Kaiser Wilhelm II.  He asked her if she was still 
“Commander-in-Chief” and explained to Herbert that the papers had stated that Mary was “the 
most dangerous woman at the Prussian Court.”131  During the winter of 1890-91, Wilhelm turned 
to a duke at a dinner and said, “you see when Waldersee wants sourkrout [sic] he has to come to 
me for he can’t get it at home – for Countess W. is commander-in-chief.”  “A good laugh was 
the result,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “[the] Emperor has never forgotten and often makes a laugh by 
it.”132 
 Wilhelm might not have been the best comedian in the room, but his persistent joking 
about Mary’s reported political influence reveals that even though he liked the Countess, she was 
not a political figure.  In July 1888, Mary received a long letter from Paris pleading that she use 
her influence on the Kaiser to promote peace.  The next day, she joined her husband in Potsdam 
where he had to present a report to Kaiser.  At dinner, Mary showed the letter to Wilhelm and 
Augusta Victoria, and it “amused them very much and caused a general laugh.”  Mrs. Lee also 
wrote that a count “laughingly told” Waldersee how he had read in French papers that Mary was 
the go-between for the Kaiser and Bismarck, and he wanted to know whether the Countess 
supported war or peace.  “These nothings go the round of papers,” Mrs. Lee lamented, “it is a 
marvel why? for Mary never interfered in affairs of state.  Well it answers to laugh about!”133  
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 Laugh they did, and Mary continued about her philanthropic and religious pursuits.  One 
evening in early December 1888, Alfred and Mary had to leave a dinner they were giving for the 
chiefs of the departments of the General Staff because Their Majesties requested that they join 
them for tea.  There, Mary lobbied Wilhelm for more worship space for soldiers, and although 
the Kaiser agreed with her, he stated that he did not have the funds for it.134  This request shows 
the extent of her sway over Wilhelm II.  From what has been revealed and analyzed about Mary, 
her relationship to her husband, and their relationship to Wilhelm and Augusta Victoria in this 
section and in Part I, it is clear that Mary did not seek to engage in and influence politics.  From 
1888 to 1891, the international press found a juicy story and printed it in their newspapers.  Mary 
especially captivated the American press, for as the title of an 1898 article in the New York 
Herald neatly states, “There is Romance in the Idea of an American Woman Influencing a 
European Palace.”135   
 The typical image of Mary that was published during the late 1880s would reappear in 
American newspapers in the late 1890s, during the height of yellow journalism.  After Waldersee 
became the commander of the allied forces during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900-01, Alfred and 
Mary would become a hot topic in the international press even more than they were in the late 
1880s.  At the request of the editor of Harper’s Bazar in 1903, Mary von Waldersee agreed to 
tell her story.  She was appreciative, but, the editor wrote, she “good-naturedly pointed out the 
extraordinary inaccuracies and misrepresentations in most of the articles about her published in 
the American press.”  Mary began her article – “The Story of My Life” – by stating why she 
agreed to write it: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, December 16, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
B. 
135 New York Herald, Sunday, July 3, 1898, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 12. 
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 [Because] the people of my native country have evinced for many years a kind interest in 
 my life – an interest which has led different newspaper editors in America to publish 
 extraordinary and at the same time foolish stories about me and my influence in the 
 political affairs of my adopted country, Germany . . .  
 
“Regarding politics, they are quite out of my sphere, and I have made it a rule to leave them 
alone,” she wrote about halfway through the article, “It has always seemed to me that selfish 
aims dominated political parties and there was little in them for the glory of humanity.”136  
Throughout her life, Mary found fulfillment in her life’s devotion to God and to the poor and 
downtrodden, not in a quest for political influence.  After her death on July 4, 1914, the title of 
one obituary stated, “Woman Feared by Bismarck Laid to Rest at Hanover.”137  Her soul had 
departed from this earth, but she could not escape her public image that had been formed in 1888 
and has largely continued until today.  
 
The Monarchist and the Changing Monarchy 
 
 On the afternoon of March 8, 1888, Mary von Waldersee went to a Bible reading at the 
Young Men’s Christian Association, where she asked the pastor to pray for the 90 year-old 
Kaiser, who had recently become ill.  That day, Prince Wilhelm called on Alfred von Waldersee, 
who, missing dinner at Herwarthstrasse 2, did not return from the royal palace in Berlin until 
after midnight.  The Quartermaster-General was then summoned again – this time with Helmuth 
von Moltke – around four in the morning of March 9.   “After daylight Alfred sent word to Mary 
the dear Emperor still lived, but his death was expected at any moment,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Mary von Waldersee, Harper’s Bazar, Vol. XXXVII No. 7, July 1903, “The Story of My 
Life,” pages 601 & 604, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 11. 
137 Unidentifiable newspaper, July 8, 1914 is the date of the article. HH, Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, Volume 8. 
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alas, it was not God’s will.”138  About 8:30 that morning, Waldersee witnessed Wilhelm I – his 
friend and king – take his final breath.  Everyone present kneeled as a preacher said a prayer.  
“To experience a more solemn moment is not possible,” he later wrote, “Never will it be 
forgotten!”   After the wheelchair-bound Empress had herself rolled away, Prince Wilhelm, with 
tears rolling down his cheeks, stood next to his grandfather while members of the Hohenzollern 
family filed past and kissed their patriarch’s hand.  The prince motioned for the others in the 
room to approach, and Waldersee kneeled down “to press a last kiss on the cooling hand.”139  
Shortly thereafter, he went home briefly to tell Mary that the Kaiser had passed away peacefully.  
At two o’clock that afternoon, as Mrs. Lee was writing to her cousin, Waldersee remained at the 
palace; the flags on the Military Staff Building flew at half-mast.140  Later on that evening, 
Waldersee obtained permission for his family – not just Mary and Mrs. Lee, but also his sister 
and niece who were visiting – to come to the palace.  They were escorted to the bedroom of the 
deceased Kaiser, whose expression, Mrs. Lee noted, “was of perfect peace, seeming as though in 
quiet sleep.”  That night, Waldersee and another aide were the Guard of Honor to the body.141 
 On Sunday morning, March 11, a religious service was held in the Kaiser’s bedroom, and 
that night, his body was brought to the cathedral in a ceremonial funeral procession.  The day’s 
events were solemn, and for Waldersee, his mother-in-law wrote, “a complete religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 9, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
139 Waldersee, March 10, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 366-370. 
140 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 9, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  
Mrs. Lee began her letter by stating, “All Berlin is in sorrow – but not their beloved Emperor.  
He is with his Savior and in happiness forever.” 
141 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  
“It was my first visit to the palace and before leaving Alfred took us through several of the large 
salons,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “Magnificence everywhere – as I glanced around I could only think alas, 
alas! – how less than nothing is all this in the face of death!” 
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worship.”142  As her son-in-law himself wrote, “The 8th and 9th of March were for me a 
continuous religious service with peaceful, marvelous, and uplifting impressions.”143  At least 
once a day, he formed part of the Guard of Honor that stood by the body of the Emperor for a 
two-hour shift.  His brother – an admiral – and sister-in-law came from Potsdam and dined at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 after paying their respects at the cathedral.  Admiral Waldersee reported that 
his brother stood at the head of the coffin holding the imperial ensign, not a muscle in his face 
moving.144  Alfred’s soldierly honor and sense of duty to his friend and sovereign must have 
overcome his grief, for soon after the death, Mrs. Lee notes, “he was very much overcome by the 
loss and wept like a child.”145  On March 10, Waldersee found time to reflect upon the occasion 
in his journal: 
 I have lost much, infinitely much.  A gracious master, who gave to me and my family 
 countless signs of goodwill, with which I was familiar in my youth, I experienced the 
 great times of 1866 and 1870-71, I was from 1870-76 Flügeladjutant and from 1880 until 
 today General à la suite and Adjutant General, and with which in the past years I had so 
 many official and personal connections, that everything could only lead me to love and 
 respect him.  Deep sorrow will come over the entire nation.  The whole world knows that 
 one of the greatest figures in history has finished his earthly career.  We stand with this 
 blow before a new time.  May God protect the Fatherland!146 
 
 Historians who have written about Waldersee have generally focused on his relationship 
to Wilhelm II and the Wilhelmine era, but he was first and foremost a member of Wilhelm I’s 
entourage and needs to be understood through his experience in the first Kaiser’s reign.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
143 Waldersee, March 10, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 366-370.  
144 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  
“We wanted to go to [cathedral] and feared the crush.  Police were in strong force mounted and 
on foot.  Alfred said they would keep clear space for carriage and he would meet us at door so 
we went and Alfred took us safely to gallery where we could see below . . . All near the body 
were required and looked so exactly like statues it was hard to believe them living men.”   
145 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
“Alfred was very fond of his sovereign who had always been a good and true friend for him.”  
146 Waldersee, March 10, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 366-370. 
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Waldersee was 28 years old when Wilhelm became King of Prussia in 1861, and his career 
would take off over the next 27 years.  Consequently, by 1888, the second half of his life – the 
half in which he was a mature and politically-conscious man – was spent during the era of 
Wilhelm I, under whom the monarchy defeated Prussian liberalism and created the German 
Empire.  By contrast, Waldersee would live for 16 years of Wilhelm II’s reign, but remain a 
figure whose Weltanschauung – and especially his conception of the Prusso-German monarchy – 
had been formed and established during the reign of Wilhelm I.  Before leaving for the front in 
July 1870, Queen Augusta told the king’s aides to “watch over him not as a superior, but instead, 
as one is concerned for a father.”147  For Waldersee, whose own father died in 1873, Wilhelm I 
was not a father figure as Waldersee was for a young Wilhelm II.  Instead, he was a friendly, 
respectable, paternalistic monarch, whose material and immaterial gifts – most notably ranks and 
duties – Waldersee wrote, “could only lead me to love and respect him.”148   
 As shown in Part I, the Kaiser’s grandson became attached to Waldersee and gave him 
marks of favor, which the general reciprocated through loyalty.  Waldersee saw in the future 
Wilhelm II a great, talented monarch who would not have his father’s tendencies toward 
constitutionalism and who would become “the right man to maintain Germany’s position of 
power, perhaps to expand it!”149  In this section, I illustrate the Waldersees’ last couple of years 
in Berlin and argue that Alfred von Waldersee erroneously believed Wilhelm II could and would 
follow in the footsteps of his grandfather.  In his campaign to defend the monarchy against its 
enemies both foreign and domestic, Waldersee failed to comprehend the inherent danger in the 
system he advocated: a sovereign has a personality and will of his own, which can actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Waldersee, August 2, 1870, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 86. 
148 Waldersee, March 10, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 366-370. 
149 Waldersee, May 28, 1884, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 238-239. 
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become a danger to the monarchy he, Waldersee, sought to defend.  In his reaction against the 
potentially dangerous rule of Frederick III, who had liberal, constitutional tendencies, Waldersee 
put all of his hopes in the man who would become Germany’s last Kaiser.  Instead of decreasing 
monarchical power as his father would have done or using it in a responsible way with his 
government like his grandfather did, Wilhelm II would assert his own control over policymaking.  
In his attempts to establish his own personal rule in the early years of his reign, Wilhelm, who 
had looked to Waldersee’s friendship and advice throughout the 1880s, reassigned his father 
figure to the command of an army corps away from Berlin in early 1891.  This act amounted to a 
demotion, especially for a man who was rumored to be a possible candidate for the 
chancellorship, and shook Waldersee’s faith in Wilhelm II, and thus the monarchy itself. 
 On February 9, 1888, the cancer-stricken Crown Prince Frederick had an operation on his 
throat, and the next day, Waldersee noted that it was generally believed the successor to the 
crown only had a few months to live.150  The uncertainty of the Crown Prince’s health caused 
instability at court and in high society.  “The worst turmoil is unavoidable,” Waldersee wrote, 
“[he] cannot reign, but under the pressure of his passionate wife there will still be enough 
havoc.”151  By the beginning of March, Waldersee complained in his journal that people who 
were once intriguing against Prince Wilhelm were now trying to gain favor with him because his 
reign seemed closer than ever.152  Through the sickness of Frederick III and then the death of 
Wilhelm I, Prince Wilhelm sought out the advice and friendship of his father figure, Waldersee.  
On March 7, 1888, he returned to Berlin from seeing his actual father in San Remo, where he 
had been at odds with his mother.  That evening, he called on Waldersee, and at the palace, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Waldersee, February 10, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 358-359. 
151 Waldersee, February 23, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 362-363. 
152 Waldersee, March 3, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 365. 
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where the Kaiser lay weak and dying, the prince took the general aside into another room.  “He 
was very excited and moved,” Waldersee wrote about their conversation, “All kinds of things are 
now going through his head!”153  On March 16, Waldersee walked with the deceased sovereign’s 
military entourage in the funeral procession.154  Leading the other princes, Crown Prince 
Wilhelm followed directly behind the hearse.  His “dignified, strong, and noble manner” made a 
deep impression on all who saw him, Waldersee later wrote.155 
 The reign of Frederick III would not last long; in fact, it would last 99 days.  Waldersee 
was sure that if the new Kaiser were healthy, he would be removed from his position on the 
General Staff, but he knew – it was common knowledge – that Frederick’s reign would be 
short.156  Although the Kaiser wanted to form his own military entourage, he did not know with 
whom he would replace the members of his father’s, and so the Chief of the Military Cabinet, 
General von Albedyll, persuaded him to keep the current group.  Even if he and Empress 
Victoria had a program to institute, J. Alden Nichols observes, Frederick’s ill health would have 
made it difficult to overcome powerful people and competing interests in Berlin, and his absence 
from the imperial capital kept him ignorant of the changing political situation, though he never 
was really politically astute.157  As in earlier years, Waldersee was greatly concerned about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 165.  Waldersee, March 7, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 
366. 
154 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, March 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B.  
“Mourning is quite general and court mourning very deep,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “all belonging must 
wear under hat a firm point of double English crape – coming low on forehead and long veil of 
same crape.  I never before saw any so crimped.  Now I don’t belong to Court – but being with 
Mary she wants me to wear the same – so I do – “point” and all.  Mary had to put her servants in 
black – 3 months deep Court mourning.” 
155 Waldersee, March 17, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 375. 
156 Waldersee, March 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 24, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 370-380.  For 
more on the early political instability of “The Ninety-Nine Days,” see Nichols, The Year of the 
Three Kaisers, 173-205. 
157 Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers, 191. 
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power of the assertive, English-born Empress Victoria over her husband and their liberal, 
progressive, and Jewish supporters.158  He complained that the liberals quietly tried to make the 
most out of the situation:  “They indulge in assurances of loyalty and hunt for orders, promotions, 
and noble titles . . . People, who until now were believed to be committed republicans, now act 
as if they were the actual pillars of the kingdom.”159  Incensed by an article he believed came 
from Bismarck’s government, Waldersee wrote, that “were the Kaiser Frederick a man, he would 
chase away Bismarck and rule himself.  He will not do this; instead, he will bow, and with that, 
the kingdom takes a great step back.”160 
 At 11:15 on the morning of June 15, 1888, Frederick III passed away peacefully at the 
New Palace (Neues Palais) in Potsdam.  In grief, Empress Victoria wrote to her mother, Queen 
Victoria of Great Britain, several days later: 
 I disappear with [Frederick], my task was with him, for him, for his dear people.  It is 
 buried in the grave where he will be buried today.  My voice will be silent forever! . . . 
 We had a mission.  We felt and we knew it – We were Papa’s & your children!  We were 
 faithful to what we believed and knew to be right.  We loved Germany.  We wished to 
 see her strong and great not only with the sword, but in all that was righteous in culture, 
 in progress, and in liberty.161 
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Waldersee, May 30, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 401-402. 
161 Empress Victoria, also known as Empress Frederick; quoted in Nichols, The Year of the 
Three Kaisers, 337. 
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If Waldersee had seen this letter, it would only have confirmed his fears of the Emperor and 
Empress, but upon hearing of Frederick’s death, Waldersee travelled to the Marble Palace 
(Marmorpalais) in Potsdam to see the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II.  The next day, Waldersee wrote, 
“it was a peculiar feeling to stand now before the young Kaiser,” who told him, “You have 
always maintained loyalty to me, now continue to help me.”162  After the Kaiser issued his 
proclamations “To the Army and Navy” and “To My People,” Waldersee observed that 
everywhere there was the feeling that the country had “overcome a difficult illness” and looked 
forward to a happier time.  “The uncertainty, the mistrust, and the dissatisfaction pressed terribly 
on all souls,” he wrote, “The gentlemen of the Progressives and the Jewish supporters have 
definitely been hit hard.”163   
 At the end of June 1888, the Kaiser ordered the Quartermaster-General to announce his 
accession personally to Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary, who, immediately upon 
hearing of the selection, sent the new German emperor a telegram of thanks.  Waldersee’s strong 
support for the German-Austrian alliance – as shown during the 1887 war scare – was no secret 
in Austrian political circles and the public.164  On June 27, 1888, the day after the Habsburg 
monarch received Wilhelm II’s envoy, the liberal Neue Freie Presse of Vienna stated that the 
choice of Waldersee for the mission “must be regarded as further proof of Germany’s loyalty to 
the alliance and, as it were, the sanction of the military part of the German-Austrian alliance 
agreement through the new Kaiser.”165   
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 Reflecting on his life on July 5, 1888, Waldersee felt he had reason not just to be thankful, 
but also be a little boastful: his enemies had been neutralized; he held a high military position; 
the General Staff had great confidence in him; he was a prominent, respected member of society; 
and he had “the happiest home life possible.”  The leading reason for his cheerfulness, however, 
was his relationship to Wilhelm II: “I stand in high favor with the Kaiser, which the whole world 
knows, and which is why a number of people run after me.  The Kaiser thinks a great deal of me, 
likes to hear my opinion on many things, and in fact has friendly feelings towards me.”166  “In 
short,” he stated, “things go as well for me as they do for few mortals; perhaps I stand at the 
zenith of my life.”167  There was, however, another positive development in Waldersee’s 
immediate future.  In August 1888, he became the Chief of Staff, when the almost 88 year-old 
Helmuth von Moltke finally submitted his resignation.  The news did not surprise Waldersee, but 
he reflected on the Kaiser’s faith in him and on the importance of his new position not only for 
the future of Germany, but also for Europe and the world if war should break out.168  He received 
the Kaiser’s letter about his appointment on August 10, while vacationing with his wife at 
Gastein, a spa town in Austria.  Mary sent the good news to her mother at her sister’s summer 
home in southwest Germany: 
 I rejoice with Alfred at his nomination to this high and responsible post and doubly so 
 that Moltke was not obliged to retire – or to be taken away [from his apartment in the 
 Military Staff Building] to make room for his successor!  How good the dear Lord is and 
 how my heart goes up in praise and thanksgiving to the great Giver of all our many 
 mercies!  I pray also that his special spirit of wisdom and grace may rest on Alfred and 
 ever guide and bless his endeavors to fulfill faithfully his duties to his Country and his 
 Sovereign!169 	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After transcribing this quotation for her cousin, Mrs. Lee, who was also glad Moltke would still 
be around, added, “The Lord has made the Emperor a firm and personal friend to Alfred.”170  
Certainly the naming of Waldersee as Chief of Staff was a positive sign of the Kaiser’s continued 
faith in, favor for, and friendship with his father figure.  The future of the Wilhelm-Waldersee 
relationship appeared bright and promising.  
 On August 28, 1888, after a dinner for the king of Denmark who was visiting Berlin, 
Waldersee was about to go home after a long day of ceremonies, for which he had to change his 
uniform five times.  The Kaiser stated, however, that he had taken tea so often at Herwarthstrasse 
2 that he wished for Waldersee to stay and have tea with him; he did not return to the Military 
Staff Building until later that evening.  “[Alfred] was so fully occupied [that day], he said it was 
impossible for him to write to Mary – a very unusual occurrence,” wrote Mrs. Lee to her cousin, 
“if face to face I could tell you the demands of the different hours from 7 a.m. . . . We thank the 
Lord his health bears it.”171  Although his relationship with Wilhelm II remained strong during 
the first years of the young Hohenzollern’s reign, Waldersee had to keep up with an active young 
Kaiser, with whom he socialized in many of the same ways he did with Wilhelm I.  The two 
often had tea while discussing the latest in domestic and international affairs.172  At a hunt in late 
November 1889, the Kaiser allowed Waldersee and the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein to wear the 
same hunting uniform as himself.  Although recognizing the clothes themselves as meaningless, 
Waldersee believed the privilege of wearing them showed the Kaiser’s “friendly attitude” toward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 13, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
B.  Alfred and Mary had been at Lautenbach from July 13 to July 27, when they left for Gastein.  
Josie had urged her mother to stay with her and she did.  Josie would then stay for a month with 
her sister and mother in Berlin before going to her winter home in Stuttgart. 
171 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, August 23, 1888, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume B. 
172 Waldersee, November 11 and 13, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 17-19. 
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him, and when he returned home “all aglow” from the hunt, he told Mary and Mrs. Lee about 
this new symbol of friendship.173  Just as in the years before his accession, Wilhelm still stopped 
by the Military Staff Building often to see Waldersee.  By four o’clock on the afternoon of New 
Year’s Day 1889, Alfred and Mary von Waldersee believed they had received all the guests they 
would that day at Herwarthstrasse 2 and decided to pay some visits of their own.  Shortly after 
they left, the Kaiser and the Empress with two of her sisters arrived.  “The disappointment was 
mutual,” Mrs. Lee stated about the Waldersees and Hohenzollerns missing each other.  During 
the winter of 1888-89, Wilhelm arrived early every morning and went for a walk in the 
Tiergarten with Waldersee “for [the] sake of exercise,” wrote Mrs. Lee, and dressed in civilian 
clothes to “not be recorded in a newspaper.”174  Of course, these moments together provided 
another informal opportunity to discuss politics.  On one February morning, the two ended their 
promenade with a visit to the chancellor.175  
 Wilhelm II loved military life, and especially its pageantry.  In September 1888, there 
were two military parades in Berlin, and after each there was a parade dinner.176  Back in April, 
Waldersee rode with then Crown Prince Wilhelm at the head of battalion from the Tempelhof 
Field to the Unter den Linden Boulevard in the middle of the capital.  The Quartermaster-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Waldersee, November 24, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 79.  Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, 
November 29, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C.  Waldersee shot 23 deer 
and 25 boars.  “Alfred showed us what Emperor gave him for a hunt,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “a long 
case with different knives and strong rings on each side to attach it to belt . . . then the clasp for 
belt of same hard metal – cleverly carved on each side [a] wreath of laurel round plain center 
which had W and Imperial Crown above – so next hunt Alfred is to wear it.”  On his trip to 
Norway, the Kaiser sketched and painted for Mary a ship passing through a sunset.  “I also want 
you to know dear Mary that my Mary thinks as I do – that all this royal favor is of the Lord – 
thus door of vanity is kept shut.” 
174 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, January 13, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C. 
175 Waldersee, January 9, 1889 and February 26, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 29 & 40.  On 
February 2, 1889, the Emperor and Empress arrived at Herwarthstrasse 2 amid a snowstorm.  
Waldersee, February 2, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 35. 
176 Waldersee, September 1 and October 9, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 2-4. 
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General believed the prince’s behavior was “completely correct,” in that he was polite, acted 
soldierly, and looked at no one in the crowd that had gathered.177  A year later, in September 
1889, Waldersee was in Hanover for the traditional army maneuvers.  Kaiser Wilhelm arrived 
and watched a military review, in which Waldersee led the regiment of cavalry that he had 
commanded in Hanover in the early 1870s.  As this unit filed past, the Kaiser called Waldersee 
over and announced, to the delight of the regiment’s officers, that he was making himself chief 
of the regiment.  When Waldersee’s cavalry passed again – this time with the horses trotting – 
the Kaiser mounted, put himself at the head of the parading troops, and led them with Waldersee 
right behind him.178  On May 22, 1890, the Waldersees travelled to the studio of Hans W. 
Schmidt, an artist who had been commissioned to create a painting for the royal palace in Berlin.  
In the foreground stood a life-size depiction of the Kaiser, and just behind him were Waldersee 
and another general; all were on horseback.  Mrs. Lee, noticing the many soldiers in the 
background, commented that the scene looked like a review.  The next day, at the “great annual 
review,” the Kaiser led the troops with Waldersee right behind him.  “Thus I need not tell you 
Alfred holds his place as favorite,” wrote Mrs. Lee to her cousin.179  After the parade in Hanover 
in September 1889, Mrs. Lee stated, “It does appear to me that Alfred has reached the top round 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Waldersee, April 24, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten I, 392.  
178 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 12, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
C. 
179 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, May 23, 1890, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume C.  
About the painting, Mrs. Lee stated, “The likeness of Alfred is perfect – wish I could say as 
much for the Emperor but it is not like him at all – no wonder for his Majesty didn’t sit once and 
Artist had to draw on his own imagination.”  Although the original painting was possibly 
destroyed during the bombing of the Berlin City Palace during the Second World War, a paper 
copy is at Harvard University’s Houghton Library, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 12. 
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of the ladder – he bears it bravely.  I think it is all the Lord’s doing for some wide purpose.  I 
pray that He will direct him in all his duties.”180  
 Although Waldersee continued to maintain his friendship with Wilhelm upon the latter’s 
accession, he began to have serious differences with, and concerns about, the assertive young 
Kaiser’s plans, passions, and politics.  In military affairs, the Kaiser is “incredibly active, but 
somewhat too much,” wrote Waldersee, soon after becoming Chief of the General Staff.181  
Following a military parade, he accompanied the Kaiser to the latter’s room in the palace, where 
they had a discussion about military and political issues.  Wilhelm still had “illusions about the 
power of cavalry,” lamented Waldersee, “[and] he is not familiar with war, and our most recent 
history of war is in no area as falsified than in the deeds of the cavalry.”182  The Kaiser was an 
enthusiastic proponent of expanding the Germany navy, which he hoped would become “the 
equal sister-force of the army.”183  Like other Prussian generals, Waldersee disapproved of the 
Kaiser’s maritime passion and maintained it was “only one part of our armed forces, and by no 
means the most important, though certainly the most costly.”184  In foreign affairs, Waldersee, 
who believed Russia could not be trusted, did not like that the Kaiser, under the influence of the 
Bismarcks, tended to favor a pro-Russian and anti-Austrian policy.  Despite the internal 
problems in the Habsburg empire and its military, Waldersee reasoned, “we need allies . . . and I 
do not know on whom we can count if not on Austria; certainly not on Italy.”185  Against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, September 12, 1889, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee Collection, Volume 
C.  Mrs. Lee added, “Mary feels as I do – so no vanity is enlisted.”  
181 Waldersee, August 26, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 1. 
182 Waldersee, September 1, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 2. 
183 Wilhelm II; quoted in Röhl, Wilhelm II, 154-155. 
184 Waldersee to Holstein, July 26, 1888; quoted in Röhl, Wilhelm II, 155.  See also Waldersee, 
October 9, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 4. 
185 Waldersee, November 1 and 3, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 13-14; quoted in Röhl, Wilhelm II, 
147. 
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Kaiser’s enthusiasm for colonies, Waldersee argued that “our African colonies could never 
amount to anything . . . the days of colonies are altogether over.  My only wish now is that we 
should avoid becoming more deeply embroiled.”186  Given his concerns about fighting Russia 
and France in what he perceived to be an inevitable war, he did not want Germany’s colonialism 
to cause trouble with Great Britain and the United States.187  In domestic affairs, Waldersee was 
concerned about the Kaiser’s desire to appeal to the Reichstag and the working class.  On March 
27, 1889, Wilhelm attended a “so-called parliamentarian dinner” at the chancellor’s, which, 
Waldersee wrote, “people in conservative and other circles find alarming as a way to bring the 
monarch in association with the Parliament.”188  Although in late January 1890, Waldersee 
believed Wilhelm would be the victor in his disagreement with Bismarck over how to solve the 
Social Question (Arbeiterfrage), he admitted in his journal on February 3, “I cannot deny that the 
Kaiser’s plans . . . begin to make me apprehensive.”189 
 On March 9, 1889, the first anniversary of Wilhelm I’s death, Alfred von Waldersee – 
with Mary – and other aides-de-camp of the former Kaiser, went to their old master’s tomb to lay 
wreaths.  “I have no doubt the present emperor has already been there,” wrote Mrs. Lee, “he 
venerates the memory of his grandfather.”190  Although Mrs. Lee was correct about Wilhelm II’s 
admiration for Wilhelm I, the former certainly did not reign like the latter.  Despite all the 
diverse differences Waldersee had with the new Kaiser, the Chief of Staff’s overarching and 
most significant anxiety was that Wilhelm II was not living up to the standards of a good ruler 
that Wilhelm I set.  In the early months of the young Kaiser’s reign, Waldersee wrote that many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Waldersee, journal entry for January 25, 1889, not printed in Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten; 
quoted in Röhl, Wilhelm II, 149. 
187 Waldersee, January 21, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 30-32.  Röhl, Wilhelm II, 149. 
188 Waldersee, March 27, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 47. 
189 Waldersee, January 27 and February 3, 1890, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 97-100. 
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in the German political elite found the monarch to be inaccessible, procrastinating, frivolous, and 
distracted by his travels.  To bring more stability to government, Waldersee turned to precedent:   
 If the Kaiser wishes to conduct business like his grandfather – and that is what he would 
 like – first the week and then the day must be precisely planned; without a firm plan it 
 certainly cannot be done.191 
 
Against complaints about Wilhelm II, including his own, Waldersee usually noted in his journal 
the Kaiser’s good qualities.  To the above quotation, Waldersee added, “[he] has a quick 
understanding, an excellent memory, and makes swift decisions.  That makes up for lost time.”192  
Two days later, he expressed a new concern about Wilhelm’s inexperience and vanity: 
 The great successes which the young lord has achieved in his short reign, and the fact that 
 he is cheered wherever he goes, and . . . all destructive elements already fear him . . . 
 could give him false impressions of his own worth.  The danger definitely exists that he 
 considers himself more important than he is and that he is becoming less open to good 
 advice.  But the successes will not continue in the same way and there will inevitably be 
 setbacks.  He is rising too quickly.”193 
 
By the end of 1889, the honeymoon period of the Kaiser’s reign was over.  Waldersee noted that 
there had been a decline in the sovereign’s popularity, which “soared to the heights far too 
quickly and a fall is therefore natural and not at all harmful.”  Experiencing and overcoming a 
serious and difficult challenge was the only way, Waldersee believed, that the Kaiser could 
become a better monarch.  As he wrote in November 1889, “[The Kaiser] must go through hard 
in times in order to reach the heights to which he is entitled by virtue of his talents and his many 
excellent qualities.”194  The complaints about Wilhelm’s ruling style continued; chiefs of 
different bureaucratic agencies – except for Waldersee and the Minister of War – complained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 113.  Waldersee, October 11, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 5-7. 
192 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 113.  Waldersee, October 11, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 5-7. 
193 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 114.  Waldersee October 13, 1888, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 7. 
194 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 116.  Waldersee, November 13, 1889, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 76-77. 
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that even if they were able to get an audience with the Kaiser, they did not receive the time and 
attention they felt they deserved.195   
 At the beginning of 1890 – about a year and a half into Wilhelm II’s reign – Waldersee 
wrote again that the Kaiser needed to stop being distracted by his traveling and establish more 
“regularity” and “thoroughness” in his conduct: 
 I too wish that he would concentrate a little more.  He shows plenty of interest in the 
 matters which I bring before him, and no doubt likewise in military affairs in general, 
 most particularly naval affairs.  But his audiences on civil business cannot be very 
 thorough; although he hears more from the Foreign Office (i.e. the Bismarcks), he hears 
 very little indeed from the other ministries.  I think, however, that all this will sort itself 
 out.  This year [1890] will bring many a serious internal problem in the country, and 
 consequently the necessity of paying more attention to these matters; I hope that 1890 
 will prove a serious but excellent school for the Kaiser.”196 
 
In reality, the years 1890 and 1891 would be a school for the monarchist.  John Röhl argues, 
“Waldersee failed to see that his own intimate relationship with Wilhelm was inconsistent with 
the well-regulated, responsible conduct of affairs of state.”197  Shown, for example, in the above 
quotation, however, Waldersee understood that there was a line between the personal and the 
political.  The German emperor held ultimate authority in the empire and used that power as he 
saw fit, including balancing the personal and political aspects of his relationships with others.  If 
Waldersee can be accused of failing to see anything, it was that Wilhelm II neither was nor 
would be like his grandfather.  Alfred von Waldersee was a monarchist à la Wilhelm I, his ideal 
model of a good ruler; Wilhelm II wanted to – and would – be his own man and create his own 
path.  He should have realized this fact when the Kaiser started tactlessly removing members of 
his grandfather’s court and administration, but Wilhelm II’s inability to separate the personal and 
the political would clearly become evident from late 1890 to early 1891, when Waldersee would 	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196 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 117.  Waldersee, January 5, 1890, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 87. 
197 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 117. 
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fall from his good graces and be removed from his prestigious social and military position in 
Berlin.198 
 In his biography of Wilhelm II, John Röhl has written a detailed analysis of the events 
leading up to, and including, Waldersee’s dismissal because, as he writes, “[it] was undoubtedly 
one of the most significant decisions taken by Kaiser Wilhelm II in the early part of his reign.”199  
Waldersee’s agitation against Bismarck on behalf of the Kaiser in 1889 apparently began to 
bother Wilhelm.  According to Prince Henry of Prussia, Wilhelm’s brother, and the 
Flügeladjutant Colonel von Lippe, in April 1889 the Kaiser showed signs that he was becoming 
annoyed by the Chief of Staff and, according to Lippe, complained that Waldersee was 
“interfering in everything” and “stirring up trouble.”200  In December, Wilhelm reportedly called 
Waldersee half-jokingly a “poisoner,” and that same month, Waldersee grew concerned that the 
Kaiser sided with the Bismarcks over the issue of civilian and military control of the railways 
administration, writing, “I am very worried about his giving way like this.”201  Röhl states that 
the reason for Wilhelm’s growing “disillusionment” with Waldersee is unclear; however, he also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 In July 1888, Wilhelm II abruptly dismissed the elderly Adjutants General Count von 
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201 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 225-226.  Waldersee, journal entry for December 11, 1889, not reproduced 
in Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten. 
  182 
notes that in 1889 Waldersee’s role “was almost that of a rival chancellor.”202  If the Kaiser did 
not want one, powerful chancellor, he certainly would not have desired a second, unofficial one, 
especially as he stacked his court, military, and government with people who would not 
challenge him. 
 After Bismarck’s dismissal, the Kaiser began to speak about, and to, Waldersee with a 
condescending tone.  Noting that “sharp-eyed observers noticed Waldersee’s star was on the 
wane soon after Bismarck’s dismissal,” Röhl calls the Bismarck crisis the “decisive break” in the 
Wilhelm-Waldersee relationship.203  Upon returning from a walk with the Chief of Staff, the 
Kaiser criticized Waldersee in front of the subordinates on the General Staff.  After leaving the 
Military Staff Building, Wilhelm told an adjutant, “I don’t understand [Waldersee]; he’s my 
Chief of [the] General Staff, and ought not to worry his head about things which don’t concern 
him.”204  Evidently, the Kaiser had forgotten that on his birthday in 1889, he had made 
Waldersee a life member of the Prussian House of Lords and stated that he wanted the general to 
be familiar with developments outside military affairs in case he was occasionally called upon to 
be an advisor on domestic and foreign politics.205  At that time, Waldersee had already been 
vocal with the Kaiser about his political opinions in private, and he must have taken these words 
in early 1889 as consent to continue his interests in affairs outside the purely military sphere.   
 At court and in Wilhelm’s entourage, Waldersee’s active involvement in politics would 
come back to haunt him – as it had in the 1880s with the Stoecker Affair, preventive war, and his 
loyalty to Prince Wilhelm.  The Kaiser told his friend Eulenburg that politics was the realm of 
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the Kaiser and not the Chief of Staff, and stated that Waldersee was “an intriguer pure and 
simple and wishes to become chancellor, although I told him I shall never appoint him.”  
Eulenburg later wrote that Wilhelm detests “the way [Waldersee] has exploited his close 
relationship with [His Majesty] for his own purposes” and maintains “the correct view that 
people should work for him and not for themselves.”206  If the Kaiser actually expressed these 
opinions, his exaggeration of Waldersee’s influence and motivations must have certainly been 
the result of Eulenburg, who, writes Lamar Cecil, “was anxious to get rid of a dangerous rival, 
for he wanted Wilhelm entirely to himself.”207  
 Waldersee began to feel the Kaiser’s growing antipathy towards him.  On June 8, 1890, 
he wrote that the Kaiser had never had any “problems on official [!] business until now [!] . . . in 
spite of his great amiability I thought I detected an underlying mood of gravity.”208  In autumn 
1890, the Kaiser floated the idea of giving Waldersee an important military position in southern 
Germany, and when Bismarck’s successor, Leo von Caprivi and Wilhelm, himself, approached 
Waldersee on the subject, the general produced adequate reasons as to why the move would not 
be a good idea.209  Caprivi told him candidly that “there was simply no room for him” in 
Berlin.210  “He is beginning to feel sure of himself in military matters, and does not want to 
appear dependent on me,” Waldersee wrote in his journal, “He fails to recognize that he is 
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nothing but a dilettante in the military sphere.”211  The Chief of Staff had become alarmed at the 
Kaiser’s harsh conduct toward his generals and grew concerned when he discovered that corps 
commanders did not report to the Kaiser when they arrived in the capital.  Drawing an obvious 
distinction with Wilhelm I, he asked rhetorically in his journal, “Would it have been conceivable 
two years ago for a commanding general to come to Berlin and not to wish above all else to see 
the Kaiser?”212  The monarchist was coming to the realization that the monarchy was changing. 
 In his journal, Waldersee said harsh things about the Kaiser’s abilities and conduct as a 
military commander: “Extremely inadequate leadership, immature ideas, inexperience combined 
with a very self-confident manner.  Playing to the gallery, in other words – a mere game, and no 
seriousness!”213  On September 19, 1890, during the army’s maneuvers in Silesia, the Kaiser 
took command of an army corps, which, unknown to him, would most likely fail according to the 
plans Waldersee crafted.  Receiving many thanks for letting the Kaiser face failure for once, 
Waldersee replied that he was only doing his duty, but he knew he would have to pay dearly for 
it.  After Wilhelm’s inevitable defeat, the Chief of Staff had to provide an assessment of the 
military exercises.  In the presence of Prussian officers and generals, the Emperor of Austria, the 
King and Crown Prince of Saxony, and the Crown Prince of Bavaria, he tactfully critiqued the 
Kaiser for his poor performance.  Despite his best intentions, Waldersee stepped into an 	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unavoidable trap: his sense of duty and responsibility for the army’s efficiency was incompatible 
with Wilhelm’s vanity and sense of entitlement.  Although the German royalty present assured 
Waldersee afterward that he spoke well and diplomatically, “the Kaiser . . . is said to have looked 
rather surprised and then very serious,” he wrote.  Wilhelm agreed with the Chief of Staff, but 
then he “began trying to make excuses for himself,” which were “very weak” and unsatisfactory.  
That evening, Waldersee learned that the Kaiser was very angry and blamed him for his 
mistakes.214  To the Chief of Staff, the monarch was at a crossroad: 
 If he bears me a grudge because of his poor command of troops he shows that he lacks 
 greatness of spirit and deserves to be treated as a little man.  But if he has allowed 
 himself to reflect calmly and to examine himself a little, he cannot but be grateful to me 
 and tell himself that I acted without fear and did my duty.  Then one could say: there is 
 nobility in him after all.215 
 
Wilhelm II was a different character than Wilhelm I, and Waldersee expected he would be 
removed from Berlin in the spring (1891).216  His departure from Herwarthstrasse 2 would 
actually come sooner than he thought.  “Waldersee’s star is really sinking now,” wrote one of the 
Kaiser’s aides, “Who would have thought that the catastrophe would come so soon?”217  
Certainly the man who had been Wilhelm’s reliable friend, confidant, and father figure during 
the turbulent 1880s did not. 
 Through the rest of 1890, Waldersee saw the writing on the wall.  The Kaiser had a 
change of heart and sided with Caprivi’s order, against Waldersee’s wishes, that the military 
attachés should be forbidden from including politics in their reports, which would also have to be 	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subject to the civilian heads of the German embassies.  Wilhelm continued to opine to his inner 
circle that he detested Waldersee’s intrigues and believed that the Chief of Staff wanted to 
become chancellor.  Waldersee believed the Kaiser was “struggling with himself inwardly” and 
“his vanity makes him feel uncomfortable with me.”218  During this time, although the 
Waldersees continued to have an active social life, Mrs. Lee’s letters to her cousin lack 
interesting anecdotes about the Kaiser and Waldersee or special marks of royal favor as she used 
to report.  There were, however, a couple of signs of cordial contact.  On December 18, the 
Kaiser arrived at Herwarthstrasse 2 to deliver the news of the premature birth of his sixth son, 
Prince Joachim, on the previous day; the Waldersees then went to the palace to visit the 
Empress.219  Waldersee also notes this visit in his journal, but his conversation with Wilhelm 
focused on family matters and not politics.220  Throughout the 1880s, Wilhelm had been a 
frequent and often unexpected guest at the Waldersees’ home, but this visit was probably the last.  
Two days later, the Chief of Staff had an audience with the Kaiser, to whom he spoke about 
military matters, and noted that he felt a “certain coldness” from Wilhelm, despite Wilhelm’s 
outward friendliness.221  On the evening of December 21, Waldersee picked up his Bible and 
opening it, came across Pslam 118, which certainly resonated with him: “The Lord is with me, I 
shall not be afraid.  What can men do to me? . . . It is good to trust in the Lord and not in men . . . 
and not in princes.”222 
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 For Christmas 1890, the Kaiser gave his Chief of Staff a pair of glass and gilt decanters 
with stork necks.  “In my opinion more to look at than to use,” noted Mrs. Lee.223  In another 
letter, however, she mentions that the Kaiser sent him a “large and superbly bound book.”224  
Although Waldersee wrote that Wilhelm gave generously, as symbols of affection and favor, 
both of these gifts must have paled in comparison to the statue of an infidel fighting a Saracen or 
the bronze pillar with scientific instruments that Wilhelm I had given Waldersee in Christmases 
past.225  On January 22, 1891, Waldersee was with the Kaiser for a military dinner in Hanover.  
There was evidently nothing special to report, so Mrs. Lee took the opportunity in her letter to 
mention another dinner, in which the Kaiser said to a duke, “you see when Waldersee wants 
sourkrout (sic) he has to come to me for he can’t get it at home – for Countess [Waldersee] is 
Commander-in-Chief.”226  Although this joke was based on press speculation about Mary’s 
influence in politics, as already stated above, one can sense that the Kaiser was also subtly 
asserting his own power over Waldersee in front of other notable guests.  As shown in Part I, 
social events such as dinners were important events that connected the members of the social and 
political elite.  On January 15 and 16, Waldersee noted – and others in the military noticed – that 
he was no longer invited to dinners given for the Kaiser, who had control of the guest list before 
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invitations were sent.  “It appears to me to point toward a crisis,” he wrote, “well, as God 
wills.”227 
 On January 24, in his usual audience with the monarch, the Chief of Staff had a heated 
argument with an uncompromising Wilhelm about the proper timing for planned Austrian and 
German military maneuvers in September.  Noting that the Kaiser did not want the maneuvers to 
affect his hunting plans, Waldersee wrote, “Stags, in other words pleasure, take first place!  And 
such great interests are harmed by this desire to pursue pleasure.”  That evening the Kaiser asked 
the Chief of Staff to return some very personal papers.228  On January 27, the Kaiser’s thirty-
second birthday, Wilhelm presented Waldersee with the Cross of the Grand Commander of the 
Order of Hohenzollern and told the Chief of Staff that, to make him happy, he wanted to give 
him command of an army corps.  While dining with his officers – including his future 
replacement Count Alfred von Schlieffen – Waldersee stated that he wanted to retire because “I 
believe I shall be doing a service to the army and to the Kaiser himself if I act firmly and show 
him that there are still people who do not simply submit to his will without further ado.”229  The 
next day, the Kaiser refused to accept his resignation and, amid several excuses for sending 
Waldersee to Altona just north of Hamburg, he stated, “the chief of the General Staff is to be no 
more than a kind of amanuensis for me, and for that reason I need a younger man.”  Waldersee 
felt, and so did many others, that his assessment at the Silesian maneuvers caused this 
development, which, as the Chief of Staff noted, Caprivi exploited.  In the early 1880s, 
Waldersee had helped take power away from the War Ministry and, in the interests of the 
monarchy, made the Kaiser’s General Staff and Military Cabinet more powerful.  Now, the 	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Kaiser was taking more power for himself.  Waldersee foresaw a bleak future: “The Kaiser wants 
to be his own Chief of General Staff!  God protect the Fatherland!”230 
 On January 31, Waldersee and the Kaiser had a quarrel, that, as Röhl states, “in many 
ways resembled the violent argument between the latter and Bismarck on March 15, 1890.”231  
After giving his report to the Kaiser with his military rivals – Chief of the Military Cabinet 
General Wilhelm von Hahnke and Flügeladjutant Count Carl von Wedel – in attendance, the 
Kaiser allowed the Chief of Staff to speak to him alone.  Waldersee argued for the autonomy of 
the position of the Chief of Staff as a powerful means for the monarch to use against the War 
Ministry and the Chancellor, both of whom he accused of trying to erode military independence.  
He spoke frankly, naming the people who had been working against him and telling the monarch 
that his subordinates had not been honest with him.  Waldersee felt obliged to say that since the 
accession, “the ideal relationship between the war lord and the officer corps which he had 
inherited no longer existed,” and he reminded the Kaiser that he “depended entirely on the 
support of the army.”  Wilhelm pleaded with Waldersee to take the command in Altona: “with 
the most tender gestures, he took my hand and said, ‘You will accept, won’t you? Your Kaiser 
begs you,’” Waldersee recorded in his journal, “but I remained adamant and I thank God that he 
gave me the strength to do so.”232 
 After this meeting, Eulenburg noted that the Kaiser had been shaken and was “in a more 
serious mood than he had ever seen him in before,” but several days later, when Wedel returned 
to Berlin after a few days absence, the Kaiser complained about Waldersee, who “revealed 
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himself in his true colors and showed what a great man he thinks he is.”233  Just as the Kaiser 
failed to reflect earnestly and rationally about the assessment on the Silesian maneuvers as 
Waldersee had hoped, he also did not think dispassionately about the current issue of the Chief 
of Staff’s removal.  In his journal, Waldersee complained that he was being sent away to protect 
the Kaiser’s reputation and called the monarch “cowardly” and a “weak man,” who “has allowed 
himself to be systematically manipulated against me without even noticing, much less having 
any sense how unworthy this is.”234  In the end, Waldersee accepted the command of the 9th 
Army Corps in Altona. 
 An officer on the General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, unsuccessfully attempted to 
discuss the Waldersee situation with Caprivi, who stated, “It is now too late because the news 
has reached the press.”  The chancellor himself provided the information to the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Waldersee, contended.235  Newspaper speculation immediately began about 
Waldersee’s removal from the General Staff.  On January 30, the Kölnische Zeitung felt it was 
sufficient to remind its readers simply of the “foolish rumors” that had been spread about 
Waldersee before.  As to current speculation about the general’s position, the paper cautioned, 
that “for the military spirit of our army, the mentioning of such rumors in serious political papers 
cannot be of much use.”236  The newspapers were unsure of the exact reason for his resignation 
as Chief of Staff.  A cable from Berlin printed in the New York World, reported, that “it would be 
fruitless to seek the real reasons for the resignation, as the strictest secrecy is always observed 
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here in military matters.”  The correspondent also stated that the resignation was “another 
instance of the Emperor’s fondness for startling surprises” and “has no political significance.”237   
 Political and personal connections, however, were the source of the gossip.  Papers 
pointed to disagreements between Caprivi and Waldersee and between the Kaiser and Waldersee, 
Mary, and Stoecker.238  The Neue Freie Presse, noting that the immediate reason was unknown, 
made the rare assertion that the resignation may have had something to do with the maneuvers in 
Silesia, and brought up the maneuvers a few days later in detail, noting the “sharp critique.”239  
An article from the New York Associated Press, pointing out that Waldersee was at the Stoecker-
associated Young Men’s Christian Association, stated, that his “unflinching adhesion to the set 
of ex-Court Chaplain Stoecker has . . . irritated the imperial temper more than any military.”240  
The conservative, evangelical Reichsbote criticized the “judoliberal press” for its “unbelievable 
spitefulness” in handling story and “their old hatred against the Christian Waldersee.”  This 
paper was especially incensed at the “Reform-Jewish” Volkszeitung for saying that the religious 
campaign taken up by then Prince Wilhelm began with such “splendor and noise” in Waldersee’s 
apartment and achieved “an extremely pathetic end.”241  The Pester Lloyd mentioned Mary von 
Waldersee’s familial connection to the Kaiser and called her a “very enthusiastic supporter of 
Stoecker.”242  One American newspaper reported that Mary, “the heroine of a whole chapter of 
tortuous Berlin Court intrigue,” was angry about the move to Altona because “the influence she 
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wielded was eminently distasteful to the Emperor, who brooks no rival near the throne.”243  On 
February 3, 1891, the conservative Kreuzzeitung printed the Kaiser’s order to Waldersee, which 
included more style than substance, put a positive spin on the transfer to Altona, and praised the 
general for his service, talent, zeal, and sense of duty.  The paper then added, “Count Waldersee 
cannot refuse to obey such a direct order from the most high war lord.”244 
 On February 5, Mrs. Lee began to write to her cousin:  
 I pray to the Lord to sustain me to tell you the great surprise that has roused Berlin, [the] 
 General Staff, and [the] best part of [the] Army itself and I may say other countries by 
 Resignation of Alfred.  The German papers are full of it – declaring the going of 
 Bismarck was as nothing in comparison with [the] present excitement – “losing Count 
 and Countess Waldersee seems more than people can bear; many are crying over it.” 
  
Mrs. Lee was unable to continue writing and came back to her letter the next day.245  Of course, 
some of her statements were exaggerated – “the sorrow in Berlin [for] him was universal” – but 
she did not anticipate this shocking development.246  Her deafness prevented her from hearing 
any possible words exchanged in the ominous days leading up to the resignation.  Alfred and 
Mary may have decided not to tell her until the change was official.  Regardless, her letters 
reveal her surprise by the abrupt life-changing news.  From her letter, it also appears that when 
either Alfred or Mary told her of the Emperor’s conversations with Waldersee, he or she 
emphasized the Kaiser’s expressions of kindness.  “Well, we must wait patiently to learn what 
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the Lord means by it,” she wrote the next day, taking back up her pen with her usual calmness.247  
Of course, during these dark times, the religious Waldersees found comfort in their faith.  “You 
must think of us and pray for us,” wrote Mrs. Lee to her cousin, “it is only by the Lord’s help we 
can bear up.”248  
 For the next month, the Waldersees received friendly visits and kind words of sympathy.  
Many people sent letters to Mary, from the Duchess of Baden, who lamented that on her visits to 
Berlin she would no longer see the Countess Waldersee, to an unknown poor woman in Altona, 
who rejoiced at Mary’s arrival.  Empress Augusta Victoria tried to console Mary and told her to 
stay in touch.  Mrs. Ellen Phelps, the wife of the American envoy to Berlin, spent some time 
visiting Mrs. Lee, saying she could not understand the Kaiser’s decision.249  The parting of the 
Chief of the German General Staff also upset Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary and King 
Albert of Saxony.  When Waldersee spoke to Moltke, his friend and predecessor, shortly after 
hearing about his removal, the old chief thought the move to Altona “quite incomprehensible, 
and [he] expressed great concern about the Kaiser.”250  In late February, Moltke stopped at 
Herwarthstrasse 2 to tell the Waldersees goodbye.  When he asked Mary what she thought of 
leaving, she answered that she could not understand the new situation.  “And nobody else can,” 
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he replied.251  Saddened by the news of his friend and counterpart, Frederick von Beck, the 
Austrian Chief of Staff, wrote to Waldersee that, although as a soldier he set a good example by 
taking the command in Altona, his departure from the General Staff was a loss for Austria and 
good Austro-German relations.252  
 Praise and sorrow did not just come from members of the aristocratic, political, and 
military elite.  Waldersee was pleased to learn that a Russian newspaper called him the greatest 
general in Europe.253  Since the Waldersees had arrived at Herwarthstrasse 2 in 1882, the same 
man stopped by weekly to tend to the clocks.  The Clock Man, as Mrs. Lee called him, was 
“respectable and respectful,” and she had encouraged him and his teenage son to join the Young 
Men’s Christian Association.  On February 7, “as soon as he came in, tears rushed to his eyes, 
and he was so overcome he couldn’t speak, pointed to outside, and I understood at once he knew 
that we must leave,” wrote Mrs. Lee, “A little thing dear Mary but it touched me.  [The] Clock 
Man is not the only one that cries.”254  The Young Men’s Christian Association held a going-
away celebration for Mary, who sat in an armchair surrounded by flowers.  In the large hall, 
there were a number of addresses, including one by Adolf Stoecker.  Even though Mary had 
prohibited the orators from praising her, they said, “that in fact there was no need – for all their 
surroundings spoke loudly of her goodness and of her true Christian spirit.”255 
 In the weeks after he was formally resigned to the command of the 9th Corps, Waldersee 
travelled back and forth between Altona and Berlin putting his affairs in order.  Before he 
departed, he spoke to the officers of General Staff, with whom he had spent the past nine years.  	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They wanted to throw him a going-away dinner, but he did not want them to incur the expensive 
cost, though he appreciated the gesture.  Waldersee told the officers that even though he did not 
want to leave them, he had been commanded to do so by the sovereign and “it was not fitting for 
a soldier to ask why!”256  “I must say what is true of Alfred,” wrote Mrs. Lee, “He has not a bit 
of envy but seemingly to me a most conscientious man and always ready to serve in [the] best 
way he could his King and Country.257  Interestingly, however, to the Kaiser’s claim that the 
transfer to Altona was for Waldersee’s “benefit,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “I confess Alfred don’t (sic) 
see exactly in that light!”  His mother-in-law thought emptying their apartment of all the things 
they had collected over the years was “no benefit” to her and her daughter.258 
 On the morning of March 5, 1891, Mary and her mother passed through the entrance of 
their apartment in the Military Staff Building for the last time.  “My dear Mary’s eye filled with 
tears,” Mrs. Lee wrote, “We were both too full to speak.”  When they arrived at the station, a 
crowd had gathered to say final farewells.  Mother and daughter stepped into the “palace 
carriage,” which the president of the Altona railway had provided for them, and on the center 
table sat a “gilded basket filled with beautiful orchids and other rare flowers from the 
Emperor!”259  As the train pulled out from the station, a chapter in the life of the Waldersees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Anne Lee to Mary Hoppin, February 5 and March 1, 1891, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee 
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came to an end.  In several ways, life in Altona would not be much different than in Hanover and 
Berlin: they continued to lead an active social life with members of the local and German elite; 
Mrs. Lee immediately resumed her correspondence with her cousin; and Mary began to establish 
new ways to help the poor and downtrodden.  Although the Kaiser had wanted him to keep an 
eye on Bismarck at his nearby estate of Friedrichsruh, Waldersee immediately reestablished a 
cordial friendship with his former political opponent and fellow exile.  The new military 
commander in Altona remained a force within the German military and elite, and through 1892, 
Waldersee continued to be floated in the press and in Berlin as a potential chancellor.260 
 But what about his view of the monarchy?  In the early 1880s, Waldersee became a 
friend and father-figure to Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, in the hopes that he, unlike his father, 
Frederick III, would continue to rule as a good monarch, like Wilhelm I.  After supporting 
Wilhelm II against Bismarck, Waldersee, before his dismissal, began to see the reality of the new, 
young Kaiser.  “Like someone waking from a dream,” writes John Röhl, “[he] was suddenly 
brought face to face with what he had failed to see before, and was able to recognize the 
disastrous mistake he had made.”261  After the trip to Russia in 1884, Waldersee wrote that 
Wilhelm “justifies our best hopes for the future,” but in September 25, 1890, after the Silesian 
maneuvers, he opined despairingly in his journal: “My thoughts always keep coming back to the 
Kaiser, and unfortunately, I can no longer bring myself to the joyful hopes I once had . . . [He is] 
not the right man to lead the Fatherland out of the many dangers that threaten it.”262 
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 In his biography of Wilhelm II, Röhl has provided a good analysis and summary of the 
different aspects of Waldersee’s view of the Kaiser in the 1890s, but he failed to point out an 
important one: he saw Wilhelm II’s flaws against the character of Wilhelm I, who showed what a 
good German monarch should be.263  In August 1890, before the Silesian maneuvers, he 
reflected on the Kaiser’s faults in his journal: 
 [Wilhelm II] fishes for ovations and – as of course follows from that – is very open to 
 flattery.  All this has developed so quickly that I am constantly surprised by what he does.  
 As Prince Wilhelm he seemed to have many of the excellent qualities of his grandfather, 
 he was modest and simple in his way of life, avoided attracting attention, did not like 
 being escorted by adjutants and was very considerate towards old people.  Now he loves 
 splendor to an alarming degree and is beginning to behave like Louis XIV.264  
 
Waldersee returned to this comparison in lifestyles in June 1893, writing, “[The Kaiser’s] love of 
splendor is compared with the simplicity with his grandfather.”265  In his removal from the 
General Staff, Waldersee believed the Kaiser was stepping beyond the boundaries set by his 
grandfather in monarchical relations to the military.  Once again turning to the Kaiser’s vanity, 
Waldersee noted that he was removed because “[Wilhelm] fears having to submit to my 
authority and not receiving any fame.  He wants to wage war not like his father or his 
grandfather, but like Frederick the Great!”266  The Kaiser’s behavior had a damaging effect on 
his a number of members of the court, government, and military.  “[He] has offended, deceived, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 For his seven points, see Röhl, Wilhelm II, 532-533.  Or for a shorter summary, page 518: “In 
increasingly harsh terms he condemned the Kaiser’s autocratic behavior, his vanity and courting 
popularity, his love of pomp, his extravagance, self-indulgence and superficiality, his constant 
interference in army business and in matters of civil administration, his inconsistency and 
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264 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 519.  Although Röhl cites Meisner’s Denkwürdigkeiten, these sentences are 
not in the entry for August 11, 1890 (Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 137-138), so it must be 
assumed Röhl quoted from the original journal, but did not note that. 
265 Waldersee, June 22, 1893, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 290-291.  Röhl, Wilhelm II, 527.  
266 Waldersee, February 7, 1891, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 186-188. 
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and let down so many loyal, able people that it is no wonder that many of them are disappointed 
and deeply hurt and leave him,” wrote Waldersee on June 8, 1896, “Unlike his grandfather he 
does not have the gift of winning hearts and binding them to him.”267   
 By the end of 1892, the former Chief of Staff also thought the Kaiser’s pandering to the 
working class was a dangerous move that Wilhelm I would not have made: 
 While his grandfather was alive the whole world looked up to us, sensing that Germany 
 was a pillar of firm, healthy strength, a rock on which the waves of revolution would 
 break, a house beneath whose roof shelter might be found in trouble times.  All this the 
 grandson has destroyed in an astonishingly short time.  He is continuing his work of 
 destruction.268 
 
In the summer of 1893, Waldersee believed the Kaiser was unjustly representing his grandfather, 
insinuating that in his last years, the aging Wilhelm I was not fully cognizant of what was going 
on around him.  “In fact,” retorted Waldersee in his journal, “the old gentleman was of 
incalculable value to us all, particularly as far as the Socialist question was concerned.”  He then 
added: 
 [Wilhelm I’s] venerable personality, known throughout the world for the 
 conscientiousness and devotion to duty he showed until his dying day, with all his past, 
 and the fact that he never gave any reason for malicious tongues to wag, was for us a 
 bulwark against the tide of revolution.  The present Kaiser, on the other hand, positively 
 cultivates Social Democrats.269 
 
In Waldersee’s eyes, the Kaiser was not living up to his grandfather and thus not being a good 
monarch. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Röhl, Wilhelm II, 529.  Waldersee, June 8, 1896, Denkwürdigkeiten II, 370-371. 
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 After the quick, tactless dismissals of some members of his grandfather’s administration, 
Wilhelm II had been certain not to burn his bridge with Waldersee.  Accepting his resignation 
would have looked bad in the public eye, and thus the Kaiser had played up the command of the 
9th Corps in Altona.  As shown above, in his dealings with Waldersee, he tried to show affection, 
even if it was superficial, but the Kaiser continued to maintain a cordial relationship with his 
former Chief of Staff.  In her letter from March 1, Mrs. Lee notes that the Kaiser had called 
Waldersee to come and dine with him, and a month later, he met Moltke and Waldersee in 
Lübeck.270  “Emperor is always attentive to Alfred and still maintains he is as fond of him as 
ever,” Mrs. Lee wrote.  Shortly after visiting with Moltke during a trip to Berlin at the end of 
April 1891, Waldersee was called to his predecessor’s apartment with the rest of the General 
Staff, who had been having dinner together.  “They were more than amazed and all came at once 
to the death chamber to look upon the one who had so long been their noble chief,” stated Mrs. 
Lee to her cousin, “I leave you to understand Alfred’s consternation and profound sorrow.”  The 
Kaiser discussed funeral arrangements with Waldersee, and although Moltke had wanted a quiet 
and simple burial, Wilhelm wanted a national mourning.271  Waldersee was distraught by the loss 
of his friend and the man who had helped launch his career; he lamented that the Kaiser had not 
genuinely sought out Moltke’s advice, but gave the impression that he did.272  That Christmas 
Wilhelm sent Waldersee a present and wished for him to come as he usually did to congratulate 
him on the New Year, “so you see thus far all goes pleasantly,” wrote Mrs. Lee.273  On January 
27, 1892, the Kaiser’s birthday, the Waldersees went to church then hosted a dinner in his 
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honor.274  That evening, at the Altona Citizen’s Association dinner for Wilhelm’s birthday, 
Waldersee presided and addressed the group, seeking to avoid “hollow glorification” of the 
Kaiser.  “Unfortunately, this day is hardly suited for me to be joyful,” Waldersee wrote in his 
journal.  Noting that it was the one-year anniversary of the Kaiser’s ordering him to Altona, he 
added, “Time has not healed the wound.”275  In the 1890s, Waldersee would once again have a 
friendly relationship with Wilhelm, but it would not be the same as it had been in the 1880s.  
Times had changed, and so had the monarch.  Alfred von Waldersee confronted and slowly 
accepted the realities of a new age and a changed monarchy. 
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Conclusion 
  
 Beginning in 1882, Count Alfred von Waldersee became a socialite and political partisan 
in the exclusive world of Berlin’s elite.  With the fallout from the City Mission meeting in late 
1887, he became an important figure at the imperial court and on the pages of domestic and 
foreign newspapers.  His dismissal from the General Staff in 1891 did not silence public and 
private speculation that he was using his influence from his new home in Altona, waiting for the 
moment to become Chancellor.  Throughout the 1890s, Waldersee was torn between his hope 
that Wilhelm II’s good qualities would prevail over the bad and his realization that the Kaiser’s 
attitude and ruling style were erratic and dangerous.  His continued personal relationship with the 
monarch, though not as strong as it used to be, encouraged his optimism; his observation of the 
political developments in Germany and Europe reinforced his pessimism.   
 In May 1898, the Waldersees moved to Hannover, where the 66 year-old Count began his 
new job as the Inspector General of the 3rd Army.  At their home – Hohenzollernstrasse 40 – Mrs. 
Anne Lee passed away at the age of 95 on March 30, 1899.  Mary Hoppin, with whom Mrs. Lee 
had maintained a correspondence since the 1860s, received a telegram from Mary the next 
morning: “Dearest mother went to heaven yesterday.”1  In August 1900, the Kaiser promoted 
Waldersee to the rank of Field Marshal and obtained international support to make him the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Eight-Nation Alliance that sought to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in 
China.  By the time Waldersee arrived in Asia, major fighting had already ended.  Military glory 
had always seemed to escape him, and the French-speaking, cosmopolitan socialite had to 
contend with the various, competing interests among the members of the international coalition.  	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Although Waldersee had first become a public figure in 1887-1888, his role as the Weltmarschall 
(World Marshal), which the liberal press sarcastically labeled him, brought him fame and 
recognition once again.2  He was not simply discussed in print media, but in this new phase of 
his public image, his name and face were printed on items such as postcards, cigar bands, and 

















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Annika Mombauer, “Wilhelm, Waldersee, and the Boxer Rebellion,” The Kaiser: New 
Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, eds. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 91-118. 
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the China Expedition.  In the 
author’s possession. 
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 After a brief stay in Japan, Field Marshal Alfred von Waldersee returned to Germany, 
arriving to a hero’s welcome in Hamburg.  From there, he headed by train to Homburg, where 
the Kaiser received him.  Cheering crowds had congregated at every station along the route, and 
in “democratic Frankfurt,” he wrote, 20,000 people turned out, many remaining outside his hotel 
late into the night.  On August 12, 1901, he finally returned to his home in Hannover with much 
fanfare.3  Once again, newspapers and members of the political elite speculated about his 
becoming Chancellor.  He explained his stance in his journal:   
 It is wonderful that certain people and circles still believe I have the aspiration to become 
 Chancellor and receive nightmares from this thought.  How often I have declared that I 
 would have to be a fool if I wanted to strive for this really unenviable position!  I have 
 already achieved some time ago everything a soldier can achieve, I hold a post that 
 involves little work and no agitation or anger, and I know the position of a  Chancellor 
 under Kaiser Wilhelm II only too well that I would have to be mad to desire it.4 
 
Reflecting on his seventieth birthday in April 1902, Waldersee gave thanks for his wonderful 
wife and friends, the “blessed” life behind him, and his “illustrious” military career.5   
 The details of his last days, which have never been described by an historian, reveal not 
only the Waldersees’ final moments together, but also the public and private reaction to the death 
of a celebrity and a Field Marshal of the German Empire.  In February 1904, Waldersee became 
ill following a trip to Berlin.  On the 24th, he and Mary rode out to visit the grave of one of his 
brothers.  Afterward, reflecting on the deaths of his two brothers who died within 13 months of 
each other, he wrote to several friends.  According to Mary, her husband believed “it now 
appeared evident [that] his generation should make way for the next and that he himself should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Alfred von Waldersee, Written at the end of December 1901, Denkwürdigkeiten des General-
Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, Volume III, ed. Heinrich Otto Meisner, 
(Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), 170. 
4 Waldersee, Written at the end of December 1901, Denkwürdigkeiten III, 171. 
5 Waldersee, April 10, 1902, Denkwürdigkeiten III, 184-185. 
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be prepared for the journey.”6  “On Sunday, February 28,” she wrote, “he came down to dinner 
for the last time, tasted hardly anything, and looked so ill I advised him to be go to bed, which he 
did.”  Two days earlier, Waldersee complained of head pains, but he also had intestinal trouble, 
which the doctors believed the climate and his activity in China were the cause.  His condition 
worsened, and Mary accepted that her husband would soon die.  “Oh! The agony of being 
obliged to abandon the hope of saving this precious life, which had hitherto buoyed me up,” she 
later wrote, “I had always believed that the Lord would restore to me my beloved husband and 
now He asked of me this supreme sacrifice and earthly hope was at an end!”  While Mary knelt 
and prayed at his bedside, the dying general, with a weak voice, accepted his fate and proclaimed 
his faith in the Lord.  “Jesus has cleared away your sins in his blood,” Mary said.  A little while 
later, holding his hand, she told him, “Auf Wiedersehen,” to which he replied, “Auf 
Wiedersehen.”  Shortly after eight o’clock on the night of March 5, 1904, in the presence of his 
wife and a small group of family, friends, and doctors, Alfred von Waldersee took his last breath.  
Mary knelt, and “then came a flood of tears.”7 
 The next day, Sunday, March 6, Waldersee’s body was laid out, and an honor guard 
stood by day and night with swords drawn.  Mary allowed the public to come pay their respects 
two days later, and thousands came.  During her mourning, she would receive at least a thousand 
letters, 500 telegrams, and about 800 floral arrangements from around the world.  Before the 
funeral at the local garrison church on March 9, Crown Prince Wilhelm arrived as his father’s 
representative and handed the widow letters from the Emperor and Empress.  The Kaiser did not 
feel well enough to attend, but wrote a glowing letter about his “teacher, friend, [and] advisor,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Mary von Waldersee to My Dear Cousins and Friends, May 5, 1904, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, Volume 8. 
7 Mary von Waldersee to My Dear Cousins and Friends, May 5, 1904, HH, Von Waldersee-Lee 
Collection, Volume 8.  Berliner Zeitung, March 6, 1904, GStA, Nachlass Waldersee, D. Nr. 3. 
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whose “devoted, unshakable loyalty for the royal house outshines everything [he did].”8  The 
Crown Prince escorted Mary to her seat in the crowded church, where generals, ministers, and 
nobles had gathered from throughout Germany and Europe.  After the funeral that afternoon, a 
procession escorted the body to the train station.  On the streets and in windows, crowds of 
people gathered to watch silently as bells tolled and a military band played funeral marches.  
From Hannover, the family and the casket travelled to Neverstorf in Holstein, the estate of 
Waldersee’s nephew, Count Franz Waldersee.  The mausoleum for Alfred and Mary was still 
under construction, so Alfred von Waldersee was laid to rest in a temporary vault at the estate’s 
cemetery, shaded by oak trees and overlooking the Baltic Sea.  Following a final prayer, some 
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Image 13: Postcard commemorating Waldersee’s 
death in 1904.  In the author’s possession.	  

















 One day in April 1903, Waldersee sat next to the Kaiser at a dinner for the Chief of the 
General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen.  The men remembered fondly the deceased former 
Chief of Staff and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke.  Waldersee was shocked when one of the 
generals present diminished his friend and predecessor’s role as a commander by saying that the 
old Field Marshal merely executed the orders of Wilhelm I.  Believing this comment was 
directed toward Wilhelm II, Waldersee noted later that his former sovereign never believed 
himself to be a great commander.  “He was much too smart for that,” he wrote, “[Wilhelm I] had 
Image 14: Photograph of Waldersee taken for his 
70th birthday in 1902.  Published in the Woche of 
Hannover, specific date unknown.  In the 
author’s possession. 
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the wisdom to let Moltke counsel him,” and the advice that was accepted became an order, which 
was then issued.9  To Waldersee, Wilhelm I was the ideal monarch who listened to the counsel of 
others; Moltke was the ideal general who gave it.  Count Alfred von Waldersee was a monarchist 
and soldier in this fashion.  During his life, but especially from 1882 to 1891, he did not aspire to 
gain political power for himself; he never wanted to become Chancellor.  Historians have 
typically called him an intriguer and a political general, but these terms ignore his special 
relationship with the monarch as a loyal friend and aide-de-camp; they capture neither the 
complexities of the man nor the time in which he lived.  Waldersee’s actions – from supporting 
Stoecker’s City Mission to advocating preventive war – were motivated by a desire to defend 
and promote the monarchy and its traditional absolutist authority against its perceived enemies.  
As a general and one of the king’s men, he did not operate outside the German Empire’s power 
structure, convoluted as it was. 
 The great irony of Alfred von Waldersee was that in fearing the potential liberal, 
constitutional monarchy of Frederick III, he placed all his hopes in the future Wilhelm II, who 
showed signs of promise, but would not live up to Waldersee’s ideal of how a monarch should 
rule, i.e. like Wilhelm I.  In the process, he sacrificed his once cordial relationship with Bismarck 
and became a hardline partisan for Wilhelm II.  As a result, he allowed himself to become swept 
up in court politics, made enemies who would promote a false image of him that persists today, 
and, worst of all, he was dismissed by the very monarch for whom he had risked everything in 
the 1880s.  Despite his continued friendship with Wilhelm II, which lasted until his death, 
Waldersee was first and foremost a member of Wilhelm I’s entourage and a man whose 
consciousness had been formed through the culture and experiences of an earlier era.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Waldersee, April 3, 1903, Denkwürdigkeiten III, 208. 
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 According to Waldersee’s nephew, who instigated the publication of his uncle’s writings, 
the last words the dying Field Marshal wrote in his journal were, “I pray to God, that I do not 
need to experience what I see coming.”10  Walter Goerlitz insinuates that these words reflect 
regret on the Count’s part: they “may betoken Waldersee’s realization that he had been travelling 
the wrong road” or he “died convinced that his country’s end was near because she had rejected 
his advice.”11  This pessimistic quotation was, however, the last of many throughout Waldersee’s 
life.  It can point not just to his long-standing concerns about Germany’s increasing isolation or 
the rise of anti-monarchical political parties, but also to his fears about the erratic and despotic 
rule of Wilhelm II.  The final pages of Waldersee’s journals remained with Mary.12  As shown in 
this thesis, analyzing the context of his life and looking at more than just a few select quotations 
from his journals – as historians typically have done – have been fundamental to reevaluating 
who he was.  Consequently, the meaning behind this quotation will remain a mystery without 
knowing the rest of his last words.  What is known, however, is that Count Alfred von Waldersee 
could not completely come to terms with the swift, sweeping changes that occurred in Germany 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten III, 232. 
11 Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 126. 
12 Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten III, 232. 
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